11 research outputs found

    The paradox of transparency, short-termism and the institutionalisation of Australian capital markets

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    As the ultimate corporate decision-makers, directors have an impact on the investment time horizons of the corporations they govern. How they make investment decisions has been profoundly influenced by the expansion of the investment chain and the increasing concentration of share ownership in institutional hands. By examining agency in light of legal theory, we highlight that the board is in fact sui generis and not an agent of shareholders. Consequently, transparency can lead to directors being 'captured' by institutional investor objectives and timeframes, potentially to the detriment of the corporation as a whole. The counter-intuitive conclusion is that transparency may, under certain conditions, undermine good corporate governance and lead to excessive short-termism

    The Impact of Audit Committee Existence and Audit Committee Meeting Frequency on the External Audit: Perceptions of Australian Auditors

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    This article examines the impact of audit committee existence, the frequency of audit committee meetings and the auditor's attendance at meetings on aspects of the external audit. Using an experimental design, we find that the audit committee, the frequency of committee meetings and the auditor's attendance at meetings are significantly associated with a reduction in perceived audit risk. The impact on audit efficiency and audit testing is perceived to be minimal. Manager and partner hours are greater when meetings are more frequent and the partner attends all meetings. The audit committee is expected to provide assistance in resolving conflicts with management and to lead to some improvement in overall audit quality. In neither case is this affected by meeting frequency or the auditor's attendance at meetings. Participants expect the existence of an audit committee to lead to an increase in audit fees, particularly when meetings are more frequent and the auditor is required to attend meetings. Reasons given for any fee increase relate to the additional preparation for and attendance at meetings

    Relation between external audit fees, audit committee characteristics and internal audit

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    This study examines whether the existence of an audit committee, audit committee characteristics and the use of internal audit are associated with higher external audit fees. Higher audit fees imply increased audit testing and higher audit quality. We find that the existence of an audit committee, more frequent committee meetings and increased use of internal audit are related to higher audit fees. The expertise of audit committee members is associated with higher audit fees when meeting frequency and independence are low. These findings are consistent with an increased demand for higher quality auditing by audit committees, and by firms that make greater use of internal audit. Copyright (c) The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2006 AFAANZ.

    Corporate Governance and Business Ethics: insights from the strategic planning experience

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    In this paper we develop an integrated approach towards corporate governance and business ethics. Our central argument is that organisations can learn from the development of strategic planning in the 1970s and 1980s. We identify three weaknesses - a bureaucratic and formalised approach, lack of implementation and lack of integration throughout the organisation - which were prevalent in strategic planning in the past and which are potentially just as problematic for an integrated corporate governance approach to business ethics. We suggest ways these weaknesses might be avoided and provide questions for boards of directors to consider when integrating ethical concerns into their organisations' corporate governance structures. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005.

    Audit committee composition and the use of an industry specialist audit firm

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    Independent, competent boards of directors and audit committees are said to be important mechanisms of corporate governance. The purpose of the present study is to empirically examine the association between audit committee composition and audit quality. Specifically, the link between the proportion of non-executive directors on an audit committee, financial qualifications of directors and the number of audit committee meetings held in a year are investigated and expected to have a positive association with the quality of the audit firm used. Audit quality is proxied by industry specialization. The results support the link between a higher proportion of non-executive directors on an audit committee and use of an industry specialist audit firm. Other measures of audit committee quality (those with a higher proportion of directors with financial qualifications and those that meet more frequently) are not significantly associated with the use of an industry specialist audit firm. Sensitivity analysis shows that the presence of an audit committee is linked to use of an industry specialist audit firm. Copyright 2005 Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand..

    The governance role of audit committees: Reviewing a decade of evidence.

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    Even though audit committees have traditionally been a key component of corporate governance regulation, the last decade has witnessed a greater emphasis on audit committee regulation and a parallel intensification of academic research on the subject. This review synthesizes recent empirical research seeking to investigate various aspects of audit committees’ governance role. The review is structured around current regulatory expectations of audit committees seeking to document the extent to which specific characteristics of good practice influence various components of audit committee effectiveness. It is found that larger and more independent audit committees as well as those with financial expertise are more likely to seek a higher level of external audit coverage and assurance. There is also evidence that more independent audit committees are associated with the purchase of lower levels of non-audit services from auditors, thereby seeking to preserve the independence of the external audit process. There seems a consensus that more independent audit committees and those with greater accounting/financial expertise have a positive impact on the quality of financial statements. Evidence on the stock market reaction to audit committee issues suggests that investors both welcome the presence of audit committees and react positively when members are appointed with relevant expertise. It is also found that internal auditors view certain audit committee characteristics, specifically independence, expertise and frequency of meetings, as leading to more effective audit committee performance. In summary, therefore, this review documents a significant amount of evidence offering support to current regulations concerning the desired characteristics of audit committees
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