Financial reporting of derivatives in banks: Disclosure conventions in Germany, Great Britain and the USA

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Why Hedge? - A Critical Review of Theory and Empirical Evidence -

Finance theory does not provide a comprehensive framework for explaining risk management within the imperfect financial environment in which firms operate. Corporate managers, however, rank risk management as one of their most important objectives. Therefore, it is not surprising that papers on the question why firms hedge are mushrooming. This paper critically reviews this literature and analyses the implications for risk management practice. It is distinguished between two competing approaches to corporate hedging: equity value maximising strategies and strategies determined by managerial risk aversion. The first category suggests that managers act in the best interest of shareholders. They hedge to reduce real costs like taxes, costs of financial distress and costs of external finance or to replace home-made hedging by shareholders. The second category considers that managers maximise their personal utility rather than the market value of equity. Their hedging strategy, therefore, is determined by their compensation plan and reputational concerns. There is ambiguous empirical evidence on the dominant hedging motive. It depends on the environment in which firms operate (e.g. tax schedule) and on firm characteristics (e.g. capital intensity). In general, one can observe that (i) hedging taxable income is of minor importance, (ii) firms with a high probability of financial distress hedge more, (iii) companies with greater growth opportunities hedge more, (iv) managers with common stockholdings hedge more than managers with option holdings and (v) high ability managers hedge more than low ability managers. The total benefits of hedging are not the sum across the various motives. Therefore, a manager has to concentrate on a primary motive to implement an effective risk management programme: If his primary motive is to minimise corporate taxes, he will hedge taxable income. If his primary concern is to reduce the costs of financial distress and if he can faithfully communicate the firm?s true probability of default, his hedging strategy will focus on the market value of debt and equity. If hedging is prompted to reduce the demand for costly external finance, he will hedge cash flows. If the manager is concerned with his reputation, he will focus on accounting earnings. Once he has focused on a certain exposure, the manager has to decide whether he wants to minimise the volatility of this exposure or simply avoid large losses. -- Der Artikel gibt einen Literaturüberblick zur Fragestellung, warum Unternehmen Risikomanagement betreiben und analysiert die Umsetzung in der Unternehmenspraxis. Ausgehend von den Irrelevanzthesen von Modigliani/Miller wird gezeigt, daß die starke Betonung des Risikomanagements in Unternehmen auf zweierlei Arten erklärbar ist: Zum einen erhöht Hedging den Shareholder Value, da es Steuern, Bankrottkosten, die Kosten von externem Kapital und den Absicherungsbedarf von schlecht diversifizierten Aktionären verringern kann. Zum anderen kann Hedging den Nutzen von Managern erhöhen, soweit es einen Einfluß auf deren Vermögen oder Ruf hat. Was die Umsetzung der Hedging-Ziele in die Unternehmenspraxis anbetrifft, haben die Modelle unterschiedliche Konsequenzen bezüglich der Art und des Ausmaßes des abzusichernden Risikos.Risk Management,Hedging,Agency Theory,Shareholder Value

Why Hedge? - A Critical Review of Theory and Empirical Evidence -

Finance theory does not provide a comprehensive framework for explaining risk management within the imperfect financial environment in which firms operate. Corporate managers, however, rank risk management as one of their most important objectives. Therefore, it is not surprising that papers on the question why firms hedge are mushrooming. This paper critically reviews this literature and analyses the implications for risk management practice. It is distinguished between two competing approaches to corporate hedging: equity value maximising strategies and strategies determined by managerial risk aversion. The first category suggests that managers act in the best interest of shareholders. They hedge to reduce real costs like taxes, costs of financial distress and costs of external finance or to replace home-made hedging by shareholders. The second category considers that managers maximise their personal utility rather than the market value of equity. Their hedging strategy, therefore, is determined by their compensation plan and reputational concerns

Financial reporting of derivatives in Banks: disclosure conventions in Germany, Great Britain and the USA

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel C 199253 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Ritualsprache/Ritual Language.

Paul I. Ritualsprache/Ritual Language. In: Ammon U, Dittmar N, Mattheier K, Trugdil P, eds. Soziolinguistik. Ein internationales Handbuch zur Wissenschaft von Sprache und Gesellschaft. 2nd ed. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter; 2005: 323-328

Hedge, redução de volatilidade dos lucros e o efeito sobre o imposto de renda das companhias abertas brasileiras

Neste artigo, procurou-se identificar se as companhias abertas brasileiras teriam conseguido benefícios fiscais ao fazer hedge, fato esse derivado de uma expectativa de queda da sua carga tributária (Imposto de Renda a pagar). Com esse objetivo, inicialmente pesquisou-se em que situações have-ria possibilidade de geração desse benefício. Após essa revisão, foram estudadas situações em que a companhia tivesse grande volatilidade de seus resultados e os efeitos que o hedge traria no valor do I.R. a ser pago. Assim, pôde-se mensurar o efeito do resultado do hedge na carga tributária dessas companhias nesse período, simulando uma situação teórica para melhor evidenciarem-se os efeitos resultantes dessa prática. Posteriormente, utilizouse uma regressão linear múltipla para relacionar o valor do imposto de renda pago por companhias abertas brasileiras no ano de 2003 com os valores de hedge em 2002 e 2003 e os prejuízos acumulados em 2002. Os resultados são fundamentados em vasta bibliografia referente ao assunto.<br>In this article we try to identify if Brazilian public companies hedge in response to tax incentives. With this goal, we first identify in which conditions the hedge causes reductions in tax obligations. Next, we study theoretical situations in which the companies' financial results change from great losses to great profits and we observe the impact in the companies' tax liabilities. Finally, we observe the results of a regression that tries to explain the tax obligations in 2003 in function of the hedge values in 2002, 2003 and the net operational losses in 2002. We conclude that it is possible to hedge in response to tax benefits in some special situations. Our results and conclusions are supported by other studies