Part I - Merrill Area Public Schools, Part II - Schools of Great Britain

No abstract provided by author

Rank Among Equals

Dignity is on the march. Once regarded as a subject exclusively within the province of antiquated moral philosophy, dignity—that “shibboleth of all perplexed and empty-headed moralists”—has recently developed into a cornerstone of contemporary legal discourse. Internationally, the concept of human dignity has been central to the emergence and acceptance of universal human rights. Dignity, in some form, is guaranteed by such seminal documents as the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the German Basic Law, and the South African Constitution. Domestically, appeals to dignity undergird popular legal arguments for social and political rights at both the state and federal levels.8 Human dignity has been cited with surprising frequency in the recent opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court—including nine times (and “indignity” once more) in Justice Kennedy’s recent majority opinion in United States v. Windsor, which struck down a central provision of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”). Scholarly engagement with dignity’s legal dimensions has never been more prevalent or more important. Against this backdrop of emergent (and still emerging) interest in the jurisprudence of dignity, Jeremy Waldron offers Dignity, Rank, and Rights, a profound and provocative take on the relationship between dignity and the law. Looking to the concept’s use in legal contexts, Waldron contends that human dignity operates as an elevated legal status that entails individual human rights. He casts what he sees as the law’s normative commitment to universalize human dignity as the gradual democratization of aristocratic privilege, a process Waldron describes as “a sort of leveling up” of humanity (p. 64). Although Waldron presents these two accounts of dignity as part of a single, self-reinforcing argument, astute readers will note their independence. The first account identifies what contemporary legal dignity consists of and how it operates. The second offers up something like an origin story for that contemporary conception, one that attempts to reconcile dignity’s history as a strongly hierarchical notion with the egalitarian undercurrents of the modern-day human-rights movement. By interweaving these accounts, Waldron believes he can offer a conception of legal dignity that salvages its universality while avoiding the pitfalls of grounding such a critical tool in the murky realm of moral thought. Dignity, Rank, and Rights is a refreshing work of legal philosophy. Edited and introduced by Meir Dan-Cohen, the book comprises two lectures by Professor Waldron; commentaries on those lectures by Michael Rosen, Don Herzog, and Wai Chee Dimock; and a reply by Waldron to his commentators. Aided by the commentaries, Dignity, Rank, and Rights unfolds more like a rich conversation than an arid academic defense. Yet Waldron’s book is perhaps most useful to those already well versed in the debates over the meaning of human dignity and its relationship to the law. Articulating his account of human dignity as an elevated legal status, Waldron draws upon a diverse array of thinkers and texts—from John Locke and John Austin to Hannah Arendt and Lewis Carroll (pp. 20, 58 n.34, 23 & 39 n.31, 29). He also dispenses with competing visions of human dignity quickly, and with no shortage of nuance (pp. 22–30). The resultant book is both pointed and poignant, if not the ideal primer for the novice starting to engage with dignity’s jurisprudential dimensions. This Review disentangles Waldron’s twin accounts in the hope of laying bare the implications of his work. Part I sets out the methodological and substantive dimensions of Waldron’s project to cast contemporary dignity in terms of legal status. It contrasts Waldron’s status claim with more traditional visions of dignity as a legal value, examining both the relationship of dignity to human rights and the normative strength of dignity’s universal distribution. Although Waldron sees his depiction of human dignity as breaking with important traditions, his work is largely synthetic—it offers a singular conception of dignity that encapsulates many features of established accounts by reimagining them as the privileges and immunities attending status. This Part also briefly examines the Windsor decision as a touchstone for domestic understandings of dignity’s operation in legal contexts. Part II explores and critiques Waldron’s account of human dignity as a gradual extension of aristocratic rank. Borrowing from feminist theory and queer theory, as well as from the equality projects to which they are allied, this Part notes some troubles with extending preexisting rights in the guise of equality. Specifically, it examines the ways in which the narratives Waldron deploys may entrench social norms that perpetuate inequality and injustice while limiting the potential for marginalized groups to employ dignity as a deeply remedial legal tool. This Part concludes by suggesting that Waldron may be able to strengthen the normative grip of dignity as a rights-entailing status by incorporating those notions of human worth that have been central to dignity-based antidiscrimination and antisubordination projects

CO/H2 Abundance Ratio ~ 10^{-4} in a Protoplanetary Disk

The relative abundances of atomic and molecular species in planet-forming disks around young stars provide important constraints on photochemical disk models and provide a baseline for calculating disk masses from measurements of trace species. A knowledge of absolute abundances, those relative to molecular hydrogen (H2), are challenging because of the weak rovibrational transition ladder of H$_{2}$ and the inability to spatially resolve different emission components within the circumstellar environment. To address both of these issues, we present new contemporaneous measurements of CO and H2 absorption through the "warm molecular layer" of the protoplanetary disk around the Classical T Tauri Star RW Aurigae A. We use a newly commissioned observing mode of the Hubble Space Telescope-Cosmic Origins Spectrograph to detect warm H2 absorption in this region for the first time. An analysis of the emission and absorption spectrum of RW Aur shows components from the accretion region near the stellar photosphere, the molecular disk, and several outflow components. The warm H2 and CO absorption lines are consistent with a disk origin. We model the 1092-1117A spectrum of RW Aur to derive log10 N(H2)~=~19.90$^{+0.33}_{-0.22}$ at T$_{rot}$(H2) ~=~440~+/-~39 K. The CO $A$~--~$X$ bands observed from 1410-1520A are best fit by log10 N(CO)~=~16.1~$^{+0.3}_{-0.5}$ at T$_{rot}$(CO) ~=~200$^{+650}_{-125}$ K. Combining direct measurements of the HI, H2, and CO column densities, we find a molecular fraction in the warm disk surface of $f_{H2}$~>=~0.47 and derive a molecular abundance ratio of CO/H2~=~1.6$^{+4.7}_{-1.3}$~x~10$^{-4}$, both consistent with canonical interstellar dense cloud values.Comment: ApJ - accepted. 13 pages, 8 figure

Advanced Navigation for Planetary Vehicles Applying an Approximate Mapping Technique

This thesis provides a method for compressing the information provided by JPL Mars rover obstacle sensors by creating an approximate map of the terrain around the vehicle. This thesis demonstrates that this method provides adequate information for a human operator to negotiate complex obstacles fields. By dividing the area around the vehicle into regions and classifying each region as to how dangerous (impassable), the sensor data can be accumulated with minimal overhead. The terrain in each region has a number between zero and one, with zero meaning completely passable and one meaning completely impassable. A continuum of possible values between the extremes classify in the sense of fuzzy set theory. This process allows obstacles to be represented in the map as an abstraction of the data instead of being arduously tracked individually, requiring much memory and complex processing. The map concept is also valuable in the respect that via translation of the vehicle information is passed to regions without direct sensor inputs. This allows the system to track obstacles to the side and to some extent behind the vehicle. The system, therefore, could potentially deal with complex situations where this information would be valuable such as a situation where it needs to recognize and back out of a trap. This thesis includes the development of the approximate mapping algorithm, explanation of the integration with a test bed vehicle, demonstration of the algorithm using the test bed vehicle, and ix ground work for the development of an automatic decision making scheme, which will constitute the continuing research effort

Homeless Residency Restrictions

Last year, the West Virginia House of Delegates introduced a radical proposal for responding to homelessness within the state: privately enforceable residency restrictions. As introduced, the restrictions prohibited homeless individuals from sheltering themselves, from being sheltered by others, or from receiving food or care within 1,500 feet of a school or childcare center. This prohibition was to operate statewide, transforming an issue that historically has been considered hyper-local into a subject of state concern. Moreover, the proposed bill established a private right of action for enforcement, legislating around the possibility of recalcitrant municipal governments declining to abide by the residency restrictions. The structure of the West Virginia bill is unique in the context of responding to homelessness, a burgeoning national crisis. In this respect, the bill illustrates how future debates about homelessness policy may be shifting away from the traditional thinking that homelessness is a local issue best addressed by local governmental actors. However, the defining features of the West Virginia bill are not themselves novel. Instead, the bill may best be seen as an extension of three emergent trends in state governance to a novel subject matter. This Essay thus explores three frontiers of homelessness law and policy that are implicated by the West Virginia bill. First, it draws upon lessons learned from sex offender residency restrictions to demonstrate the bill’s potential for unintended, and undesirable, consequences in communities with sizable homeless populations. Second, it situates the use of state power to regulate a traditionally local concern amidst a recent trend in aggressive state–local preemption to question the wisdom and propriety of statewide responses to homelessness. Third, it compares the deployment of private enforcement mechanisms to similar legislation in other contexts—including Texas’s fetal heartbeat bill—to highlight the pernicious and antidemocratic possibilities of marshaling private disdain for homeless residents. Throughout, the Essay explores how these features of the West Virginia bill expose the shifting thinking about the phenomenon of homelessness more broadly

Rank Among Equals

Dignity is on the march. Once regarded as a subject exclusively within the province of antiquated moral philosophy, dignity—that “shibboleth of all perplexed and empty-headed moralists”—has recently developed into a cornerstone of contemporary legal discourse. Internationally, the concept of human dignity has been central to the emergence and acceptance of universal human rights. Dignity, in some form, is guaranteed by such seminal documents as the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the German Basic Law, and the South African Constitution. Domestically, appeals to dignity undergird popular legal arguments for social and political rights at both the state and federal levels.8 Human dignity has been cited with surprising frequency in the recent opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court—including nine times (and “indignity” once more) in Justice Kennedy’s recent majority opinion in United States v. Windsor, which struck down a central provision of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”). Scholarly engagement with dignity’s legal dimensions has never been more prevalent or more important. Against this backdrop of emergent (and still emerging) interest in the jurisprudence of dignity, Jeremy Waldron offers Dignity, Rank, and Rights, a profound and provocative take on the relationship between dignity and the law. Looking to the concept’s use in legal contexts, Waldron contends that human dignity operates as an elevated legal status that entails individual human rights. He casts what he sees as the law’s normative commitment to universalize human dignity as the gradual democratization of aristocratic privilege, a process Waldron describes as “a sort of leveling up” of humanity (p. 64). Although Waldron presents these two accounts of dignity as part of a single, self-reinforcing argument, astute readers will note their independence. The first account identifies what contemporary legal dignity consists of and how it operates. The second offers up something like an origin story for that contemporary conception, one that attempts to reconcile dignity’s history as a strongly hierarchical notion with the egalitarian undercurrents of the modern-day human-rights movement. By interweaving these accounts, Waldron believes he can offer a conception of legal dignity that salvages its universality while avoiding the pitfalls of grounding such a critical tool in the murky realm of moral thought. Dignity, Rank, and Rights is a refreshing work of legal philosophy. Edited and introduced by Meir Dan-Cohen, the book comprises two lectures by Professor Waldron; commentaries on those lectures by Michael Rosen, Don Herzog, and Wai Chee Dimock; and a reply by Waldron to his commentators. Aided by the commentaries, Dignity, Rank, and Rights unfolds more like a rich conversation than an arid academic defense. Yet Waldron’s book is perhaps most useful to those already well versed in the debates over the meaning of human dignity and its relationship to the law. Articulating his account of human dignity as an elevated legal status, Waldron draws upon a diverse array of thinkers and texts—from John Locke and John Austin to Hannah Arendt and Lewis Carroll (pp. 20, 58 n.34, 23 & 39 n.31, 29). He also dispenses with competing visions of human dignity quickly, and with no shortage of nuance (pp. 22–30). The resultant book is both pointed and poignant, if not the ideal primer for the novice starting to engage with dignity’s jurisprudential dimensions. This Review disentangles Waldron’s twin accounts in the hope of laying bare the implications of his work. Part I sets out the methodological and substantive dimensions of Waldron’s project to cast contemporary dignity in terms of legal status. It contrasts Waldron’s status claim with more traditional visions of dignity as a legal value, examining both the relationship of dignity to human rights and the normative strength of dignity’s universal distribution. Although Waldron sees his depiction of human dignity as breaking with important traditions, his work is largely synthetic—it offers a singular conception of dignity that encapsulates many features of established accounts by reimagining them as the privileges and immunities attending status. This Part also briefly examines the Windsor decision as a touchstone for domestic understandings of dignity’s operation in legal contexts. Part II explores and critiques Waldron’s account of human dignity as a gradual extension of aristocratic rank. Borrowing from feminist theory and queer theory, as well as from the equality projects to which they are allied, this Part notes some troubles with extending preexisting rights in the guise of equality. Specifically, it examines the ways in which the narratives Waldron deploys may entrench social norms that perpetuate inequality and injustice while limiting the potential for marginalized groups to employ dignity as a deeply remedial legal tool. This Part concludes by suggesting that Waldron may be able to strengthen the normative grip of dignity as a rights-entailing status by incorporating those notions of human worth that have been central to dignity-based antidiscrimination and antisubordination projects

Collusive Prosecution

In this Article, we argue that increasingly harsh collateral consequences have surfaced an underappreciated and undertheorized dynamic of criminal plea bargaining. Collateral consequences that mostly or entirely benefit third parties (such as other communities or other states) create an interest asymmetry that prosecutors and defendants can exploit in plea negotiations. In particular, if a prosecutor and a defendant can control the offense of conviction (often through what some term a “fictional plea”), they can work together to evade otherwise applicable collateral consequences, such as deportation or sex-offender registration and notification. Both parties arguably benefit: Prosecutors can leverage collateral consequences to extract greater punishments and defendants can avoid consequences they view as particularly burdensome. But these benefits can come at a cost to others who are not at the bargaining table. We contend that “collusive prosecution” of this sort can be pernicious, as may be the case when sex-offender registration and notification laws are in play, but it also has potential to be socially attractive. Accordingly, we sketch a normative framework for evaluating collusive prosecution as a matter of prosecutorial ethics. We draw on the emerging field of public fiduciary theory to characterize prosecutors’ ethical duties to varied—and often conflicting—beneficiaries. We suggest that programmatic uses of collusive prosecution may be fair and reasonable in a common immigration context, but collusive prosecution designed to relocate sex-offense registrants likely fail these conditions. Ultimately, we offer a suite of reforms that may be useful for policing collusive prosecution without banning the practice outright