Epoxy/ graphene nanocomposites – processing and properties: a review

Graphene has recently attracted significant academic and industrial interest because of its excellent performance in mechanical, electrical and thermal applications. Graphene can significantly improve physical properties of epoxy at extremely small loading when incorporated appropriately. Herein, the structure, preparation and properties of epoxy/graphene nanocomposites are reviewed in general, along with detailed examples drawn from the key scientific literature. The modification of graphene and the utilization of these materials in the fabrication of nanocomposites with different processing methods have been explored. This review has been focused on the processing methods and mechanical, electrical, thermal, and fire retardant properties of the nanocomposites. The synergic effects of graphene and other fillers in epoxy matrix have been summarised as well

A Semantic Hierarchy for Erasure Policies

We consider the problem of logical data erasure, contrasting with physical erasure in the same way that end-to-end information flow control contrasts with access control. We present a semantic hierarchy for erasure policies, using a possibilistic knowledge-based semantics to define policy satisfaction such that there is an intuitively clear upper bound on what information an erasure policy permits to be retained. Our hierarchy allows a rich class of erasure policies to be expressed, taking account of the power of the attacker, how much information may be retained, and under what conditions it may be retained. While our main aim is to specify erasure policies, the semantic framework allows quite general information-flow policies to be formulated for a variety of semantic notions of secrecy.Comment: 18 pages, ICISS 201

Исследование свойств композиционного материала на основе гидроксиапатита и природного полимера

Before starting the security analysis of an existing system, the most likely outcome is often already clear, namely that the system is not entirely secure. Modifying a program such that it passes the analysis is a difficult problem and usually left entirely to the programmer. In this article, we show that and how unification can be used to compute such program transformations. This opens a new perspective on the problem of correcting insecure programs. We demonstrate that integrating our approach into an existing transforming type system can also improve the precision of the analysis and the quality of the resulting program

Tracking Data-Flow with Open Closure Types

Type systems hide data that is captured by function closures in function types. In most cases this is a beneficial design that favors simplicity and compositionality. However, some applications require explicit information about the data that is captured in closures. This paper introduces open closure types, that is, function types that are decorated with type contexts. They are used to track data-flow from the environment into the function closure. A simply-typed lambda calculus is used to study the properties of the type theory of open closure types. A distinctive feature of this type theory is that an open closure type of a function can vary in different type contexts. To present an application of the type theory, it is shown that a type derivation establishes a simple non-interference property in the sense of information-flow theory. A publicly available prototype implementation of the system can be used to experiment with type derivations for example programs.Comment: Logic for Programming Artificial Intelligence and Reasoning (2013

Termination-insensitive noninterference leaks more than just a bit

Current tools for analysing information flow in programs build upon ideas going back to Denning's work from the 70's. These systems enforce an imperfect notion of information flow which has become known as termination-insensitive noninterference. Under this version of noninterference, information leaks are permitted if they are transmitted purely by the program's termination behaviour (i.e., whether it terminates or not). This imperfection is the price to pay for having a security condition which is relatively liberal (e.g. allowing while-loops whose termination may depend on the value of a secret) and easy to check. But what is the price exactly? We argue that, in the presence of output, the price is higher than the “one bit” often claimed informally in the literature, and effectively such programs can leak all of their secrets. In this paper we develop a definition of termination-insensitive noninterference suitable for reasoning about programs with outputs. We show that the definition generalises “batch-job” style definitions from the literature and that it is indeed satisfied by a Denning-style program analysis with output. Although more than a bit of information can be leaked by programs satisfying this condition, we show that the best an attacker can do is a brute-force attack, which means that the attacker cannot reliably (in a technical sense) learn the secret in polynomial time in the size of the secret. If we further assume that secrets are uniformly distributed, we show that the advantage the attacker gains when guessing the secret after observing a polynomial amount of output is negligible in the size of the secret

Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment- Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73

Securing communication in large scale distributed systems is an open problem. When multiple principals exchange sensitive information over a network, security and privacy issues arise immediately. For instance, in an online auction system we may want to ensure that no bidder knows the bids of any other bidder before the auction is closed. Such systems are typically interactive/reactive and communication is mostly asynchronous, lossy or unordered. Language-based security provides language mechanisms for enforcing end-to-end security. However, with few exceptions, previous research has mainly focused on relational or synchronous models, which are generally not suitable for distributed systems. This paper proposes a general knowledge-based account of possibilistic security from a language perspective and shows how existing trace-based conditions fit in. A syntactic characterization of these conditions, given by an epistemic temporal logic, shows that existing model checking tools can be used to enforce security.QC 20131219</p

Stochastic flow simulation and particle transport in a 2D layer of random porous medium

A stochastic numerical method is developed for simulation of flows and particle transport in a 2D layer of porous medium. The hydraulic conductivity is assumed to be a random field of a given statistical structure, the flow is modeled in the layer with prescribed boundary conditions. Numerical experiments are carried out by solving the Darcy equation for each sample of the hydraulic conductivity by a direct solver for sparse matrices, and tracking Lagrangian trajectories in the simulated flow. We present and analyze different Eulerian and Lagrangian statistical characteristics of the flow such as transverse and longitudinal velocity correlation functions, longitudinal dispersion coefficient, and the mean displacement of Lagrangian trajectories. We discuss the effect of long-range correlations of the longitudinal velocities which we have found in our numerical simulations. The related anomalous diffusion is also analyzed.researc

The PER model of abstract non-interference

Abstract. In this paper, we study the relationship between two models of secure information flow: the PER model (which uses equivalence relations) and the abstract non-interference model (which uses upper closure operators). We embed the lattice of equivalence relations into the lattice of closures, re-interpreting abstract non-interference over the lattice of equivalence relations. For narrow abstract non-interference, we show non-interference it is strictly less general. The relational presentation of abstract non-interference leads to a simplified construction of the most concrete harmless attacker. Moreover, the PER model of abstract noninterference allows us to derive unconstrained attacker models, which do not necessarily either observe all public information or ignore all private information. Finally, we show how abstract domain completeness can be used for enforcing the PER model of abstract non-interference

A conference management system with verified document confidentiality

We present a case study in verified security for realistic systems: the implementation of a conference management system, whose functional kernel is faithfully represented in the Isabelle theorem prover, where we specify and verify confidentiality properties. The various theoretical and practical challenges posed by this development led to a novel security model and verification method generally applicable to systems describable as input–output automata