A multifidelity multiobjective optimization framework for high-lift airfoils

High-lift devices design is a challenging task as it involves highly complex flow features while being critical for the overall performance of the aircraft. When part of an optimization loop, the computational cost of the Computational Fluid Dynamics becomes increasingly problematic. Methods to reduce the optimization time has been of major interest over the last 50 years. This paper presents a multiobjective multifidelity optimization framework that takes advantage of two approximation levels of the flow equations: a rapid method that provides quick estimates but of relatively low accuracy and a reference method that provides accurate estimations at the cost of a longer run-time. The method uses a sub-optimization, under a trust-region scheme, performed on the low-fidelity model corrected by a surrogate model that is fed by the high-fidelity tool. The size of the trust region is changed according to the accuracy of the corrected model. The multiobjective optimizer is used to set the positions of the ap and slat of a two-dimensional geometry with lift and drag as objectives with an empirical-based method and a Reynolds Averaged Navier-Stokes equations solver. The multifidelity method shows potential for discovering the complete Pareto front, yet it remains less optimal than the Pareto front from the high-fidelity-only optimization

Budget feasible mechanisms on matroids

Motivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study budget feasible mechanisms where the goal is to procure independent sets from matroids. More specifically, we are given a matroid =(,) where each ground (indivisible) element is a selfish agent. The cost of each element (i.e., for selling the item or performing a service) is only known to the element itself. There is a buyer with a budget having additive valuations over the set of elements E. The goal is to design an incentive compatible (truthful) budget feasible mechanism which procures an independent set of the matroid under the given budget that yields the largest value possible to the buyer. Our result is a deterministic, polynomial-time, individually rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism with 4-approximation to the optimal independent set. Then, we extend our mechanism to the setting of matroid intersections in which the goal is to procure common independent sets from multiple matroids. We show that, given a polynomial time deterministic blackbox that returns -approximation solutions to the matroid intersection problem, there exists a deterministic, polynomial time, individually rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism with (3+1) -approximation to the optimal common independent set

Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer–seller networks

We examine the relationship between the matching structure of a bipartite (buyer-seller) network and the (expected) shares of the unit surplus that each connected pair in this network can create. We show that in different bargaining environments, these shares are closely related to the Gallai-Edmonds Structure Theorem. This theorem characterizes the structure of maximum matchings in an undirected graph. We show that the relationship between the (expected) shares and the tructure Theorem is not an artefact of a particular bargaining mechanism or trade centralization. However, this relationship does not necessarily generalize to non-bipartite networks or to networks with heterogeneous link values

Anterolateral ligament reconstruction: a possible option in the therapeutic arsenal for persistent rotatory instability after ACL reconstruction

The results of anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction (ACLR) are widely recognized to be satisfactory on the basis of outcome measures such as the International Knee Documentation Committee (IKDC) and Lysholm scores. However, there is moderate variation among several series of different techniques. For example, Hussein et al showed a range of residual pivot, from 7% to 33%, depending on the technique used. Furthermore, up to 30% of patients in contemporary series can still experience persistent instability, and only 65% to 83% can return to the preinjury level of sport

Group Strategyproof Pareto-Stable Marriage with Indifferences via the Generalized Assignment Game

We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that is group strategyproof for one side of the market. Our key technique involves modeling the stable marriage market as a generalized assignment game. We also show that our mechanism can be implemented efficiently. These results can be extended to the college admissions problem with indifferences

Orthonormal sequences in L2(Rd)L^2(R^d) and time frequency localization

We study uncertainty principles for orthonormal bases and sequences in $L^2(\R^d)$. As in the classical Heisenberg inequality we focus on the product of the dispersions of a function and its Fourier transform. In particular we prove that there is no orthonormal basis for $L^2(\R)$ for which the time and frequency means as well as the product of dispersions are uniformly bounded. The problem is related to recent results of J. Benedetto, A. Powell, and Ph. Jaming. Our main tool is a time frequency localization inequality for orthonormal sequences in $L^2(\R^d)$. It has various other applications.Comment: 18 page