Genetic Dissection of Epidermal Growth Factor Receptor Signaling during Luteinizing Hormone-Induced Oocyte Maturation

Recent evidence that luteinizing hormone (LH) stimulation of ovulatory follicles causes transactivation of the epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR) has provided insights into the mechanisms of ovulation. However, the complete array of signals that promote oocyte reentry into the meiotic cell cycle in the follicle are still incompletely understood. To elucidate the signaling downstream of EGFR involved in oocyte maturation, we have investigated the LH responses in granulosa cells with targeted ablation of EGFR. Oocyte maturation and ovulation is disrupted when EGFR expression is progressively reduced. In granulosa cells from mice with either global or granulosa cell-specific disruption of EGFR signaling, LH-induced phosphorylation of MAPK3/1, p38MAPK, and connexin-43 is impaired. Although the LH-induced decrease in cGMP is EGFR-dependent in wild type follicles, LH still induces a decrease in cGMP in Egfrdelta/f Cyp19-Cre follicles. Thus compensatory mechanisms appear activated in the mutant. Spatial propagation of the LH signal in the follicle also is dependent on the EGF network, and likely is important for the control of signaling to the oocyte. Thus, multiple signals and redundant pathways contribute to regulating oocyte reentry into the cell cycle

Managerial delegation in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly

I propose a differential oligopoly game of resource extraction under (quasi-static) open-loop and nonlinear feedback strategies, where firms are managerial and two alternative types of delegation contract are considered. Under open-loop information, delegation expands the residual steady state resource stock. Conversely, under nonlinear feedback information the outcome depends on the structure of managerial incentives. If sales are used, once again delegation favours resource preservation. On the contrary, if market shares are included in the delegation contract, this combines with an underlying voracity effect in shrinking the steady state volume of the resource

Spatial resource wars: A two region example

We develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two-location setup. In order to contrast the overexploitation of the resource (the tragedy of commons) that occurs when the player are free to choose where to fish/hunt/extract/harvest, the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies. We compare the three situations in which the regulator: (a) leaves the player free to choose where to harvest; (b) establishes a natural reserve where nobody is allowed to harvest; (c) assigns to each player a specific exclusive location to hunt. We show that when preference parameters dictate a low harvesting intensity, the policies cannot mitigate the overexploitation and in addition they worsen the utilities of the players. Conversely, in a context of harsher harvesting intensity, the intervention can help to safeguard the resource, preventing the extinction and also improving the welfare of both players

Instability of Democracy as Resource Curse

We suggest a dynamic game theoretic model to explain why resource abundance may lead to instability of democracy. Stationary Markov perfect equilibria of this game with four players – Politician, Oligarch, Autocrat and Public (voters) – are analyzed. Choosing a rate of resource rent tax, potential Autocrat competes with conventional Politician for the office, and Oligarch, the owner of the resource wealth, bribes Politician to influence her decisions. Actual Autocrat's tax policy may be different from the announced one. If the difference is large, then Public may revolt or Oligarch may organize a coup to throw Autocrat down. It is shown that the probability of democracy preservation is decreasing in the amount of resources if the institutional quality is low enough. It does not depend on the amount of resources, if the institutional quality is higher than a threshold. The level of the threshold, however, depends positively on the resource wealth. We have found also that under very low institutional quality, a paradoxical effect takes place: the probability of democracy preservation may decrease with small improvements of institutional quality. It is shown as well that Oligarch earns larger part of rent under democracy than under autocracy. This result conforms to empirical observation which is demonstrated in the paper: under low quality of institutions, democratization leads to higher inequality and inequality entails worsening of the attitude to democracy