We develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically
exploit a mobile resource in a two-location setup. In order to contrast the overexploitation of
the resource (the tragedy of commons) that occurs when the player are free to choose where to
fish/hunt/extract/harvest, the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies.
We compare the three situations in which the regulator: (a) leaves the player free to choose
where to harvest; (b) establishes a natural reserve where nobody is allowed to harvest; (c)
assigns to each player a specific exclusive location to hunt. We show that when preference
parameters dictate a low harvesting intensity, the policies cannot mitigate the overexploitation
and in addition they worsen the utilities of the players. Conversely, in a context of harsher
harvesting intensity, the intervention can help to safeguard the resource, preventing the
extinction and also improving the welfare of both players