Herbert Simon's decision-making approach: Investigation of cognitive processes in experts

This is a post print version of the article. The official published can be obtained from the links below - PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved.Herbert Simon's research endeavor aimed to understand the processes that participate in human decision making. However, despite his effort to investigate this question, his work did not have the impact in the “decision making” community that it had in other fields. His rejection of the assumption of perfect rationality, made in mainstream economics, led him to develop the concept of bounded rationality. Simon's approach also emphasized the limitations of the cognitive system, the change of processes due to expertise, and the direct empirical study of cognitive processes involved in decision making. In this article, we argue that his subsequent research program in problem solving and expertise offered critical tools for studying decision-making processes that took into account his original notion of bounded rationality. Unfortunately, these tools were ignored by the main research paradigms in decision making, such as Tversky and Kahneman's biased rationality approach (also known as the heuristics and biases approach) and the ecological approach advanced by Gigerenzer and others. We make a proposal of how to integrate Simon's approach with the main current approaches to decision making. We argue that this would lead to better models of decision making that are more generalizable, have higher ecological validity, include specification of cognitive processes, and provide a better understanding of the interaction between the characteristics of the cognitive system and the contingencies of the environment

The effect of stimulus variability on children\u2019s judgements of quantity

This study investigates the effect of stimulus variability on development of the ability to make quantity judgements related to area. Participants were 241 children (aged 4, 5, 6, 8, and 12 years) and 82 university students, who were asked to compare the quantities in 2 sets of 5 chocolate bars of constant width but variable length. Participants indicated which set contained more chocolate or that the amounts of chocolate were equal. Judgement accuracy of 12-year-olds and adults decreased monotonically as the variance of bar lengths increased. In younger children, performance was low when variance was very low or very high, but accuracy was higher for intermediate levels of variance, thus resulting in an inverted U-shaped effect. This pattern was confirmed in a second experiment in which we controlled for a possible age-related response bias against \u201cequal\u201d judgements. Findings suggest that judgements of quantity are based on a mixture of learned heuristics and comparisons of approximate quantity representations, both of which develop throughout childhood

Understanding Aesthetic Evaluation using Deep Learning

A bottleneck in any evolutionary art system is aesthetic evaluation. Many different methods have been proposed to automate the evaluation of aesthetics, including measures of symmetry, coherence, complexity, contrast and grouping. The interactive genetic algorithm (IGA) relies on human-in-the-loop, subjective evaluation of aesthetics, but limits possibilities for large search due to user fatigue and small population sizes. In this paper we look at how recent advances in deep learning can assist in automating personal aesthetic judgement. Using a leading artist's computer art dataset, we use dimensionality reduction methods to visualise both genotype and phenotype space in order to support the exploration of new territory in any generative system. Convolutional Neural Networks trained on the user's prior aesthetic evaluations are used to suggest new possibilities similar or between known high quality genotype-phenotype mappings

Capturing judgement strategies in risk assessments with improved quality of clinical information: How nurses' strategies differ from the ecological model

Background: Nurses' risk assessments of patients at risk of deterioration are sometimes suboptimal. Advances in clinical simulation mean higher quality information can be used as an alternative to traditional paper-based approaches as a means of improving judgement. This paper tests the hypothesis that nurses' judgement strategies and policies change as the quality of information used by nurses in simulation changes. Methods: Sixty-three student nurses and 34 experienced viewed 25 paper-case based and 25 clinically simulated scenarios, derived from real cases, and judged whether the (simulated) patient was at 'risk' of acute deterioration. Criteria of judgement "correctness" came from the same real cases. Information relative weights were calculated to examine judgement policies of individual nurses. Group comparisons of nurses and students under both paper and clinical simulation conditions were undertaken using non parametric statistical tests. Judgment policies were also compared to the ecological statistical model. Cumulative relative weights were calculated to assess how much information nurses used when making judgements. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves were generated to examine predictive accuracy amongst the nurses. Results: There were significant variations between nurses' judgement policies and those optimal policies determined by the ecological model. Nurses significantly underused the cues of consciousness level, respiration rate, and systolic blood pressure than the ecological model requires. However, in clinical simulations, they tended to make appropriate use of heart rate, with non-significant difference in the relative weights of heart rate between clinical simulations and the ecological model. Experienced nurses paid substantially more attention to respiration rate in the simulated setting compared to paper cases, while students maintained a similar attentive level to this cue. This led to a non-significant difference in relative weights of respiration rate between experienced nurses and students. Conclusions: Improving the quality of information by clinical simulations significantly impacted on nurses' judgement policies of risk assessments. Nurses' judgement strategies also varied with the increased years of experience. Such variations in processing clinical information may contribute to nurses' suboptimal judgements in clinical practice. Constructing predictive models of common judgement situations, and increasing nurses' awareness of information weightings in such models may help improve judgements made by nurses

The Epistemic Status of Processing Fluency as Source for Judgments of Truth

This article combines findings from cognitive psychology on the role of processing fluency in truth judgments with epistemological theory on justification of belief. We first review evidence that repeated exposure to a statement increases the subjective ease with which that statement is processed. This increased processing fluency, in turn, increases the probability that the statement is judged to be true. The basic question discussed here is whether the use of processing fluency as a cue to truth is epistemically justified. In the present analysis, based on Bayes’ Theorem, we adopt the reliable-process account of justification presented by Goldman (1986) and show that fluency is a reliable cue to truth, under the assumption that the majority of statements one has been exposed to are true. In the final section, we broaden the scope of this analysis and discuss how processing fluency as a potentially universal cue to judged truth may contribute to cultural differences in commonsense beliefs

Applied Personality Assessment: A 'Cronbachian' Perspective in Open Peer Commentary and Author's Response

Lievens's proposal that personality psychology would benefit from using applied tools of assessment—situation judgement tests and assessment centre exercises—was appropriate, especially as these tools focus on real-world criteria in high-stakes situations. Their use would help to integrate (specific) situationally influenced intra-individual differences (variability) and (general) inter-individual differences (diversity). Lievens's proposal also raised a broader issue: each assessment tool yields unique information, and together they have potential to provide a truly comprehensive model of personality based on the ‘Cronbachian’ perspective that has, so far, not been realized. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psycholog

Engrained experience—a comparison of microclimate perception schemata and microclimate measurements in Dutch urban squares

Acceptance of public spaces is often guided by perceptual schemata. Such schemata also seem to play a role in thermal comfort and microclimate experience. For climate-responsive design with a focus on thermal comfort it is important to acquire knowledge about these schemata. For this purpose, perceived and “real” microclimate situations were compared for three Dutch urban squares. People were asked about their long-term microclimate perceptions, which resulted in “cognitive microclimate maps”. These were compared with mapped microclimate data from measurements representing the common microclimate when people stay outdoors. The comparison revealed some unexpected low matches; people clearly overestimated the influence of the wind. Therefore, a second assumption was developed: that it is the more salient wind situations that become engrained in people’s memory. A comparison using measurement data from windy days shows better matches. This suggests that these more salient situations play a role in the microclimate schemata that people develop about urban places. The consequences from this study for urban design are twofold. Firstly, urban design should address not only the “real” problems, but, more prominently, the “perceived” problems. Secondly, microclimate simulations addressing thermal comfort issues in urban spaces should focus on these perceived, salient situations