Voters’ responsiveness to public employment policies [WP]

This paper examines whether the distribution of public employment affects the electoral support for the incumbent government that allocates jobs. To do this we focus on the Spanish Plan for Rural Employment (PER), a program of temporary public employment introduced by the central government in two lagging regions. We evaluate voters’ responsiveness to this policy using municipal-level electoral data and employing an estimator that combines propensity score matching with a difference-indifferences strategy (Heckman et al., Econometrica 65 (1998) 2). We show that the average treatment effect on the treated is a 2 percentage-point increase of the vote share for the ruling party at general elections and we also find evidence of an increase in electoral participation

Party discipline and government spending: Theory and evidence

This paper studies the relationship between party discipline and discretionary spending with theory and data. We propose a theoretical model in which a politician faces a conflict between her constituents' interests and the party line. Party loyalty is electorally costly for the politician and is therefore rewarded by the party leader with greater amounts of discretionary spending allocated to the politician's constituency. This effect is greater the more intense the conflict between the voters' and the party's interests. Using data on party discipline in the U.S. House of Representatives and federal payments to congressional districts between 1986 and 2010, we provide evidence that increases in legislators' party discipline raise the amounts of discretionary spending their districts receive. The rewards for discipline are larger the greater the gap between the constituents' and party's preferences (i.e., in conservative-leaning districts represented by Democrats or liberal-leaning districts represented by Republicans)

Voters' Responsiveness to public employment policies

This paper examines the electoral rewards for the distribution of public employment. We focus on the Spanish Plan for Rural Employment, a public jobs program introduced by the central government in two lagging regions. We evaluate voters' responsiveness to this policy using municipal-level electoral data and employ an estimator that combines difference-in-differences with propensity score matching. The main findings are that the program lead to an increase in the vote share for the ruling party in the treated municipalities. This effect is very persistent over the years, and it is unlikely to be explained by turnout buyin

Does electoral competition curb party favoritism? [WP]

We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co‐partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about their chances of re‐election. To do so, we draw on data detailing capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during the period 1995‐2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that, on average, a mayor belonging to the same party as that of the regional president obtains nearly twice the amount in grants as is received by a mayor belonging to an opposition party. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears in the case of highly competitive elections. The effects estimated by difference‐in‐differences are not so great but they point in the same direction. Overall, the results are consistent with predictions that regional incumbents focus on obtaining the most votes possible when elections are strongly contested, while they seek to increase the number of aligned mayors when their position at the ballot box is not vulnerable

Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?

We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co-partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about reelection. We draw on data on capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during 1995-2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that a mayor belonging to the party of the regional president obtains twice the amount in grants received by an opposition's mayor. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears for highly competitive elections

The political economy of infrastructure construction: The Spanish “Parliamentary Roads” (1880-1914)

This paper examines the extent to which the public allocation of road investment was influenced by political and electoral goals during the Spanish Restoration (1874-1923). More precisely, we seek to identify those provinces that were favoured with higher road construction expenditure and whether tactical strategies adopted by the political parties varied over time to reflect increasing political competition. In so doing, this paper combines concepts from three strands of literature: legislative pork-barrel; clientelism and machine politics; and electoral competition. Our main empirical finding for a panel of Spain’s provinces suggests that constituencies electing a higher proportion of deputies from minority or opposition parties were initially punished through lower levels of road investment but that, by the end of the period, they were instead favoured with more resources than the rest. In addition, we also observe that senior deputies who had been ministers in previous administrations were more capable than other politicians of attracting resources to their constituencies

Party Discipline and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence

This paper studies the relationship between party discipline and discretionary spending with theory and data. We propose a theoretical model in which a politician faces a conflict between her constituents' interests and the party line. Party loyalty is electorally costly for the politician and is therefore rewarded by the party leader with greater amounts of discretionary spending allocated to the politician's constituency. The more intense the conflict between the voters' and the party's interests, the more grants the district receives. Using panel data on party discipline in the U.S. House of Representatives and federal grants to congressional districts between 1984 and 2010, we provide evidence that districts represented by loyal legislators receive greater amounts of discretionary spending. This effect holds only for legislators in the majority party, who may enjoy a legislative advantage. Districts represented by loyal legislators who face a greater conflict of interest between following the party and serving their constituents (e.g., Republican legislators representing liberal-leaning districts) are rewarded to a larger extent

La formación de Gobiernos municipales: una nueva base de datos

Esta nota de investigación presenta una nueva base de datos a nivel local, que recoge los partidos políticos que apoyaron la formación de Gobiernos locales en los municipios españoles de más de 1000 habitantes en las legislaturas 2003-‍2007 y 2007-‍2011. La nota de investigación describe el proceso de obtención de la información, los datos obtenidos y unos análisis descriptivos iniciales. La base de datos es de acceso público y permitirá mejorar el conocimiento sobre los Gobiernos locales en España. También facilitará la realización de estudios cuantitativos que requieren contar con un elevado número de municipios en un mismo contexto institucional

Caring for family caregivers: An analysis of a family-centered intervention

Objetivo Evaluar la efectividad de la Técnica de Resolución de Problemas (TRP) en cuidadoras familiares mediante escalas positivas de ansiedad, depresión y malestar emocional; explorar los factores facilitadores y barreras en su aplicación a partir de la narrativa de las enfermeras. Método Ensayo clínico y grupo focal exploratorio y metodología de análisis mixta. Ilevado a cabo en el Centro de Atención Primaria de Tarragona (España), cuya muestra fue 122 cuidadoras familiares incluidas en el programa de atención domiciliaria y 10 enfermeras del grupo intervención. Grupo experimental aplicación de la TRP, a la cuidadora familiar con síntomas de ansiedad, depresión y malestar percibido. Grupo control la enfermera realiza la intervención habitual. Medición pre-post en ambos grupos. Grupo de discusión con ocho enfermeras del grupo intervención, trascripción y análisis del contenido. Conclusión Se demuestra la efectividad de la TRP en la reducción de ansiedad, depresión y malestar percibido. Se identifican los puntos fuertes y las barreras descritas por las enfermeras en la aplicación de la técnica.
Objective To assess the effectiveness of Problem-Solving Therapy (PST) on family caregivers through the use of scales to measure anxiety, depression and emotional distress; and to explore facilitating factors and obstacles for its use based on the narrative of nurses. Method A clinical trial and an exploratory focus group with the use of mixed analysis methodology. The study was conducted in a primary health care center in Tarragona, Spain, and the sample consisted of 122 family caregivers who were included in the home care service, and 10 nurses who participated in the intervention group. Family caregivers with evident symptoms of anxiety, depression and emotional distress received PST in the intervention group. The intervention group also consisted of a discussion with eight nurses, which was transcribed and submitted to content analysis. Conclusion Problem-Solving Therapy proved to be effective in reducing perceived anxiety, depression and emotional distress. We identified its strong points and obstacles as described by nurses.

Objetivo Avaliar a efetividade da Técnica de Resolução de Problemas (TRP) em cuidadores familiares mediante escalas positivas de ansiedade, depressão e stress emocional; explorar os fatores facilitadores e as barreiras para sua aplicação a partir das narrativas das enfermeiras. Método Ensaio clínico e grupo focal exploratório, com metodologia de análise mista. Realizado em centros de cuidados primários em Tarragona (Espanha), cuja amosta foi de 122 cuidadores familiares, incluindo atendimento domiciliar e 10 enfermeiros no grupo de intervenção. Grupo implementação experimental do TRP, cuidador familiar com sintomas de ansiedade, depressão e desconforto percebido. No grupo controle a enfermeira executa a intervenção habitual. Feita medição pré e pós intervenção em ambos os grupos. Grupo de discussão com oito enfermeiros do grupo de intervenção, transcrição e análise de conteúdo. Conclusão Ficou demonstrada a eficácia da TRP na redução da ansiedade, depressão e desconforto percebido. Foram identificados os pontos fortes e as barreiras na aplicação da técnica.

Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?

We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co-partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about their chances of re-election. To do so, we draw on data detailing capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during the period 1995-2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that, on average, a mayor belonging to the same party as that of the regional president obtains nearly twice the amount in grants as is received by a mayor belonging to an opposition party. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears in the case of highly competitive elections. The effects estimated by difference-in-differences are not so great but they point in the same direction. Overall, the results are consistent with predictions that regional incumbents focus on obtaining the most votes possible when elections are strongly contested, while they seek to increase the number of aligned mayors when their position at the ballot box is not vulnerable