85 research outputs found
Bonding and the agency risk premium: An analysis of migrations between the AIM and the Official List of the London Stock Exchange
Firms that change their listing from the less regulated AIM to the more regulated main section of the London Stock Exchange exhibit positive abnormal returns on the announcement day. For firms moving in the opposite direction, both announcement and implementation day abnormal returns are negative. Following implementation, the pattern is reversed for both categories of firm. We show that differences in liquidity, conventional risk factors and in medium to long term firm survival rates between the two listing regimes do not explain the observed patterns of returns, suggesting that the answer lies in the different bonding requirements of the two market segments and an agency risk premium.JEL Codes: G12, G14, G15, G30, G32, G3
Warrants in underwritten IPOs: The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) experience
We examine the use of warrants as a part of underwriter compensation in IPOs listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange. Our results show that, though warrant-issuing IPO firms are riskier, they are usually underwritten by reputable underwriters. Firms that are cash constrained at the time of their IPO are more likely to use warrants. Both market volatility and hot issue markets increase the likelihood of firms issuing warrants. We also find that warrant issuers are able to minimise their total costs of going public, even under a very light regulatory setting with regards non-cash compensation. They incur actual costs of 29.1%, but would have incurred greater costs of 33.8% had they not issued warrants to their underwriters. Overall, our results support the cost minimisation explanation of the use of warrants by UK IPO firms
Neutrality of narrative discussion in annual reports of UK listed companies
This paper reports the results of an investigation into the neutrality of the narrative discussion of financial performance and position, as evidenced in 179 annual reports of UK listed companies. Neutrality of narrative discussion was determined by comparing the average proportions of good and bad news contained in the narrative and statutory accounts sections of the annual reports. The results of a comparison of the proportion of good news in the two sections of the annual reports suggest that the narrative sections contained a significantly higher proportion of good news than the statutory accounts sections. Comparison of proportions of bad news, however, indicates that the narrative sections contained a significantly lower proportion of bad news compared to the statutory accounts sections. Finally, the results also suggest that the proportion of good news as compared to bad news in the narrative sections is significantly higher than the proportion of good news compared to bad news in the statutory accounts section. The results are consistent with the suggestion that company management highlights good news in narrative discussions. The implications of the findings for company management, users, auditors and regulators are discussed
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Fundamental indexation revisited: new evidence on alpha
This study proposes indexing strategies representative of the equity market and based on readily available accounting information. In contrast to the previous literature, we discard balance sheet variables and instead develop two indices that revolve solely around income statement and dividend measures. We find that these indices outperformed the FTSE 100 by 3% on an annual basis over the last 25 years, whilst delivering similar or lower volatility. The constructed indices overlap by 90% with the FTSE 100, in terms of their total market capitalisation and constituent members. They have positive and significant alphas in 3- and 4-factor performance attribution models, showing that the performance cannot be explained by value, size, market beta or momentum tilts alone
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Accounting for information: Information and knowledge in the annual reports of FTSE 100 companies
The purpose of this study was to assess the ways in which a sample group of companies discuss information and knowledge.
Quantitative and qualitative content analyses were used to survey the way that companies present and value information and knowledge, based on the annual reports of the FTSE 100, the United Kingdom's largest publicly-listed companies. A novel content analysis approach is used, based on a set of categories proposed by Oppenheim, Stenson and Wilson.
Many of the companies analysed made explicit the importance of information and knowledge, through either discussion in the text of the annual report or through an attempt to assign a monetary value to information assets. Where the importance of information and knowledge was not made explicit, the study revealed links between successful performance and effective use of information assets. Different categories of information assets were identified within the annual reports.
Conclusions drawn from the analysis include that information and knowledge are demonstrably important to FTSE 100 companies, although the specific term âknowledgeâ does not appear to have a special significance in the companiesâ lexicon; and that certain sectors, such as General Financial, General Retail, Travel & Leisure, Mining, Aerospace & Defence and Software & Computer Services, mention information and knowledge more than others
Innocent Frauds Meet Goodhartâs Law in Monetary Policy
This paper discusses recent UK monetary policies as instances of Galbraithâs âinnocent fraudsâ, including the idea that money is a thing rather than a relationship, the fallacy of composition that what is possible for one bank is possible for all banks, and the belief that the money supply can be controlled by reserves management. The origins of the idea of QE, and its defense when it was applied in Britain, are analysed through this lens. An empirical analysis of the effect of reserves on lending is conducted; we do not find evidence that QE âworkedâ either by a direct effect on money spending, or through an equity market effect. These findings are placed in a historical context in a comparison with earlier money control experiments in the UK
Corporate governance, affirmative action and firm value in post-apartheid South Africa: a simultaneous equation approach
The post-Apartheid South African corporate governance (CG) model is a unique hybridisation of the traditional Anglo-American and Continental European-Asian CG models, distinctively requiring firms to explicitly comply with a number of affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions, such as black economic empowerment, employment equity, environment, HIV/Aids, and health and safety. This paper examines the association between a composite CG index and firm value in this distinct corporate setting within a simultaneous equation framework. Using a sample of post-Apartheid South African listed corporations, and controlling for potential interdependencies among block ownership, board size, leverage, institutional ownership, firm value and a broad CG index, we find a significant positive association between a composite CG index and firm value. Further, our two-stage least squares results show that there is also a reverse association between our broad CG index and firm value, emphasising the need for future research to adequately control for potential interrelationships between possible alternative CG mechanisms and firm value. Distinct from prior studies, we find that compliance with affirmative action CG provisions impacts positively on firm value. Our results are consistent with agency, legitimacy, political cost, and resource dependence theoretical predictions. Our findings are robust across a number of econometric models that adequately control for different types of endogeneity problems, and alternative accounting, and market-based firm valuation proxies
Am empirical comparison of the performance of classical power indices
Power indices are general measures of the relative voting power of individual members of a voting body. They are useful in helping understand and design voting bodies particularly those which employ weighted voting, in which different members having different numbers of votes. It is well known that in such bodies a member's voting power, in the sense of their capacity to affect the outcomes of votes called, rarely corresponds to the actual number of votes allocated to him. Many voting bodies for which this is an important consideration exist: examples include international organisations (notably the World Bank, the IMF, the European Union), the US presidential Electoral College and corporations in which votes are proportionate to stockholdings.
Two classical power indices dominate the literature: the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index (also known by other names). Both are based on the idea that a member's power depends on the relative number of times they can change a coalition from losing to winning by joining it and adding their vote. They may be defined in probabilistic terms as the probability of being able to swing the result of a vote, where all possible outcomes are taken as equiprobable. The indices differ however in the way they count voting coalitions. In probabilistic terms they use different coalition models and therefore differ in precisely what is meant by equiprobable outcomes.
The indices have been used in a number of empirical applications but their relative performance has remained an open question for many years, a factor, which has hindered the wider acceptance of the approach.
Where both the indices have been used for the same case, they have often given different results, sometimes substantially so, and theoretical studies of their properties have not been conclusive. There is therefore a need for comparative testing of their relative performance in practical contexts. Very little work of this type has been done however for a number of reasons: lack of independent indicators of power in actual voting bodies with which to compare them, difficulties in obtaining consistent data on a voting body over time with sufficient variation in the disposition of votes among members of actual legislatures and the lack of independent criteria against which the results of the indices may be judged. It has also been hampered to some extent by lack of easily available algorithms for computing the indices in large games.
This paper assesses the indices against a set of reasonable criteria in terms of shareholder voting power and the control of the corporation in a large cross section of British companies. Each company is a separate voting body and there is much variation in the distribution of voting shares among them. Moreover reasonable criteria exist against which to judge the indices. New algorithms for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices are applied to detailed data on beneficial ownership of 444 large UK companies without majority control. Because some of the data is missing, both finite and oceanic games of shareholder voting are studied to overcome this problem.
The results, judged against these criteria, are unfavorable to the Shapley-Shubik index and suggest that the Banzhaf index much better reflects the variations in the power of shareholders between companies as the weights of shareholder blocks vary
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