Obesity, unhappiness, and the challenge of affluence : theory and evidence

Is affluence a good thing? The book "The Challenge of Affluence" by Avner Offer (2006) argues that economic prosperity weakens self-control and undermines human well-being. Consistent with a pessimistic view, we show that psychological distress has been rising through time in modern Great Britain. Taking over-eating as an example, our data reveal that half the British population view themselves as overweight, and that happiness and mental health are worse among fatter people in Britain and Germany. Comparisons also matter. We discuss problems of inference and argue that longitudinal data are needed. We suggest a theory of obesity imitation where utility depends on relative weight

Preferences, power, and the determination of working hours

Preferences, power, and the determination of working hour

Behavioural economics in competition policy enforcement for financial product markets

Behavioural Economics (BE) acknowledges that individuals often make choices that are not entirely rational. The UK Competition and Markets Authority and Financial Conduct Authority have recently highlighted the relevance of BE. This article explains the difference it makes to the economic analysis of competition and why it is seen as particularly relevant to financial product markets. BE is already being used to frame and test theories of harm. It also brings experimental techniques to the analytical toolkit. The current approach is illustrated with examples from recent and ongoing cases. Finally, the risks of over-intervention and unintended harm from inappropriate remedies are highlighted

Essays in Local Public Finance

The first essay, "Producers and Predators in a Multiple Community Setting" investigates how different ways of organizing the provision of local policing services in a multi-community setting affect the level of criminal activity, the spatial distribution of the population, the cost of policing, and overall productivity across all communities. Our analysis shows that if individual local governments are boundedly rational, in the sense that they do not anticipate the effects of their own defense activity on the equilibrium predator/producer ratio and distribution of producer activity, then competition among local governments never achieves a first-best outcome and sometimes yields a lower consumption per capita in equilibrium than would be achieved if there were no local governments and each agent who chose to be a producer also chose his own level of defense. The second essay, "Discriminatory Taxation in a Model of Local Community Competition," analyzes tax competition for new economic resources among local communities within the context of a dynamic, overlapping generations model. We show that in a simple model of discriminatory tax competition, allowing communities to compete for new entrants via the use of entry bonuses and entry taxes does not produce a 'race to the bottom,' does not reduce overall efficiency, and can prevent the economy from getting stuck in an inefficient allocation of resources across communities. The third essay, "A Note on the Effects of Tax Increment Financing on the Path of Land Development," shows that TIFs introduce distortions in the early use of property even as they reduce tax distortions on later use of property. The net effect of a TIF on the dynamic efficiency of land use depends on the magnitude of the TIF subsidy

Happiness and economic performance

If a nation's economic performance improves, how much extra happiness does that buy its citizens? Most public debate assumes -- without real evidence -- that the answer is a lot. This paper examines the question by using information on well-being in Western countries. The data are of four kinds: on reported happiness, on reported life satisfaction, on reported job satisfaction, and on the number of suicides. These reveal patterns that are not visible to the anecdotal eye. In industrialized countries, well-being appears to rise as real national income grows. But the rise is so small as to be sometimes almost undetectable. Unemployment, however, seems to be a large source of unhappiness. This suggests that governments ought to be trying to reduce the amount of joblessness in the economy. In a country that is already rich, policy aimed instead at raising economic growth may be of comparatively little value

Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods

According to economists, severe legal sanctions deter violations of the law. According to legal scholars, people may obey law backed by mild sanctions because of norm-activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild and severe legal sanctions in the provision of public goods. The results show that severe sanctions almost perfectly deter free-riding. However, people also obey law backed by mild sanctions if it is accepted in a referendum. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to obey the law if they expect many others to do so.deterrent effect of legal sanctions, expressive law, social norms, public goods, voting.

Revealed Distributional Preferences: Individuals vs. Teams

We compare experimentally the revealed distributional preferences of individuals and teams in allocation tasks. We find that teams are significantly more benevolent than individuals in the domain of disadvantageous inequality while the benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality is similar across decision makers. A consequence for the frequency of preference types is that while a substantial fraction of individuals is classified as inequality averse, this type disappears completely in teams. Spiteful types are markedly more frequent among individuals than among teams. On the other hand, by far more teams than individuals are classified as efficiency lovers