Rail Passenger Selective Screening Summit, MTI S-09-01

This publication is an edited transcript of the Rail Passenger Selective Screening Summit, which was co-sponsored by MTI and the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) in Chicago, Illinois on June 18, 2009, during APTA´s annual Rail Conference. The workshop was moderated by Brian Michael Jenkins, director, Mineta Transportation Institute\u27s National Transportation Security Center of Excellence (NTSCOE). Speakers included Bruce R. Butterworth, co-author, Selective Screening of Rail Passengers; Greg Hull, president, American Public Transportation Association (APTA); Paul MacMillan, chief of police, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Transit Police Department; Ron Masciana, deputy chief, Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), New York; Jesus Ojeda, security coordinator, Southern California Regional Rail Authority; Ed Phillips, operations deputy, Office of Security, Amtrak; and John P. Sammon, assistant administrator, Transportation Sector Network Management, Transportation Security Administration (TSA

The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial Selection

A core insight of the legal realists was that many disputes are indeterminate. For example, in many appellate adjudications, respectable legal arguments can be made for both sides of the dispute. A contemporary reaction to the realist insight by critical legal scholars is expressed in the slogan Law is politics. This critical slogan might be elaborated as follows: in openly political activities, such as the legislative process or partisan elections, debate centers on issues of value and social vision that are outside the scope of legal reasoning. Judicial opinions merely dress up political decisions in the garb of legal reasoning. The realist insight and critical reaction challenge conventional notions about the selection of appellate judges on the basis of merit-a combination of legal expertise and judicial temperament. If appellate judges really render decisions on the basis of politics, then why should judges be selected (or elected) on the basis of merit? In his essay, Judging in a Corner of the Law, Professor Schauer has gone so far as to suggest that appellate judges need not be lawyers and certainly need not be experienced or excellent lawyers. Moreover, Schauer maintains, the skills and knowledge desirable in appellate judges are not even taught in law schools

What is "true" in internal realism?

This paper is a critical examination of Putnam's theory of truth as it evolves from metaphysical to internal realism. First, I analyze the model-theoretic argument that led Putnam to abandon the metaphysical concept of truth as correspondence and to adopt and epistemic view of truth. Though a powerful critique of the metaphysical realist conception of truth, this argument does not establish conclusively that the concept of truth has any epistemic content. Secondly, I discuss Putnam's idealization theory of truth, arguing that the identification of truth with "acceptability under ideal conditions" is at odds with the claim that truth is context-transcendent, since the notion of justification is intrinsically context-dependent and no amount of idealization can reedeem its contextual character. Finally, I suggest that the realist intuitions that Putnam's internal realism tries to capture call for no more than a deflationary view of truth. Acceptance of this view requires abandoning not only the idea that truth is an epistemic property, but also the idea that truth is a substantive property that all true statements share and, therefore, a proper object of philosophical theorizing.Aquest article és un examen critic de la teoria de la veritat de Putnam en la seva evolució des d'un realisme metafisic a un realisme intern. En primer lloc, presento una anàlisi de l'argument de la teoria de models que va dur a Putnam a abandonar el concepte metafísic de veritat corn a correspondència i a adoptar un concepte epistèmic de veritat. Aquest argument, encara que constitueix una potent crítica de la concepció de la veritat del realisme metafísic, no estableix conclusivament que la veritar tingui algun contingut epistèmic. En segon lloc, discuteixo la teoria idealitzada de la veritat de Putnam, tot argumentant que la identificació de la veritat amb "acceptabilitat en condicions ideals" no s'adiu amb la tesi que la veritat no és contextual sinó transcendent, per tal com la noció de justificació és intrínsecament contextual i no hi ha idealització que la pugui redimir d'aquest caracter. Finalment, suggereixo que les intuicions realistes que el realisme intern de Putnam intenta captar no requereixen més que una perspectiva deflacionista sobre la veritat. Adoptar aquesta perspectiva implica abandonar no sols la idea que la veritat és una propietat epistèmica, sinó també la idea que la veritat és una propietat substantiva que totes les afirmacions verdaderes comparteixen i que, per tant, és objecte d'una teoria filosòfica

Sedition, November 3, 1971

Volume 1, Issue 3https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sedition/1000/thumbnail.jp

Towards Principled Responsible Research and Innovation: Employing the Difference Principle in Funding Decisions

Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) has emerged as a science policy framework that attempts to import broad social values into technological innovation processes whilst supporting institutional decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. When looking at RRI from a ‘principled’ perspective, we consider responsibility and justice to be important cornerstones of the framework. The main aim of this article is to suggest a method of realising these principles through the application of a limited Rawlsian Difference Principle in the distribution of public funds for research and innovation. There are reasons why the world's combined innovative capacity has spewed forth iPhones and space shuttles but not yet managed to produce clean energy or universal access to clean water. (Stilgoe 2013, xii) I derive great optimism from empathy's evolutionary antiquity. It makes it a robust trait that will develop in virtually every human being so that society can count on it and try to foster and grow it. It is a human universal. (de Waal 2009, 209) Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) has emerged as a science policy framework that attempts to import broad social values into technological innovation processes whilst supporting institutional decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. In this respect, RRI re-focuses technological governance from standard debates on risks to discussions about the ethical stewardship of innovation. This is a radical step in Science & Technology (S&T) policy as it lifts the non-quantifiable concept of values into the driving seat of decision-making. The focus of innovation then goes beyond product considerations to include the processes and – importantly – the purposes of innovation (Owen et al. 2013, 34). Shared public values are seen as the cornerstone of the new RRI framework, while market mechanisms and risk-based regulations are of a secondary order. What are the values that could drive RRI? There are different approaches to the identification of public values. They can be located in democratically agreed processes and commitments (such as European Union treaties and policy statements) or they can be developed organically via public engagement processes. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. For instance, although constitutional values can be regarded as democratically legitimate, their application to specific technological fields can be difficult or ambiguous (Schroeder and Rerimassie 2015). On the other hand, public engagement can accurately reflect stakeholder values but is not necessarily free from bias and lobbyist agenda setting. We argue that if RRI is to be more successful in resolving policy dilemmas arising from poorly described and uncertain technological impacts, basic universal principles need to be evoked and applied. When looking at RRI from a ‘principled’ perspective, we consider responsibility and justice to be important cornerstones of the framework. One could describe them in the following manner: Research and innovation should be conducted responsibly. Publicly funded research and innovation should be focused fairly on socially beneficial targets. Research and innovation should promote and not hinder social justice. The main aim of this article is to suggest a method of realising these principles through the application of a limited Rawlsian Difference Principle in the distribution of public funds for research and innovation. This paper is in three parts. The first part discusses the above principles and introduces the Rawlsian Difference Principle. The second part identifies how RRI is currently applied by public funding bodies. The third part discusses the operationalisation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle in responsible funding decisions

Analysis of the retail survey of products that carry welfare- claims and of non-retailer led assurance schemes whose logos accompany welfare-claims.

This report serves two aims. Firstly, this report contains analysis of the retail audit (sub-deliverable 1.2.2.1) of welfare-friendly food products in the 6 study countries. The report gives the results of an emerging comparative analysis of the ‘market’ for welfare-friendly food products in the 6 study countries. It also outlines ‘non-retailer’ led schemes1 whose products occurred in the study. In this way, an emerging picture of the actual product ranges, that make claims about welfare-friendliness, will be drawn based on fieldwork carried out from November 2004 until April 2005. Also, the report explores how the different legislative and voluntary standards on animal welfare compare across different countries and how these actively advertise their welfare-friendlier component to consumers through food packaging. <br/

The effects of death and post-mortem cold ischemia on human tissue transcriptomes

Post-mortem tissues samples are a key resource for investigating patterns of gene expression. However, the processes triggered by death and the post-mortem interval (PMI) can significantly alter physiologically normal RNA levels. We investigate the impact of PMI on gene expression using data from multiple tissues of post-mortem donors obtained from the GTEx project. We find that many genes change expression over relatively short PMIs in a tissue-specific manner, but this potentially confounding effect in a biological analysis can be minimized by taking into account appropriate covariates. By comparing ante- and post-mortem blood samples, we identify the cascade of transcriptional events triggered by death of the organism. These events do not appear to simply reflect stochastic variation resulting from mRNA degradation, but active and ongoing regulation of transcription. Finally, we develop a model to predict the time since death from the analysis of the transcriptome of a few readily accessible tissues.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version