Stone-type representations and dualities for varieties of bisemilattices

In this article we will focus our attention on the variety of distributive bisemilattices and some linguistic expansions thereof: bounded, De Morgan, and involutive bisemilattices. After extending Balbes' representation theorem to bounded, De Morgan, and involutive bisemilattices, we make use of Hartonas-Dunn duality and introduce the categories of 2spaces and 2spaces$^{\star}$. The categories of 2spaces and 2spaces$^{\star}$ will play with respect to the categories of distributive bisemilattices and De Morgan bisemilattices, respectively, a role analogous to the category of Stone spaces with respect to the category of Boolean algebras. Actually, the aim of this work is to show that these categories are, in fact, dually equivalent

On the Tightness of Bounds for Transients of Weak CSR Expansions and Periodicity Transients of Critical Rows and Columns of Tropical Matrix Powers

We study the transients of matrices in max-plus algebra. Our approach is based on the weak CSR expansion. Using this expansion, the transient can be expressed by $\max\{T_1,T_2\}$, where $T_1$ is the weak CSR threshold and $T_2$ is the time after which the purely pseudoperiodic CSR terms start to dominate in the expansion. Various bounds have been derived for $T_1$ and $T_2$, naturally leading to the question which matrices, if any, attain these bounds. In the present paper we characterize the matrices attaining two particular bounds on $T_1$, which are generalizations of the bounds of Wielandt and Dulmage-Mendelsohn on the indices of non-weighted digraphs. This also leads to a characterization of tightness for the same bounds on the transients of critical rows and columns. The characterizations themselves are generalizations of those for the non-weighted case.Comment: 42 pages, 9 figure

Relevant Logics Obeying Component Homogeneity

This paper discusses three relevant logics that obey Component Homogeneity - a principle that Goddard and Routley introduce in their project of a logic of significance. The paper establishes two main results. First, it establishes a general characterization result for two families of logic that obey Component Homogeneity - that is, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their consequence relations. From this, we derive characterization results for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Second, the paper establishes complete sequent calculi for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Among the other accomplishments of the paper, we generalize the semantics from Bochvar, Hallden, Deutsch and Daniels, we provide a general recipe to define containment logics, we explore the single-premise/single-conclusion fragment of S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fdeand the connections between crossS*fde and the logic Eq of equality by Epstein. Also, we present S*fde as a relevant logic of meaninglessness that follows the main philosophical tenets of Goddard and Routley, and we briefly examine three further systems that are closely related to our main logics. Finally, we discuss Routley's criticism to containment logic in light of our results, and overview some open issues

An epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent weak Kleene logic

This paper extends Fitting’s epistemic interpretation of some Kleene logics to also account for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. To achieve this goal, a dualization of Fitting’s “cut-down” operator is discussed, leading to the definition of a “track-down” operator later used to represent the idea that no consistent opinion can arise from a set including an inconsistent opinion. It is shown that, if some reasonable assumptions are made, the truth-functions of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene coincide with certain operations defined in this track-down fashion. Finally, further reflections on conjunction and disjunction in the weak Kleene logics accompany this paper, particularly concerning their relation with containment logics. These considerations motivate a special approach to defining sound and complete Gentzen-style sequent calculi for some of their four-valued generalizations.Fil: Szmuc, Damián Enrique. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentin

Bochvar's Three-Valued Logic and Literal Paralogics: Their Lattice and Functional Equivalence

In the present paper, various features of the class of propositional literal paralogics are considered. Literal paralogics are logics in which the paraproperties such as paraconsistence, paracompleteness and paranormality, occur only at the level of literals; that is, formulas that are propositional letters or their iterated negations. We begin by analyzing Bochvar’s three-valued nonsense logic B3 , which includes two isomorphs of the propositional classical logic CPC. The combination of these two ‘strong’ isomorphs leads to the construction of two famous paralogics P1 and I1, which are functionally equivalent. Moreover, each of these logics is functionally equivalent to the fragment of logic B3 consisting of external formulas only. In conclusion, we structure a four-element lattice of three-valued paralogics with respect to the possession of paraproperties

Noncomparabilities & Non Standard Logics

Many normative theories set forth in the welfare economics, distributive justice and cognate literatures posit noncomparabilities or incommensurabilities between magnitudes of various kinds. In some cases these gaps are predicated on metaphysical claims, in others upon epistemic claims, and in still others upon political-moral claims. I show that in all such cases they are best given formal expression in nonstandard logics that reject bivalence, excluded middle, or both. I do so by reference to an illustrative case study: a contradiction known to beset John Rawls\u27s selection and characterization of primary goods as the proper distribuendum in any distributively just society. The contradiction is avoided only by reformulating Rawls\u27s claims in a nonstandard form, which form happens also to cohere quite attractively with Rawls\u27s intuitive argumentation on behalf of his claims