16 research outputs found
Study of Peer-to-Peer Network Based Cybercrime Investigation: Application on Botnet Technologies
The scalable, low overhead attributes of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Internet
protocols and networks lend themselves well to being exploited by criminals to
execute a large range of cybercrimes. The types of crimes aided by P2P
technology include copyright infringement, sharing of illicit images of
children, fraud, hacking/cracking, denial of service attacks and virus/malware
propagation through the use of a variety of worms, botnets, malware, viruses
and P2P file sharing. This project is focused on study of active P2P nodes
along with the analysis of the undocumented communication methods employed in
many of these large unstructured networks. This is achieved through the design
and implementation of an efficient P2P monitoring and crawling toolset. The
requirement for investigating P2P based systems is not limited to the more
obvious cybercrimes listed above, as many legitimate P2P based applications may
also be pertinent to a digital forensic investigation, e.g, voice over IP,
instant messaging, etc. Investigating these networks has become increasingly
difficult due to the broad range of network topologies and the ever increasing
and evolving range of P2P based applications. In this work we introduce the
Universal P2P Network Investigation Framework (UP2PNIF), a framework which
enables significantly faster and less labour intensive investigation of newly
discovered P2P networks through the exploitation of the commonalities in P2P
network functionality. In combination with a reference database of known
network characteristics, it is envisioned that any known P2P network can be
instantly investigated using the framework, which can intelligently determine
the best investigation methodology and greatly expedite the evidence gathering
process. A proof of concept tool was developed for conducting investigations on
the BitTorrent network.Comment: This is a thesis submitted in fulfilment of a PhD in Digital
Forensics and Cybercrime Investigation in the School of Computer Science,
University College Dublin in October 201
Distributed Reinforcement Learning for Network Intrusion Response
The increasing adoption of technologies and the exponential growth of networks has made the area of information technology an integral part of our lives, where network security plays a vital role. One of the most serious threats in the current Internet is posed by distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, which target the availability of the victim system. Such an attack is designed to exhaust a server's resources or congest a network's infrastructure, and therefore renders the victim incapable of providing services to its legitimate users or customers.
To tackle the distributed nature of these attacks, a distributed and coordinated defence mechanism is necessary, where many defensive nodes, across different locations cooperate in order to stop or reduce the flood. This thesis investigates the applicability of distributed reinforcement learning to intrusion response, specifically, DDoS response. We propose a novel approach to respond to DDoS attacks called Multiagent Router Throttling. Multiagent Router Throttling provides an agent-based distributed response to the DDoS problem, where multiple reinforcement learning agents are installed on a set of routers and learn to rate-limit or throttle traffic towards a victim server. One of the novel characteristics of the proposed approach is that it has a decentralised architecture and provides a decentralised coordinated response to the DDoS problem, thus being resilient to the attacks themselves.
Scalability constitutes a critical aspect of a defence system since a non-scalable mechanism will never be considered, let alone adopted, for wide deployment by a company or organisation. We propose Coordinated Team Learning (CTL) which is a novel design to the original Multiagent Router Throttling approach based on the divide-and-conquer paradigm, that uses task decomposition and coordinated team rewards. To better scale-up CTL is combined with a form of reward shaping. The scalability of the proposed system is successfully demonstrated in experiments involving up to 1000 reinforcement learning agents. The significant improvements on scalability and learning speed lay the foundations for a potential real-world deployment
Resilience Strategies for Network Challenge Detection, Identification and Remediation
The enormous growth of the Internet and its use in everyday life make it an attractive target for malicious users. As the network becomes more complex and sophisticated it becomes more vulnerable to attack. There is a pressing need for the future internet to be resilient, manageable and secure. Our research is on distributed challenge detection and is part of the EU Resumenet Project (Resilience and Survivability for Future Networking: Framework, Mechanisms and Experimental Evaluation). It aims to make networks more resilient to a wide range of challenges including malicious attacks, misconfiguration, faults, and operational overloads. Resilience means the ability of the network to provide an acceptable level of service in the face of significant challenges; it is a superset of commonly used definitions for survivability, dependability, and fault tolerance. Our proposed resilience strategy could detect a challenge situation by identifying an occurrence and impact in real time, then initiating appropriate remedial action. Action is autonomously taken to continue operations as much as possible and to mitigate the damage, and allowing an acceptable level of service to be maintained. The contribution of our work is the ability to mitigate a challenge as early as possible and rapidly detect its root cause. Also our proposed multi-stage policy based challenge detection system identifies both the existing and unforeseen challenges. This has been studied and demonstrated with an unknown worm attack. Our multi stage approach reduces the computation complexity compared to the traditional single stage, where one particular managed object is responsible for all the functions. The approach we propose in this thesis has the flexibility, scalability, adaptability, reproducibility and extensibility needed to assist in the identification and remediation of many future network challenges
Cyber Law and Espionage Law as Communicating Vessels
Professor Lubin\u27s contribution is Cyber Law and Espionage Law as Communicating Vessels, pp. 203-225.
Existing legal literature would have us assume that espionage operations and “below-the-threshold” cyber operations are doctrinally distinct. Whereas one is subject to the scant, amorphous, and under-developed legal framework of espionage law, the other is subject to an emerging, ever-evolving body of legal rules, known cumulatively as cyber law. This dichotomy, however, is erroneous and misleading. In practice, espionage and cyber law function as communicating vessels, and so are better conceived as two elements of a complex system, Information Warfare (IW). This paper therefore first draws attention to the similarities between the practices – the fact that the actors, technologies, and targets are interchangeable, as are the knee-jerk legal reactions of the international community. In light of the convergence between peacetime Low-Intensity Cyber Operations (LICOs) and peacetime Espionage Operations (EOs) the two should be subjected to a single regulatory framework, one which recognizes the role intelligence plays in our public world order and which adopts a contextual and consequential method of inquiry. The paper proceeds in the following order: Part 2 provides a descriptive account of the unique symbiotic relationship between espionage and cyber law, and further explains the reasons for this dynamic. Part 3 places the discussion surrounding this relationship within the broader discourse on IW, making the claim that the convergence between EOs and LICOs, as described in Part 2, could further be explained by an even larger convergence across all the various elements of the informational environment. Parts 2 and 3 then serve as the backdrop for Part 4, which details the attempt of the drafters of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 to compartmentalize espionage law and cyber law, and the deficits of their approach. The paper concludes by proposing an alternative holistic understanding of espionage law, grounded in general principles of law, which is more practically transferable to the cyber realmhttps://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facbooks/1220/thumbnail.jp
Break on Through: An Analysis of Computer Damage Cases
The following Article is an extensive inquiry into computer damage cases through a comprehensive study of over three hundred computer damage cases. Throughout the study, the authors have performed an empirical categorization of the essential aspects of computer damage cases and analyzed the most relevant issues, interpretations, and arguments available for each computer damage category. These categories include fundamental facets, such as legal elements; motive and intent; results; profile of perpetrators; and means of perpetration, including, if applicable, the software involved. The Article provides a comprehensive analysis and conceptual approach for understanding computer damage cases by discussing the legal elements of computer damage offenses under the CFAA; considering the CFAA’s practical application; discussing the essential features involved in the perpetration of computer damage offenses and profiling the attackers; and summarizing the researchers’ findings
Security for Service-Oriented On-Demand Grid Computing
Grid Computing ist mittlerweile zu einem etablierten Standard für das verteilte Höchstleistungsrechnen geworden. Während die erste Generation von Grid Middleware-Systemen noch mit proprietären Schnittstellen gearbeitet hat, wurde durch die Einführung von service-orientierten Standards wie WSDL und SOAP durch die Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) die Interoperabilität von Grids signifikant erhöht. Dies hat den Weg für mehrere nationale und internationale Grid-Projekten bereitet, in denen eine groß e Anzahl von akademischen und eine wachsende Anzahl von industriellen Anwendungen im Grid ausgeführt werden, die die bedarfsgesteuerte (on-demand) Provisionierung und Nutzung von Ressourcen erfordern. Bedarfsgesteuerte Grids zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass sowohl die Software, als auch die Benutzer einer starken Fluktuation unterliegen. Weiterhin sind sowohl die Software, als auch die Daten, auf denen operiert wird, meist proprietär und haben einen hohen finanziellen Wert. Dies steht in starkem Kontrast zu den heutigen Grid-Anwendungen im akademischen Umfeld, die meist offen im Quellcode vorliegen bzw. frei verfügbar sind. Um den Ansprüchen einer bedarfsgesteuerten Grid-Nutzung gerecht zu werden, muss das Grid administrative Komponenten anbieten, mit denen Anwender autonom Software installieren können, selbst wenn diese Root-Rechte benötigen. Zur gleichen Zeit muss die Sicherheit des Grids erhöht werden, um Software, Daten und Meta-Daten der kommerziellen Anwender zu schützen. Dies würde es dem Grid auch erlauben als Basistechnologie für das gerade entstehende Gebiet des Cloud Computings zu dienen, wo ähnliche Anforderungen existieren.
Wie es bei den meisten komplexen IT-Systemen der Fall ist, sind auch in traditionellen Grid Middlewares Schwachstellen zu finden, die durch die geforderten Erweiterungen der administrativen Möglichkeiten potentiell zu einem noch größ erem Problem werden. Die Schwachstellen in der Grid Middleware öffnen einen homogenen Angriffsvektor auf die ansonsten heterogenen und meist privaten Cluster-Umgebungen. Hinzu kommt, dass anders als bei den privaten Cluster-Umgebungen und kleinen akademischen Grid-Projekten die angestrebten groß en und offenen Grid-Landschaften die Administratoren mit gänzlich unbekannten Benutzern und Verhaltenstrukturen konfrontieren. Dies macht das Erkennen von böswilligem Verhalten um ein Vielfaches schwerer. Als Konsequenz werden Grid-Systeme ein immer attraktivere Ziele für Angreifer, da standardisierte Zugriffsmöglichkeiten Angriffe auf eine groß e Anzahl von Maschinen und Daten von potentiell hohem finanziellen Wert ermöglichen.
Während die Rechenkapazität, die Bandbreite und der Speicherplatz an sich schon attraktive Ziele darstellen können, sind die im Grid enthaltene Software und die gespeicherten Daten viel kritischere Ressourcen. Modelldaten für die neuesten Crash-Test Simulationen,
eine industrielle Fluid-Simulation, oder Rechnungsdaten von Kunden haben einen beträchtlichen Wert und müssen geschützt werden. Wenn ein Grid-Anbieter nicht für die Sicherheit von Software, Daten und Meta-Daten sorgen kann,
wird die industrielle Verbreitung der offenen Grid-Technologie nicht stattfinden. Die Notwendigkeit von strikten Sicherheitsmechanismen muss mit der diametral entgegengesetzten
Forderung nach einfacher und schneller Integration von neuer Software und neuen Kunden in
Einklang gebracht werden.
In dieser Arbeit werden neue Ansätze zur Verbesserung der Sicherheit und Nutzbarkeit von service-orientiertem bedarfsgesteuertem Grid Computing vorgestellt. Sie ermöglichen eine autonome und sichere Installation und Nutzung von komplexer, service-orientierter und traditioneller Software auf gemeinsam genutzen Ressourcen.
Neue Sicherheitsmechanismen schützen Software, Daten und Meta-Daten der Anwender vor anderen Anwendern und vor externen Angreifern. Das System basiert auf Betriebssystemvirtualisierungstechnologien und bietet dynamische Erstellungs- und Installationsfunktionalitäten für virtuelle Images in einer sicheren Umgebung, in der automatisierte Mechanismen anwenderspezifische Firewall-Regeln setzen, um anwenderbezogene Netzwerkpartitionen zu erschaffen. Die Grid-Umgebung wird selbst in mehrere Bereiche unterteilt, damit die Kompromittierung von einzelnen Komponenten nicht so leicht zu einer Gefährdung des gesamten Systems führen kann. Die Grid-Headnode und der Image-Erzeugungsserver werden jeweils in einzelne Bereiche dieser demilitarisierten Zone positioniert.
Um die sichere Anbindung von existierenden Geschäftsanwendungen zu ermöglichen, werden der BPEL-Standard (Business Process Execution Language) und eine Workflow-Ausführungseinheit um Grid-Sicherheitskonzepte erweitert. Die Erweiterung erlaubt eine nahtlose Integration von geschützten Grid Services mit existierenden Web Services. Die Workflow-Ausführungseinheit bietet die Erzeugung und die Erneuerung (im Falle von lange laufenden Anwendungen) von Proxy-Zertifikaten. Der Ansatz ermöglicht die sichere gemeinsame Ausführung von neuen, fein-granularen, service-orientierten Grid Anwendungen zusammen mit traditionellen Batch- und Job-Farming Anwendungen. Dies wird durch die Integration des vorgestellten Grid Sandboxing-Systems in existierende Cluster Scheduling Systeme erreicht.
Eine innovative Server-Rotationsstrategie sorgt für weitere Sicherheit für den Grid Headnode Server, in dem transparent das virtuelle Server Image erneuert wird und damit auch unbekannte und unentdeckte Angriffe neutralisiert werden. Um die Angriffe, die nicht verhindert werden konnten, zu erkennen, wird ein neuartiges Intrusion Detection System vorgestellt, das auf Basis von Datenstrom-Datenbanksystemen funktioniert.
Als letzte Neuerung dieser Arbeit wird eine Erweiterung des modellgetriebenen Softwareentwicklungsprozesses eingeführt, die eine automatisierte Generierung von sicheren Grid Services ermöglicht, um die komplexe und damit unsichere manuelle Erstellung von Grid Services zu ersetzen.
Eine prototypische Implementierung der Konzepte wird auf Basis des Globus Toolkits 4, der Sun Grid Engine und der ActiveBPEL Engine vorgestellt. Die modellgetriebene Entwicklungsumgebung wurde in Eclipse für das Globus Toolkit 4 realisiert. Experimentelle Resultate und eine Evaluation der kritischen Komponenten des vorgestellten neuen Grids werden präsentiert. Die vorgestellten Sicherheitsmechanismem sollen die nächste Phase der Evolution des Grid Computing in einer sicheren Umgebung ermöglichen
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Design and Analysis of Decoy Systems for Computer Security
This dissertation is aimed at defending against a range of internal threats, including eaves-dropping on network taps, placement of malware to capture sensitive information, and general insider threats to exfiltrate sensitive information. Although the threats and adversaries may vary, in each context where a system is threatened, decoys can be used to deny critical information to adversaries making it harder for them to achieve their target goal. The approach leverages deception and the use of decoy technologies to deceive adversaries and trap nefarious acts. This dissertation proposes a novel set of properties for decoys to serve as design goals in the development of decoy-based infrastructures. To demonstrate their applicability, we designed and prototyped network and host-based decoy systems. These systems are used to evaluate the hypothesis that network and host decoys can be used to detect inside attackers and malware. We introduce a novel, large-scale automated creation and management system for deploying decoys. Decoys may be created in various forms including bogus documents with embedded beacons, credentials for various web and email accounts, and bogus financial in- formation that is monitored for misuse. The decoy management system supplies decoys for the network and host-based decoy systems. We conjecture that the utility of the decoys depends on the believability of the bogus information; we demonstrate the believability through experimentation with human judges. For the network decoys, we developed a novel trap-based architecture for enterprise networks that detects "silent" attackers who are eavesdropping network traffic. The primary contributions of this system is the ease of injecting, automatically, large amounts of believable bait, and the integration of various detection mechanisms in the back-end. We demonstrate our methodology in a prototype platform that uses our decoy injection API to dynamically create and dispense network traps on a subset of our campus wireless network. We present results of a user study that demonstrates the believability of our automatically generated decoy traffic. We present results from a statistical and information theoretic analysis to show the believability of the traffic when automated tools are used. For host-based decoys, we introduce BotSwindler, a novel host-based bait injection sys- tem designed to delude and detect crimeware by forcing it to reveal itself during the ex- ploitation of monitored information. Our implementation of BotSwindler relies upon an out-of-host software agent to drive user-like interactions in a virtual machine, seeking to convince malware residing within the guest OS that it has captured legitimate credentials. To aid in the accuracy and realism of the simulations, we introduce a novel, low overhead approach, called virtual machine verification, for verifying whether the guest OS is in one of a predefined set of states. We provide empirical evidence to show that BotSwindler can be used to induce malware into performing observable actions and demonstrate how this approach is superior to that used in other tools. We present results from a user to study to illustrate the believability of the simulations and show that financial bait infor- mation can be used to effectively detect compromises through experimentation with real credential-collecting malware. We present results from a statistical and information theo- retic analysis to show the believability of simulated keystrokes when automated tools are used to distinguish them. Finally, we introduce and demonstrate an expanded role for decoys in educating users and measuring organizational security through experiments with approximately 4000 university students and staff