Recentering Creativity in Copyright Law Discourse

Copyright discourse often centers around creativity; as a rationale for copyright, and as a threshold for copyright to subsist in songs, books, art and other creative works. Yet creativity remains an ethereal concept: if we do not know what it means, we cannot evaluate whether copyright law is promoting it, nor can we properly understand what it means for a work to be creative where that is required for copyright to subsist. An emerging strand of copyright discourse seeks to respond by examining scientific insights into the cognitive process of creativity to highlight how copyright law should be reshaped to cultivate it. In this paper I develop that scholarship with an ontological analysis of copyright’s relationship with creativity. Drawing on a recent meta-theory of creativity research, I demonstrate how creativity is phenomenological; that is, sociocultural and environmental factors are as important to creativity as individual cognitive processes. I then show that copyright law does not easily cohere with this phenomenological view of creativity: it has no role in some elements and is structured as to stymy others. While this analysis adds a further basis to the argument that we should not consider copyright law as a creativity-promoting legal framework, I use social contract theory to show that copyright can be regarded as having a secondary, facilitative role in the phenomenon of creativity. This analysis provides the theoretical framework for further research in three areas: (a) it challenges copyright expansionism; (b) it encourages examination of avenues to promote creativity beyond copyright law; and (c) it suggests the provision of property rights in respect of intellectual creations under copyright law should be revisited

Prof. Andrew Hammond appointed to Seventh Circuit Advisory Committee on Circuit Rules

Andrew Hammond, Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow at Indiana University Maurer School of Law, has been appointed to the Advisory Committee on Circuit Rules for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. “I am honored to serve on the Seventh Circuit’s Advisory Committee on Circuit Rules,” Hammond said. “My first job out of law school was clerking for then-Chief Judge Wood of the Seventh Circuit, and my experience working for her and later Judge Dow in the Northern District of Illinois helped shape how I think about federal practice and procedure. I am also excited to serve as a conduit for my colleagues and my students to learn more about and provide feedback to the Seventh Circuit on its rules. We are fortunate in Indiana to have such a collegial and intellectually rigorous federal circuit court.

Patenting AI Discoveries in Life Sciences: Overcoming Eligibility, Disclosure, and Inventorship Challenges

The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries face transformative opportunities through artificial intelligence and machine learning integration. However, these technological advances create distinct patent law complications that traditional drug development does not encounter. This article analyzes three interconnected obstacles: establishing eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, meeting disclosure standards under § 112(a), and determining proper inventorship when AI systems contribute substantially to claimed inventions. Drawing from recent USPTO guidance and Federal Circuit precedent, this analysis offers evidence-based strategies for patent practitioners, research scientists, and business leaders seeking robust intellectual property protection for AI-integrated pharmaceutical innovations

“Spinning Wheel Got to Go Round”: Developments in the Law Affecting Electronic Payments and Financial Services

The past year reminds us of the rock lyrics from “Spinning Wheel” on Blood, Sweat & Tears’s 1968 self-titled record—“What goes up, must come down/Spinning Wheel got to go round”—because there have been many changes in strategy and reversal of policy since President Trump’s inauguration in January 2025. Our Survey documents these changes and reversals as they affect electronic payments and financial services. This year’s Survey also reports on warnings from state and federal regulators aimed at bank and non-bank providers of consumer financial services. Part II examines an FTC enforcement action related to the unfair and deceptive marketing of so-called “free” products. In Part III, we address a CFPB action against a peer-to-peer payments platform for failing to protect consumers from fraud. Part IV examines several federal enforcement actions that emphasize safety and soundness, as well as robust anti-money laundering programs. We also examine several cases that demonstrate how states are stepping up to address regulatory issues that are not being pursued at the federal level in Part V. In a similar vein, Part VI discusses developments in New York regarding Buy Now, Pay Later (“BNPL”) legislation in the wake of CFPB abandoning its regulatory authority over those products. In Part VII, we give a brief account of the federal government’s effort to impose economic sanctions on a “crypto mixer,” Tornado Cash, our only nod to our longstanding coverage of crypto currencies. We conclude in Part VIII with brief comments on—to borrow from the same refrain—what happens if you miss the “directing sign on the straight and narrow highway.” While the “spinning wheel” of regulatory pronouncements and retractions may prove dizzying to many observers, we trust this year’s Survey will help business lawyers provide a steadying hand and calming influence to nervous clients

AI Can\u27t Adlib: Theorizing an Improvisation Carveout in the Work for Hire Doctrine

AI-generated actors and digital replicas are an increasingly pressing concern in the filmmaking industry. While this technology is only one of the myriad ways that generative AI is set to change Hollywood, debates about its use reflect a throughline in debates about AI generally: Can this technology do a convincing, much less desirable, job of what humans have done before? This Article argues that, at least in one particular context, the answer is no. It focuses on the art of adlibbing. It explains the unique position of improvisation within copyright law and proposes one mechanism—a carveout in the work for hire doctrine—that might elevate it, allowing human actors to be better rewarded for making these contributions. It also explains why such a carveout matters, not only through the lens of a particular case study but also against the broader backdrop of technological change in the filmmaking industry. In doing so, it seeks to do two things: (1) articulate the unique value of human creativity in this context and (2) give the human creators behind these contributions the leverage to secure more robust economic and intellectual property benefits in the AI era

True Man, Captive Mother: Abortion as a Fundamental Self-Defense Right

Abortion healthcare has faced significant challenges since the Supreme Court held in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization that there exists no constitutional right to abortion. Contrastingly, the right to bear arms, grounded in the right to self-defense, has strong constitutional protections, as highlighted in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. The extension of the right to self-defense is exemplified by the proliferation of Stand Your Ground laws in numerous states. This Comment examines the growing tension between self-defense doctrine, particularly through Stand Your Ground laws, and the increasing criminalization of abortion in various states. It argues that the fundamental right to self-defense, which permits individuals to use deadly force when fearing for their life, should extend to the context of abortion, particularly when a woman’s life or health is at risk due to pregnancy. The Comment draws on historical self-defense doctrine, modern expansions of gun rights, and the evolving jurisprudence on fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. It asserts that the Supreme Court cannot simultaneously uphold expansive self-defense protections while permitting abortion bans without exceptions for maternal life or health. Ultimately, this Comment posits that life-or-health abortions should be recognized as a form of self-defense and thus ­­constitutionally protected, offering a compelling argument for reform in the current landscape of abortion law