Logics of Imprecise Comparative Probability

This paper studies connections between two alternatives to the standard probability calculus for representing and reasoning about uncertainty: imprecise probability andcomparative probability. The goal is to identify complete logics for reasoning about uncertainty in a comparative probabilistic language whose semantics is given in terms of imprecise probability. Comparative probability operators are interpreted as quantifying over a set of probability measures. Modal and dynamic operators are added for reasoning about epistemic possibility and updating sets of probability measures

Lexicographic choice functions

We investigate a generalisation of the coherent choice functions considered by Seidenfeld et al. (2010), by sticking to the convexity axiom but imposing no Archimedeanity condition. We define our choice functions on vector spaces of options, which allows us to incorporate as special cases both Seidenfeld et al.'s (2010) choice functions on horse lotteries and sets of desirable gambles (Quaeghebeur, 2014), and to investigate their connections. We show that choice functions based on sets of desirable options (gambles) satisfy Seidenfeld's convexity axiom only for very particular types of sets of desirable options, which are in a one-to-one relationship with the lexicographic probabilities. We call them lexicographic choice functions. Finally, we prove that these choice functions can be used to determine the most conservative convex choice function associated with a given binary relation.Comment: 27 page

Decision-Making with Belief Functions: a Review

Approaches to decision-making under uncertainty in the belief function framework are reviewed. Most methods are shown to blend criteria for decision under ignorance with the maximum expected utility principle of Bayesian decision theory. A distinction is made between methods that construct a complete preference relation among acts, and those that allow incomparability of some acts due to lack of information. Methods developed in the imprecise probability framework are applicable in the Dempster-Shafer context and are also reviewed. Shafer's constructive decision theory, which substitutes the notion of goal for that of utility, is described and contrasted with other approaches. The paper ends by pointing out the need to carry out deeper investigation of fundamental issues related to decision-making with belief functions and to assess the descriptive, normative and prescriptive values of the different approaches

Accept & Reject Statement-Based Uncertainty Models

We develop a framework for modelling and reasoning with uncertainty based on accept and reject statements about gambles. It generalises the frameworks found in the literature based on statements of acceptability, desirability, or favourability and clarifies their relative position. Next to the statement-based formulation, we also provide a translation in terms of preference relations, discuss---as a bridge to existing frameworks---a number of simplified variants, and show the relationship with prevision-based uncertainty models. We furthermore provide an application to modelling symmetry judgements.Comment: 35 pages, 17 figure

Reasons and Means to Model Preferences as Incomplete

Literature involving preferences of artificial agents or human beings often assume their preferences can be represented using a complete transitive binary relation. Much has been written however on different models of preferences. We review some of the reasons that have been put forward to justify more complex modeling, and review some of the techniques that have been proposed to obtain models of such preferences

Probabilistic entailment in the setting of coherence: The role of quasi conjunction and inclusion relation

In this paper, by adopting a coherence-based probabilistic approach to default reasoning, we focus the study on the logical operation of quasi conjunction and the Goodman-Nguyen inclusion relation for conditional events. We recall that quasi conjunction is a basic notion for defining consistency of conditional knowledge bases. By deepening some results given in a previous paper we show that, given any finite family of conditional events F and any nonempty subset S of F, the family F p-entails the quasi conjunction C(S); then, given any conditional event E|H, we analyze the equivalence between p-entailment of E|H from F and p-entailment of E|H from C(S), where S is some nonempty subset of F. We also illustrate some alternative theorems related with p-consistency and p-entailment. Finally, we deepen the study of the connections between the notions of p-entailment and inclusion relation by introducing for a pair (F,E|H) the (possibly empty) class K of the subsets S of F such that C(S) implies E|H. We show that the class K satisfies many properties; in particular K is additive and has a greatest element which can be determined by applying a suitable algorithm

The shape of incomplete preferences

Incomplete preferences provide the epistemic foundation for models of imprecise subjective probabilities and utilities that are used in robust Bayesian analysis and in theories of bounded rationality. This paper presents a simple axiomatization of incomplete preferences and characterizes the shape of their representing sets of probabilities and utilities. Deletion of the completeness assumption from the axiom system of Anscombe and Aumann yields preferences represented by a convex set of state-dependent expected utilities, of which at least one must be a probability/utility pair. A strengthening of the state-independence axiom is needed to obtain a representation purely in terms of a set of probability/utility pairs.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/009053606000000740 in the Annals of Statistics (http://www.imstat.org/aos/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org