The Small-Is-Very-Small Principle

The central result of this paper is the small-is-very-small principle for restricted sequential theories. The principle says roughly that whenever the given theory shows that a property has a small witness, i.e. a witness in every definable cut, then it shows that the property has a very small witness: i.e. a witness below a given standard number. We draw various consequences from the central result. For example (in rough formulations): (i) Every restricted, recursively enumerable sequential theory has a finitely axiomatized extension that is conservative w.r.t. formulas of complexity $\leq n$. (ii) Every sequential model has, for any $n$, an extension that is elementary for formulas of complexity $\leq n$, in which the intersection of all definable cuts is the natural numbers. (iii) We have reflection for $\Sigma^0_2$-sentences with sufficiently small witness in any consistent restricted theory $U$. (iv) Suppose $U$ is recursively enumerable and sequential. Suppose further that every recursively enumerable and sequential $V$ that locally inteprets $U$, globally interprets $U$. Then, $U$ is mutually globally interpretable with a finitely axiomatized sequential theory. The paper contains some careful groundwork developing partial satisfaction predicates in sequential theories for the complexity measure depth of quantifier alternations

Incompleteness of boundedly axiomatizable theories

Our main result (Theorem A) shows the incompleteness of any consistent sequential theory T formulated in a finite language such that T is axiomatized by a collection of sentences of bounded quantifier-alternation-depth. Our proof employs an appropriate reduction mechanism to rule out the possibility of completeness by simply invoking Tarski's Undefinability of Truth theorem. We also use the proof strategy of Theorem A to obtain other incompleteness results (as in Theorems A+; B and B+).Comment: 6 pages; in this version reference to MathOverflow work of Emil Je\v{r}\'{a}bek has been added, and the author list of [AGLRZ] is now up-to-dat

Interpretability in Robinson's Q

Edward Nelson published in 1986 a book defending an extreme formalist view of mathematics according to which there is an impassable barrier in the totality of exponentiation. On the positive side, Nelson embarks on a program of investigating how much mathematics can be interpreted in Raphael Robinson’s theory of arithmetic Q. In the shadow of this program, some very nice logical investigations and results were produced by a number of people, not only regarding what can be interpreted in Q but also what cannot be so interpreted. We explain some of these results and rely on them to discuss Nelson’s position.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Pairs, sets and sequences in first-order theories

Asuransi sebagai aktivitas bisnis diharuskan memenuhi prinsip-prinsip hukum asuransi. Salah satu prinsip yang harus dipegang teguh adalah principle of  utmost good faith, di samping prinsip yang lain. Prinsip ini berbunyi bahwa seorang tertanggung wajib memberi informasi secara jujur terhadap apa yang dipertanggungkan kepada penanggung. Dalam bisnis Islam, kejujuran merupakan prinsip yang harus dijunjung tinggi. Secara hukum, prinsip ini diatur dalam KUH Dagang. Persoalannya adalah apakah prinsip ini dianggap cukup dari sudut pandang hukum perjanjian syariah. Secara sekilas bahwa prinsip iktikad baik sempurna ini telah memenuhi asas perjanjian syariah, namun demikian tidak memiliki kriteria maksimal kejujuran. Ketiadaan kejujuran dalam bisnis asuransi akan berdampak pada batalnya perjanjian asuransi karena ada unsur cacat kehendak (‘uyub ar-ridla). Insurance as a business activity must fulfill principles of insurance law. One of the principles that must be hold on is the principle of  utmost good faith. The principle says that an endured person must honestly give information of  what should be given responsibility to the guarantor. In Islamic business, honesty is a principle that should be respected. From point of  view of  law, the principle is settled in commerce law. The problem is that whether the principle is represenative enough if it is viewed from law of  syariah agreement. At glance, the principle has fulfilled the basic of syariah agreement, however, it does not have maximum criteria of  honesty. Unavailability of honesty in insurance business will give effect of  invalidate of  insurance agreement, for there is a deformity of desire (‘uyub ar-ridla).</p

Incompleteness of boundedly axiomatizable theories

Our main result (Theorem A) shows the incompleteness of any consistent sequential theory T formulated in a finite language such that T is axiomatized by a collection of sentences of bounded quantifier-alternation-depth. Our proof employs an appropriate reduction mechanism to rule out the possibility of completeness by simply invoking Tarski's Undefinability of Truth theorem. We also use the proof strategy of Theorem A to obtain other incompleteness results (as in Theorems A+; B and B+)

The Significance of Evidence-based Reasoning for Mathematics, Mathematics Education, Philosophy and the Natural Sciences

In this multi-disciplinary investigation we show how an evidence-based perspective of quantification---in terms of algorithmic verifiability and algorithmic computability---admits evidence-based definitions of well-definedness and effective computability, which yield two unarguably constructive interpretations of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA---over the structure N of the natural numbers---that are complementary, not contradictory. The first yields the weak, standard, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically verifiable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. The second yields a strong, finitary, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically computable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. We situate our investigation within a broad analysis of quantification vis a vis: * Hilbert's epsilon-calculus * Goedel's omega-consistency * The Law of the Excluded Middle * Hilbert's omega-Rule * An Algorithmic omega-Rule * Gentzen's Rule of Infinite Induction * Rosser's Rule C * Markov's Principle * The Church-Turing Thesis * Aristotle's particularisation * Wittgenstein's perspective of constructive mathematics * An evidence-based perspective of quantification. By showing how these are formally inter-related, we highlight the fragility of both the persisting, theistic, classical/Platonic interpretation of quantification grounded in Hilbert's epsilon-calculus; and the persisting, atheistic, constructive/Intuitionistic interpretation of quantification rooted in Brouwer's belief that the Law of the Excluded Middle is non-finitary. We then consider some consequences for mathematics, mathematics education, philosophy, and the natural sciences, of an agnostic, evidence-based, finitary interpretation of quantification that challenges classical paradigms in all these disciplines

Friedman-reflexivity

In the present paper, we explore an idea of Harvey Friedman to obtain a coordinate-free presentation of consistency. For some range of theories, Friedman's idea delivers actual consistency statements (modulo provable equivalence). For a wider range, it delivers consistency-like statements. We say that a sentence C is an interpreter of a finitely axiomatised A over U iff it is the weakest statement C over U, with respect to U-provability, such that U+C interprets A. A theory U is Friedman-reflexive iff every finitely axiomatised A has an interpreter over U. Friedman shows that Peano Arithmetic, PA, is Friedman-reflexive. We study the question which theories are Friedman-reflexive. We show that a very weak theory, Peano Corto, is Friedman-reflexive. We do not get the usual consistency statements here, but bounded, cut-free, or Herbrand consistency statements. We illustrate that Peano Corto as a base theory has additional desirable properties. We prove a characterisation theorem for the Friedman-reflexivity of sequential theories. We provide an example of a Friedman-reflexive sequential theory that substantially differs from the paradigm cases of Peano Arithmetic and Peano Corto. Interpreters over a Friedman-reflexive U can be used to define a provability-like notion for any finitely axiomatised A that interprets U. We explore what modal logics this idea gives rise to. We call such logics interpreter logics. We show that, generally, these logics satisfy the Löb Conditions, aka K4. We provide conditions for when interpreter logics extend S4, K45, and Löb's Logic. We show that, if either U or A is sequential, then the condition for extending Löb's Logic is fulfilled. Moreover, if our base theory U is sequential and if, in addition, its interpreters can be effectively found, we prove Solovay's Theorem. This holds even if the provability-like operator is not necessarily representable by a predicate of Gödel numbers. At the end of the paper, we briefly discuss how successful the coordinate-free approach is