The Grounding Problem and Presentist Explanations

Opponents of presentism have often argued that the presentist has difficulty in accounting for what makes (presently) true past-tensed propositions (TptP) true in a way that is compatible with her metaphysical view of time and reality. The problem is quite general and concerns not only strong truth-maker principles, but also the requirement that truth be grounded in reality. In order to meet the challenge, presentists have proposed many peculiar present aspects of the world as grounds for truths concerning the past, such as uninstantiated haecceities, Meinongian non-existents, ersatz times, and dispositional and distributional properties. The main problem with all such solutions is that any explanation of what grounds a TptP that involves the past is eo ipso a better explanation than any that involves only the present. Thus, the quest for an account of grounding for TptP that is compatible with the presentist ontology and ideology is doomed to be explanatorily deficient with respect to eternalism. In a recent article, Ben Caplan and David Sanson have claimed that presentists should change their strategy and, rather than seeking for exotic grounds for TptP, should adopt a more liberal view of explanation. That is, they should allow themselves to resort to \u201cpast directed\u201d explanations, even if they do not accept the past in their ontology and ideology. I argue that such a proposal is not compatible with the tenet that there is a substantial distinction between the ideology of such a version of presentism and that of eternalism. Therefore, the presentist cannot endorse such \u201cdeflationist\u201d explanations as an easy way out to the problem of the grounding of TptP

Once Grounded, Always Grounded: past truths without present grounds

Màster en Filosofia Analítica (APhil), Facultat Filosofía, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2021-2022, Director/Tutor: Sven Rosenkranz. Co-examiners: Esa Diaz Leon, Manuel Garcia-CarpinteroPresentism, roughly the view that only present objects exist, is intuitively appealing, and hence worthy of serious consideration. However, according to another equally intuitive and well-established constraint on truth, propositions require grounding, i.e. a wordly item capable of suitably ground their truth. Given that presentists are not committed to the existence of past objects like Caesar or dinosaurs, what could possibly ground the present truth of propositions about Cesar or dinosaurs? Henceforth, I shall refer to this challenge faced by presentists as the grounding objection to presentism. In this nal research paper, I set out to clarify such objection, carefully examine the number of di erent answers to it, and nally assess whether they succeed. In doing this, I shall proceed as follows. In the rst part, I will spell out the objection more in details, and specify presentists are mainly faced with a particular explanatory challenge rather than with a mere request of specifying an ontological ground for propositions about the past. Along the way, I will also lay out some desiderata for a overly satisfying solution to the grounding objection on behalf of the presentists. In the second part, accordingly, I'll proceed to weigh various presentist solutions by considering how well they fare in providing e cacious explanations for the truth of past propositions. Finally, I will set forward my preferred versions of the solution to the objection, helping myself from a speci c reading of the notion of grounding and also appealing to a more minimalist strategy. Crucially, the challenge will be met on the basis of a suitable explanation of why past propositions are tru

Abstract Objects in a Metaphysical Perspective

The article presents an unconventional although not absolutely unprecedented view on abstract objects defending the position of metaphysical realism. It is argued that abstract objects taken in purely ontological sense are the forms of objects. The forms possess some common characteristics of abstract objects, they can exist not in physical space and time and play a grounding role in their relation to concrete objects. It is stated that commonly discussed abstract objects – properties, kinds, mathematical objects – are forms

Ostrich presentism

Ostrich presentists maintain that we can use all the expressive resources of the tensed language to provide an explanation of why true claims about the past are true, without thereby paying any price in terms of ontology or basic ideology. I clarify the position by making a distinction between three kinds of explanation, which has general interest and applicability. I then criticize the ostrich position because it requires an unconstrained version of the third form of explanation, which is out of place in metaphysics

The fate of presentism in modern physics

There has been a recent spate of essays defending presentism, the view in the metaphysics of time according to which all and only present events or entities exist. What is particularly striking about this resurgence is that it takes place on the background of the significant pressure exerted on the position by the relativity of simultaneity asserted in special relativity, and yet in several cases invokes modern physics for support. I classify the presentist arguments into a two by two matrix depending on whether they take a compatibilist or incompatibilist stance with respect to both special relativity in particular and modern physics in general. I then review and evaluate what I take to be some of the most forceful and intriguing presentist arguments turning on modern physics. Although nothing of what I will say eventuates its categorical demise, I hope to show that whatever presentism remains compatible with empirical facts and our best physics is metaphysically repugnant.Comment: 23 pages, 4 figure

Liberated Presentism

(The version now posted is a revision of what was posted earlier. Final version now published.) The article gives a novel argument to show that there is sense of 'exists' suitable for posing a substantive issue between presentists and eternalists. It then seeks to invigorate a neglected variety of presentism. There are seven doctrines, widely accepted even among presentists, that create problems for presentism. Without distinguishing existence and being, presentists can comfortably reject all seven. Doing so would dispose of the majority of presentism’s problems. Further, it would enable presentists to reduce A-judgments to B-judgments, thereby insulating presentism from doubts about the intelligibility of A-theories. For reasons indicated very briefly, it might also make presentism less difficult to reconcile with special relativity, though the point is not pursued here

Nefarious presentism

Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions: ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists should be nefarious presentists

We don’t need no explanation

Explanation has played myriad roles in truthmaker theory. The notion of explanation is sometimes thought to give content to the very idea of truthmaking, and is sometimes used as a weapon to undermine the entire point of truthmaker theory. I argue that the notion of explanation is dialectically useless in truthmaker theory: while it’s true that truthmaking offers a form of explanation, this claim is theoretically unilluminating, and leaves truthmaker theorists vulnerable to various kinds of attack. I advocate an alternative approach to truthmaker theory that downplays the role of explanation, and show how it releases the enterprise from a variety of problematic commitments that have troubled truthmaker theorists. The “ontology-first” approach to truthmaking that I advocate not only restores the initial impulse behind truthmaking, but also has a number of theoretical advantages. Most prominently, it dodges the infamous problem of negative existentials, and lessens truthmaker theory’s dependence on contentious intuitive judgments about both explanation and truthmaking

The Openness and Closure of the Past and Future

In this thesis I investigate the claim that the future is in some sense ‘open’, with a view to giving a lucid and useful definition that is currently absent in the literature. To do this, I propose a four-part taxonomy to explain the senses that the future might be open for closed: ontological, nomic, semantic, and epistemological. This approach allows me to do two things: firstly, I systematically investigate each sense of openness towards both the past and future, noting both the logical possibility and plausibility of their combinations along with any temporal asymmetries they may be used to justify. I argue that we should consider any account of openness holistically by specifying a position of openness or closure for each of these senses, and develop a framework for doing this. Each sense of openness and closure has corresponding philosophical views, and I explore their impact on the plausibility of combination with other senses. This generates new insights into both the views themselves and the commitments to combinations of openness and closure they entail