There has been a recent spate of essays defending presentism, the view in the
metaphysics of time according to which all and only present events or entities
exist. What is particularly striking about this resurgence is that it takes
place on the background of the significant pressure exerted on the position by
the relativity of simultaneity asserted in special relativity, and yet in
several cases invokes modern physics for support. I classify the presentist
arguments into a two by two matrix depending on whether they take a
compatibilist or incompatibilist stance with respect to both special relativity
in particular and modern physics in general. I then review and evaluate what I
take to be some of the most forceful and intriguing presentist arguments
turning on modern physics. Although nothing of what I will say eventuates its
categorical demise, I hope to show that whatever presentism remains compatible
with empirical facts and our best physics is metaphysically repugnant.Comment: 23 pages, 4 figure
