The role of Dopamine in temporal uncertainty

Abstract The temporal preparation of motor responses to external events (temporal preparation) relies on internal representations of the accumulated elapsed time (temporal representations) before an event occurs and on estimates about its most likely time of occurrence (temporal expectations). The precision (inverse of uncertainty) of temporal preparation, however, is limited by two sources of uncertainty. One is intrinsic to the nervous system and scales with the length of elapsed time such that temporal representations are least precise for longest time durations. The other is external and arises from temporal variability of events in the outside world. The precision of temporal expectations thus decreases if events become more variable in time. It has long been recognized that the processing of time durations within the range of hundreds of milliseconds (interval timing) strongly depends on dopaminergic (DA) transmission. The role of DA for the precision of temporal preparation in humans, however, remains unclear. This study therefore directly assesses the role of DA in the precision of temporal preparation of motor responses in healthy humans. In a placebo-controlled double-blind design using a selective D2-receptor antagonist (sulpiride) and D1/D2 receptor antagonist (haloperidol), participants performed a variable foreperiod reaching task, under different conditions of internal and external temporal uncertainty. DA blockade produced a striking impairment in the ability of extracting temporal expectations across trials and on the precision of temporal representations within a trial. Large Weber fractions for interval timing, estimated by fitting subjective hazard functions, confirmed that this effect was driven by an increased uncertainty in the way participants were experiencing time. This provides novel evidence that DA regulates the precision with which we process time when preparing for an action.</jats:p

Midbrain Dopamine Neurons Signal Belief in Choice Accuracy during a Perceptual Decision

Central to the organization of behavior is the ability to predict the values of outcomes to guide choices. The accuracy of such predictions is honed by a teaching signal that indicates how incorrect a prediction was (“reward prediction error,” RPE). In several reinforcement learning contexts, such as Pavlovian conditioning and decisions guided by reward history, this RPE signal is provided by midbrain dopamine neurons. In many situations, however, the stimuli predictive of outcomes are perceptually ambiguous. Perceptual uncertainty is known to influence choices, but it has been unclear whether or how dopamine neurons factor it into their teaching signal. To cope with uncertainty, we extended a reinforcement learning model with a belief state about the perceptually ambiguous stimulus; this model generates an estimate of the probability of choice correctness, termed decision confidence. We show that dopamine responses in monkeys performing a perceptually ambiguous decision task comply with the model’s predictions. Consequently, dopamine responses did not simply reflect a stimulus’ average expected reward value but were predictive of the trial-to-trial fluctuations in perceptual accuracy. These confidence-dependent dopamine responses emerged prior to monkeys’ choice initiation, raising the possibility that dopamine impacts impending decisions, in addition to encoding a post-decision teaching signal. Finally, by manipulating reward size, we found that dopamine neurons reflect both the upcoming reward size and the confidence in achieving it. Together, our results show that dopamine responses convey teaching signals that are also appropriate for perceptual decisions

A Local Circuit Model of Learned Striatal and Dopamine Cell Responses under Probabilistic Schedules of Reward

Before choosing, it helps to know both the expected value signaled by a predictive cue and the associated uncertainty that the reward will be forthcoming. Recently, Fiorillo et al. (2003) found the dopamine (DA) neurons of the SNc exhibit sustained responses related to the uncertainty that a cure will be followed by reward, in addition to phasic responses related to reward prediction errors (RPEs). This suggests that cue-dependent anticipations of the timing, magnitude, and uncertainty of rewards are learned and reflected in components of the DA signals broadcast by SNc neurons. What is the minimal local circuit model that can explain such multifaceted reward-related learning? A new computational model shows how learned uncertainty responses emerge robustly on single trial along with phasic RPE responses, such that both types of DA responses exhibit the empirically observed dependence on conditional probability, expected value of reward, and time since onset of the reward-predicting cue. The model includes three major pathways for computing: immediate expected values of cures, timed predictions of reward magnitudes (and RPEs), and the uncertainty associated with these predictions. The first two model pathways refine those previously modeled by Brown et al. (1999). A third, newly modeled, pathway is formed by medium spiny projection neurons (MSPNs) of the matrix compartment of the striatum, whose axons co-release GABA and a neuropeptide, substance P, both at synapses with GABAergic neurons in the SNr and with the dendrites (in SNr) of DA neurons whose somas are in ventral SNc. Co-release enables efficient computation of sustained DA uncertainty responses that are a non-monotonic function of the conditonal probability that a reward will follow the cue. The new model's incorporation of a striatal microcircuit allowed it to reveals that variability in striatal cholinergic transmission can explain observed difference, between monkeys, in the amplitutude of the non-monotonic uncertainty function. Involvement of matriceal MSPNs and striatal cholinergic transmission implpies a relation between uncertainty in the cue-reward contigency and action-selection functions of the basal ganglia. The model synthesizes anatomical, electrophysiological and behavioral data regarding the midbrain DA system in a novel way, by relating the ability to compute uncertainty, in parallel with other aspects of reward contingencies, to the unique distribution of SP inputs in ventral SN.National Science Foundation (SBE-354378); Higher Educational Council of Turkey; Canakkale Onsekiz Mart University of Turke

Contextual novelty changes reward representations in the striatum

Reward representation in ventral striatum is boosted by perceptual novelty, although the mechanism of this effect remains elusive. Animal studies indicate a functional loop (Lisman and Grace, 2005) that includes hippocampus, ventral striatum, and midbrain as being important in regulating salience attribution within the context of novel stimuli. According to this model, reward responses in ventral striatum or midbrain should be enhanced in the context of novelty even if reward and novelty constitute unrelated, independent events. Using fMRI, we show that trials with reward-predictive cues and subsequent outcomes elicit higher responses in the striatum if preceded by an unrelated novel picture, indicating that reward representation is enhanced in the context of novelty. Notably, this effect was observed solely when reward occurrence, and hence reward-related salience, was low. These findings support a view that contextual novelty enhances neural responses underlying reward representation in the striatum and concur with the effects of novelty processing as predicted by the model of Lisman and Grace (2005)

The Dopaminergic Midbrain Encodes the Expected Certainty about Desired Outcomes

Dopamine plays a key role in learning; however, its exact function in decision making and choice remains unclear. Recently, we proposed a generic model based on active (Bayesian) inference wherein dopamine encodes the precision of beliefs about optimal policies. Put simply, dopamine discharges reflect the confidence that a chosen policy will lead to desired outcomes. We designed a novel task to test this hypothesis, where subjects played a "limited offer" game in a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment. Subjects had to decide how long to wait for a high offer before accepting a low offer, with the risk of losing everything if they waited too long. Bayesian model comparison showed that behavior strongly supported active inference, based on surprise minimization, over classical utility maximization schemes. Furthermore, midbrain activity, encompassing dopamine projection neurons, was accurately predicted by trial-by-trial variations in model-based estimates of precision. Our findings demonstrate that human subjects infer both optimal policies and the precision of those inferences, and thus support the notion that humans perform hierarchical probabilistic Bayesian inference. In other words, subjects have to infer both what they should do as well as how confident they are in their choices, where confidence may be encoded by dopaminergic firing

An interoceptive predictive coding model of conscious presence

We describe a theoretical model of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying conscious presence and its disturbances. The model is based on interoceptive prediction error and is informed by predictive models of agency, general models of hierarchical predictive coding and dopaminergic signaling in cortex, the role of the anterior insular cortex (AIC) in interoception and emotion, and cognitive neuroscience evidence from studies of virtual reality and of psychiatric disorders of presence, specifically depersonalization/derealization disorder. The model associates presence with successful suppression by top-down predictions of informative interoceptive signals evoked by autonomic control signals and, indirectly, by visceral responses to afferent sensory signals. The model connects presence to agency by allowing that predicted interoceptive signals will depend on whether afferent sensory signals are determined, by a parallel predictive-coding mechanism, to be self-generated or externally caused. Anatomically, we identify the AIC as the likely locus of key neural comparator mechanisms. Our model integrates a broad range of previously disparate evidence, makes predictions for conjoint manipulations of agency and presence, offers a new view of emotion as interoceptive inference, and represents a step toward a mechanistic account of a fundamental phenomenological property of consciousness