The Value of Existence Beyond Life: Towards a More Versatile Environmental Ethics

This paper argues that those that subscribe to “Biocentrism”, specifically the Biocentrism argued for by Paul Taylor, ought to adopt “Ontocentrism” instead. Biocentrism, the theory that all and only living things are morally considerable, fails to account for important moral differences between living things. It cannot justify, without ad-hoc addition, the intuition that a man is worth more than a pig, and a pig is worth more than a mouse. It similarly fails to account for the status of larger systems such as ecosystems, and lastly it fails to account for the status of non-biological entities and artificial life. Ontocentrism, the theory that all existing things, broadly construed, are morally considerable, ought to be adopted because it can account for these things without being ad-hoc and arbitrary

Invasive Species and Natural Function in Ecology

If ecological systems are functionally organised, they can possess functions or malfunctions. Natural function would provide justification for conservationists to act for the protection of current ecological arrangements and control the presence of populations that create ecosystem malfunctions. Invasive species are often thought to be malfunctional for ecosystems, so functional arrangement would provide an objective reason for their control. Unfortunately for this prospect, I argue no theory of function, which can support such normative conclusions, can be applied to large scale ecosystems. Instead ecological systems have causal structure, with small clusters of populations achieving functional arrangement. This, however, does not leave us without reason to control invasive species. We can look at the causal arrangement of ecological systems for populations that support ecological features that we should preserve. Populations that play a causal role in reducing biodiversity should be controlled, because biodiversity is a good all prudent agents should want to preserve

Invasive Species and Natural Function in Ecology

If ecological systems are functionally organised, they can possess functions or malfunctions. Natural function would provide justification for conservationists to act for the protection of current ecological arrangements and control the presence of populations that create ecosystem malfunctions. Invasive species are often thought to be malfunctional for ecosystems, so functional arrangement would provide an objective reason for their control. Unfortunately for this prospect, I argue no theory of function, which can support such normative conclusions, can be applied to large scale ecosystems. Instead ecological systems have causal structure, with small clusters of populations achieving functional arrangement. This, however, does not leave us without reason to control invasive species. We can look at the causal arrangement of ecological systems for populations that support ecological features that we should preserve. Populations that play a causal role in reducing biodiversity should be controlled, because biodiversity is a good all prudent agents should want to preserve

The function argument for ascribing interests

In the debate over the moral status of nonsentient organisms, biocentrists argue that all living things, including nonsentient ones, have interests of their own. They often defend this claim by arguing that living organisms are goal-directed, functionally organized systems. This argument for ascribing interests has faced a serious challenge that is sometimes called the Problem of Scope. Critics have argued that ascribing interests on the basis of functional organization would have implausible implications regarding the scope of the argument, such as ascribing interests to inanimate artifacts and machines. In this paper, I argue that much of the recent discussion on the Problem of Scope is based on an uncharitable interpretation of the argument for ascribing interests, which presupposes a reductionist account of functions. I assess this version of the argument, and explain why it cannot succeed. I then consider an alternative interpretation of the argument, which appeals to a non-reductionist account of functions. I argue that this version of the argument avoids the Problem of Scope, while acknowledging that it has limitations of its own

Divergent Teleology: A Response to Zoe Grabow’s Reconciliation of Taylor and Aristotle

In this paper, I will provide a commentary of “Unified Teleology: Paul Taylor’s Biocentric Egalitarianism through Aristotle.” In addition to providing an account of Zoe Grabow’s reconciliation of Aristotle’s value ethics with Paul Taylor’s “respect for nature,” I will also attempt to offer a few thoughts on some of the primary philosophical tensions mentioned by Grabow. The most notable of these issues include the adoption of Aristotle’s ancient philosophy to a modern conception of environmental ethics, the limitations of Taylor’s “biocentric egalitarianism”, and the nature of the relationship between humans and the environment

Environmental philosophy: rivalry within

Environmental philosophy contains fractious elements, two of these being social ecology and deep ecology. This study highlights and elaborates upon the fact that social ecology and deep ecology actually have more in common than their respective proponents care to acknowledge, and identifies a major barrier between them which has been with environmental philosophy since its inception some 30 years ago and still persists to this day, namely the biocentric-anthropocentric divide

Environmental ethics: An African understanding

Global concerns about the current environmental crisis have culminated into some controversial environmental ethical theories, that is, normative environmental ethics, sentientist ethics, biocentric ethics, ecocentric ethics and eco-feminist ethics. One of the fundamental underlying features connecting these environmental ethical theories is their grounding in Western perspectives and cultural experiences. Given that environmental concerns are global concerns, and that the imperative of environmental ethics is challenging those life-threatening concerns, critical explorations of environmental ethics need to go beyond the Western horizon. But with respect to the African perspective to environmental ethics and the people’s cultural understanding of the environmental crisis, little has been done in this penultimate area. However, Segun Ogungbemi and Godfrey Tangwa have pioneered philosophical discussions on environmental ethics from an African vantage point. Hence, Ogungbemi defends what he calls “ethics of nature-relatedness,” while Tangwa proposes “ecobio-communitarianism” as a definitive theory of an African orientation to environmental ethics. This paper is therefore a contribution to the consolidation of an African orientation to environmental ethics through a critique and reconstruction of some of the misrepresentations of the African perspective to the environment, implicit in the arguments of Ogungbemi and Tangwa.Key words: Environmental ethics, ethics of nature-relatedness, eco-biocommunitarianism

Edible insects – defining knowledge gaps in biological and ethical considerations of entomophagy

While seeking novel food sources to feed the increasing population of the globe, several alternatives have been discussed, including algae, fungi or in vitro meat. The increasingly propagated usage of farmed insects for human nutrition raises issues regarding food safety, consumer information and animal protection. In line with law, insects like any other animals must not be reared or manipulated in a way that inflicts unnecessary pain, distress or harm on them. Currently, there is a great need for research in the area of insect welfare, especially regarding species-specific needs, health, farming systems and humane methods of killing. Recent results from neurophysiological, neuroanatomical and behavioral sciences prompt caution when denying consciousness and therefore the likelihood of presence of pain and suffering or something closely related to it to insects. From an animal protection point of view, these issues should be satisfyingly solved before propagating and establishing intensive husbandry systems for insects as a new type of mini-livestock factory farming