Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms

Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings. We then focus on sub-committee voting with approvals and propose extensions of the justified representation axioms that have been considered for proportional representation in approval-based committee voting. We study the properties and relations of these axioms. For each of the axioms, we analyse whether a representative committee exists and also examine the complexity of computing and verifying such a committee

Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences

From fundamental concepts and results to recent advances in computational social choice, this open access book provides a thorough and in-depth look at multi-winner voting based on approval preferences. The main focus is on axiomatic analysis, algorithmic results and several applications that are relevant in artificial intelligence, computer science and elections of any kind. What is the best way to select a set of candidates for a shortlist, for an executive committee, or for product recommendations? Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of candidates based on the preferences expressed by the voters. A wide variety of decision processes in settings ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer applications (collaborative filtering, dynamic Q&A platforms, diversity in search results, etc.) share the problem of identifying a representative subset of alternatives. The study of multi-winner voting provides the principled analysis of this task. Approval-based committee voting rules (in short: ABC rules) are multi-winner voting rules particularly suitable for practical use. Their usability is founded on the straightforward form in which the voters can express preferences: voters simply have to differentiate between approved and disapproved candidates. Proposals for ABC rules are numerous, some dating back to the late 19th century while others have been introduced only very recently. This book explains and discusses these rules, highlighting their individual strengths and weaknesses. With the help of this book, the reader will be able to choose a suitable ABC voting rule in a principled fashion, participate in, and be up to date with the ongoing research on this topic

Models of Political Economy

Models of Political Economy will introduce students to the basic methodology of political economics. It covers all core theories as well as new developments including: decision theory game theory mechanism design games of asymmetric information. Hannu Nurmi's text will prove to be invaluable to all students who wish to understand this increasingly technical field

Collective decision-making under the influence of bribers and temporal constraints

Jo estudio la connexió entre la corrupció i les característiques estructurals dels parlaments: nombre de seients, el nombre de partits representats, i regles de decisió adoptades. Amb l'aplicació d'enfocaments analítics i computacionals, a més de simulacions, mostro que el nombre mitjà de diputats que han de ser subornats disminueix a mesura que el nombre de partits augmenta, de manera que el suborn se sent encoratjat per un nombre cada vegada més gran de parts. També investigo dues formes en que pot afectar el temps a la presa de decisions. En primer lloc, suggereixo un procediment de votació iteratiu en el que el retard en prendre una decisió és costós. Amb dos electors, dues opcions i un ordre de votació fix, demostro que en l’únic equilibri perfecte en subjocs, l’elector que vota primer, obté la seva opció preferida a l'inici del procediment. Si l'ordre s'inverteix en algun moment, identifico la condició sota la qual el votant que vota segon pot obtenir la seva opció preferida al principi. En segon lloc, proposo un altre procediment de votació iterativa, permetent que els votants canvien els seus vots, però ara amb una data límit: una etapa que, si no s'ha pres una decisió, els resultats de la votació són pitjors. Mostro que (i) si hi ha temps suficient perquè tots els votants canviïn el seu vot, es prendrà una decisió, i (ii) si hi ha una alternativa preferida per la majoria dels votants, aquesta alternativa serà finalment triada. Afegeixo un estudi experimental que indica que fins i tot amb menys temps del necessari per a què cada votant pugui canviar el seu vot, els electors estaran d'acord amb una decisió de totes maneres.Estudio la conexión entre la corrupción y las características estructurales de los parlamentos: número de asientos, el número de partidos representados, y reglas de decisión adoptadas. Con la aplicación de enfoques analíticos y computacionales, además de simulaciones, muestro que el número medio de diputados que deben ser sobornados disminuye a medida que el número de partidos aumenta, por lo que el soborno se siente alentado por un número cada vez mayor de partes. También investigo dos formas en que puede afectar el tiempo en la toma de decisiones. En primer lugar, sugiero un procedimiento de votación iterativo en el que el retraso en tomar una decisión es costoso. Con dos electores, dos opciones y un orden de votación fijo, demuestro que en el único equilibrio perfecto en subjuegos, el elector que vota primero obtiene su opción preferida al inicio del procedimiento. Si el orden se invierte en algún momento, identifico la condición bajo la cual el votante que vota segundo puede obtener su opción preferida al principio. En segundo lugar, propongo otro procedimiento de votación iterativa, permitiendo que los votantes cambian sus votos, pero ahora con una fecha límite: una etapa que, si no se ha tomado una decisión, los resultados de la votación son peores. Muestro que (i) si hay tiempo suficiente para que todos los votantes cambien su voto, se tomará una decisión, y (ii) si hay una alternativa preferida por la mayoría de los votantes, esta alternativa será finalmente elegida. Añado un estudio experimental que indica que los electores estarán de acuerdo con una decisión aunque no haya tiempo sufficiente para que cada votante pueda cambiar su voto.I study the connection between corruption and structural characteristics of parliaments: number of seats, the number of parties represented, and decision rules adopted. Applying analytical and computational approaches, and running simulations, I show that the average number of deputies needed to be bribed decreases as the number of parties increases, so bribery is encouraged by a growing number of parties. I also investigate two ways in which time may affect decision-making. First, I suggest an iterative voting procedure in which delay to reach a decision is costly. For two voters and two options, with a fixed voting order, I prove that in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium the voter who votes first obtains his most preferred option at the beginning of the procedure. If the fixed order is reversed once at some stage, I identify the condition under which the voter initially voting the second obtains this most preferred option, also at the beginning. Second, I propose another iterative voting procedure, allowing voters to change their votes, but now with a deadline: a stage such that, if no decision has been taken by then, the worst outcome results. I show that (i) if there is enough time for all the voters to change their vote, a decision will be taken, and (ii) if there is an alternative preferred by a majority of the voters, this alternative will be finally chosen. I add an experimental study indicating that even with less time necessary for every voter to change his vote, the voters will agree with a decision anyway

Fostering e-participation sustainability through a BPM-driven semantic model

According to a recent Eurobarometer survey (2014), 68% of Europeans tend not to trust national governments. As the increasing alienation of citizens from politics endangers democracy and welfare, governments, practitioners and researchers look for innovative means to engage citizens in policy matters. One of the measures intended to overcome the so-called democratic deficit is the promotion of civic participation. Digital media proliferation offers a set of novel characteristics related to interactivity, ubiquitous connectivity, social networking and inclusiveness that enable new forms of societal-wide collaboration with a potential impact on leveraging participative democracy. Following this trend, e-Participation is an emerging research area that consists in the use of Information and Communication Technologies to mediate and transform the relations among citizens and governments towards increasing citizens’ participation in public decision-making. However, despite the widespread efforts to implement e-Participation through research programs, new technologies and projects, exhaustive studies on the achieved outcomes reveal that it has not yet been successfully incorporated in institutional politics. Given the problems underlying e-Participation implementation, the present research suggested that, rather than project-oriented efforts, the cornerstone for successfully implementing e-Participation in public institutions as a sustainable added-value activity is a systematic organisational planning, embodying the principles of open-governance and open-engagement. It further suggested that BPM, as a management discipline, can act as a catalyst to enable the desired transformations towards value creation throughout the policy-making cycle, including political, organisational and, ultimately, citizen value. Following these findings, the primary objective of this research was to provide an instrumental model to foster e-Participation sustainability across Government and Public Administration towards a participatory, inclusive, collaborative and deliberative democracy. The developed artefact, consisting in an e-Participation Organisational Semantic Model (ePOSM) underpinned by a BPM-steered approach, introduces this vision. This approach to e-Participation was modelled through a semi-formal lightweight ontology stack structured in four sub-ontologies, namely e-Participation Strategy, Organisational Units, Functions and Roles. The ePOSM facilitates e-Participation sustainability by: (1) Promoting a common and cross-functional understanding of the concepts underlying e-Participation implementation and of their articulation that bridges the gap between technical and non-technical users; (2) Providing an organisational model which allows a centralised and consistent roll-out of strategy-driven e-Participation initiatives, supported by operational units dedicated to the execution of transformation projects and participatory processes; (3) Providing a standardised organisational structure, goals, functions and roles related to e-Participation processes that enhances process-level interoperability among government agencies; (4) Providing a representation usable in software development for business processes’ automation, which allows advanced querying using a reasoner or inference engine to retrieve concrete and specific information about the e-Participation processes in place. An evaluation of the achieved outcomes, as well a comparative analysis with existent models, suggested that this innovative approach tackling the organisational planning dimension can constitute a stepping stone to harness e-Participation value

Uncertainty management for coastal defence systems.

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:DXN029923 / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

Intelligent monitoring of business processes using case-based reasoning

The work in this thesis presents an approach towards the effective monitoring of business processes using Case-Based Reasoning (CBR). The rationale behind this research was that business processes constitute a fundamental concept of the modern world and there is a constantly emerging need for their efficient control. They can be efficiently represented but not necessarily monitored and diagnosed effectively via an appropriate platform. Motivated by the above observation this research pursued to which extent there can be efficient monitoring, diagnosis and explanation of the workflows. Workflows and their effective representation in terms of CBR were investigated as well as how similarity measures among them could be established appropriately. The monitoring results and their following explanation to users were questioned as well as which should be an appropriate software architecture to allow monitoring of workflow executions. Throughout the progress of this research, several sets of experiments have been conducted using existing enterprise systems which are coordinated via a predefined workflow business process. Past data produced over several years have been used for the needs of the conducted experiments. Based on those the necessary knowledge repositories were built and used afterwards in order to evaluate the suggesting approach towards the effective monitoring and diagnosis of business processes. The produced results show to which extent a business process can be monitored and diagnosed effectively. The results also provide hints on possible changes that would maximize the accuracy of the actual monitoring, diagnosis and explanation. Moreover the presented approach can be generalised and expanded further to enterprise systems that have as common characteristics a possible workflow representation and the presence of uncertainty. Further work motivated by this thesis could investigate how the knowledge acquisition can be transferred over workflow systems and be of benefit to large-scale multidimensional enterprises. Additionally the temporal uncertainty could be investigated further, in an attempt to address it while reasoning. Finally the provenance of cases and their solutions could be explored further, identifying correlations with the process of reasoning