SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT IN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY

The automotive industry is one of the world\u27s most important economic sectors in terms of revenue and employment. The automotive supply chain is complex owing to the large number of parts in an automobile, the multiple layers of suppliers to supply those parts, and the coordination of materials, information, and financial flows across the supply chain. Many uncertainties and different natural and man-made disasters have repeatedly stricken and disrupted automotive manufacturers and their supply chains. Managing supply chain risk in a complex environment is always a challenge for the automotive industry. This research first provides a comprehensive literature review of the existing research work on the supply chain risk identification and management, considering, but not limited to, the characteristics of the automotive supply chain, since the literature focusing on automotive supply chain risk management (ASCRM) is limited. The review provides a summary and a classification for the underlying supply chain risk resources in the automotive industry; and state-of-the-art research in the area is discussed, with an emphasis on the quantitative methods and mathematical models currently used. The future research topics in ASCRM are identified. Then two mathematical models are developed in this research, concentrating on supply chain risk management in the automotive industry. The first model is for optimizing manufacturer cooperation in supply chains. OEMs often invest a large amount of money in supplier development to improve suppliers’ capabilities and performance. Allocating the investment optimally among multiple suppliers to minimize risks while maintaining an acceptable level of return becomes a critical issue for manufacturers. This research develops a new non-linear investment return mathematical model for supplier development, which is more applicable in reality. The solutions of this new model can assist supply chain management in deciding investment at different levels in addition to making “yes or no” decisions. The new model is validated and verified using numerical examples. The second model is the optimal contract for new product development with the risk consideration in the automotive industry. More specifically, we investigated how to decide the supplier’s capacity and the manufacturer’s order in the supply contract in order to reduce the risks and maximize their profits when the demand of the new product is highly uncertain. Based on the newsvendor model and Stackelberg game theory, a single period two-stage supply chain model for a product development contract, consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer, is developed. A practical back induction algorithm is conducted to get subgame perfect optimal solutions for the contract model. Extensive model analyses are accomplished for various situations with theoretical results leading to conditions of solution optimality. The model is then applied to a uniform distribution for uncertain demands. Based on a real automotive supply chain case, the numerical experiments and sensitivity analyses are conducted to study the behavior and performance of the proposed model, from which some interesting managerial insights were provided. The proposed solutions provide an effective tool for making the supplier-manufacturer contracts when manufacturers face high uncertain demand. We believe that the quantitative models and solutions studied in this research have great potentials to be applied in automotive and other industries in developing the efficient supply chains involving advanced and emerging technologies

Competitive Bidding in Supply Chains

This thesis is primarily concerned with the competition between suppliers for a buyer’s procurement business with consideration of subcontracting, commitment and capacity reservation. Under the circumstance where suppliers face diseconomies of scale, it may be cost effective for a buyer to split an order across different suppliers. Even when the buyer chooses only one supplier, the winning supplier may subcontract part of the work to the others subsequently. Motivated by these observations, Chapter 2 studies a supplier bidding game where a buyer requests quotes from two competing suppliers. We consider two procurement scenarios: (1) Order Splitting where each supplier submits a function bid which specifies different payments for different quantities, and the buyer may split the order; (2) Single-Sourcing Commitment where the buyer commits to purchasing from only one supplier before suppliers submit their bids, and the winning supplier may subsequently subcontract with the losing one. The second and third papers investigate the competitive behaviour of suppliers with capacity reservation. To hedge against financial risks, the suppliers often require a buyer to reserve capacity in advance by paying an upfront fee. In Chapter 3, we consider a discrete version of this problem where competing suppliers each choose a reservation price and an execution price for blocks of capacity, and the buyer needs to decide which blocks to reserve. Chapter 4 studies a continuous version of the problem where we allow general cost functions. The suppliers compete by offering the price functions (for reservation and execution) and the buyer decides how much to reserve from each supplier. This thesis sheds light on how suppliers compete with each other by considering a variety of factors. We believe an in-depth look at the competitive behaviour of suppliers will deepen our understanding of a buyer’s procurement process, and hence helps a buyer make a better sourcing decision

Competitive Bidding in Supply Chains

This thesis is primarily concerned with the competition between suppliers for a buyer’s procurement business with consideration of subcontracting, commitment and capacity reservation. Under the circumstance where suppliers face diseconomies of scale, it may be cost effective for a buyer to split an order across different suppliers. Even when the buyer chooses only one supplier, the winning supplier may subcontract part of the work to the others subsequently. Motivated by these observations, Chapter 2 studies a supplier bidding game where a buyer requests quotes from two competing suppliers. We consider two procurement scenarios: (1) Order Splitting where each supplier submits a function bid which specifies different payments for different quantities, and the buyer may split the order; (2) Single-Sourcing Commitment where the buyer commits to purchasing from only one supplier before suppliers submit their bids, and the winning supplier may subsequently subcontract with the losing one. The second and third papers investigate the competitive behaviour of suppliers with capacity reservation. To hedge against financial risks, the suppliers often require a buyer to reserve capacity in advance by paying an upfront fee. In Chapter 3, we consider a discrete version of this problem where competing suppliers each choose a reservation price and an execution price for blocks of capacity, and the buyer needs to decide which blocks to reserve. Chapter 4 studies a continuous version of the problem where we allow general cost functions. The suppliers compete by offering the price functions (for reservation and execution) and the buyer decides how much to reserve from each supplier. This thesis sheds light on how suppliers compete with each other by considering a variety of factors. We believe an in-depth look at the competitive behaviour of suppliers will deepen our understanding of a buyer’s procurement process, and hence helps a buyer make a better sourcing decision

Analysis of a decentralized production-inventory system

We model an isolated portion of a competitive supply chain as a M/M/1 make-to-stock queue. The retailer carries finished goods inventory to service a Poisson demand process, and specifies a policy for replenishing his inventory from an upstream supplier. The supplier chooses the service rate, i.e., the capacity of his manufacturing facility, which behaves as a single-server queue with exponential service times. Demand is backlogged and both agents share the backorder cost. In addition, a linear inventory holding cost is charged to the retailer, and a linear cost for building production capacity is incurred by the supplier. The inventory level, demand rate, and cost parameters are common knowledge to both agents. Under the continuous-state approximation where the M/M/1 queue has an exponential rather than geometric steady-state distribution, we characterize the optimal centralized and Nash solutions, and show that a contract with linear transfer payments replicates a cost-sharing agreement and coordinates the system. We also compare the total system costs, the agents' decision variables, and the customer service levels of the centralized versus Nash versus Stackelberg solutions. (Make-to-Stock Queue; Game Theory

Strategic Operational Decisions in a Supply Chain with Demand and Recall Risks

Among supply chain risks, both demand risk and recall risk have been recognized as critical challenges firms have to face. Making proper operational decisions to mitigate these two types of risks is of great importance to every firm. This dissertation ``Strategic Operational Decisions in a Supply Chain with Demand and Recall Risks'' focus on capacity related decisions, which tackles the demand risk, and quality related decisions, which tackles the recall risk. Specifically, we conduct our research along three dimensions: (i) optimizing capacity decisions or quality decisions; (ii) the interaction between capacity and quality decisions; (iii) the impact of supply chain factors on these decisions. In Chapter 2, we examine quality choice and capacity timing of start-ups and established firms. In Chapter 3, we focus on procurement contracting under product recall risk to manage product quality and mitigate the financial impact of product recalls. In Chapter 4, we investigate strategies to improve product quality and to make proper recall decisions.Doctor of Philosoph

Essays on Firms and Human Behavior

This dissertation studies three different topics related to the economic science. In the first chapter, it is shown that collaborations between firms can have more harmful consequences on prices than a consolidation between them. We analyze a symmetric joint venture in which firms facing external competition collaborate in input production. Under standard regularity conditions, the collaboration leads to higher profits than a horizontal merger, whereas the effect on prices and quantities depends on the form of downstream competition. When firms compete in prices, downstream prices for all firms are higher following a symmetric joint venture than following a merger. The reverse result may obtain under quantity competition. In light of our results regarding profits, we provide reasons why firms might still wish to merge: imperfect information, cost synergies, and organizational asymmetries.On the second chapter, it is measured the impact on retail prices for a gas station if a big-box store starts selling gasoline to consumers. To the concern of their smaller competitors Wal-Mart, big-box stores, and other high-volume, low-price retailers have entered many retail industries globally in recent decades. In particular, big-box stores have increased in presence and market share in the U.S. retail gasoline industry. We examine the price impact of these hypermarts on traditional gasoline retailers and find it to be economically large. The presence of a hypermart reduces a mean retailer\u27s profit by over one-half. This impact is considerably larger than that induced by the presence of a typical retailer. We employ a unique data set covering a medium-sized metropolitan areas: Tucson, AZ.The third chapter investigates the effects of norms and peer pressure on the evolution of an epidemics, and the policies that could minimize its extent. Individuals make binary decisions regarding the level of protection from contagion and the payoffs from those decisions would depend on the popularity of their choices. Social norms can influence the decision both by lowering the payoffs from playing outside the norm or by lowering the probability of interaction. I\u27ve found that the stronger the norms are, the higher the incidence of the disease needed for agents to start protecting, but also, the eradication is easier to occur. I extend the analysis to the asymptomatic latency case and I extend the model to include different variations affecting the agents\u27 decisions. Finally, I analyze different types of government interventions to eradicate the disease

Corporate Investment under Uncertainty and Competition: A Real Options Approach.

Abstract: Corporate investment opportunities can be represented as a set of (real) options to acquire productive assets. Identification of the optimal exercise strategies for these options plays a crucial role in improving the quality of capital budgeting decisions and, as a consequence, in maximizing shareholders¿ wealth. Structural changes in the economic environment, imperfect product market competition and agency conflicts across different groups of the firm¿s stakeholders make the standard option theory alone often insufficient for analyzing real investment decisions. This thesis combines option theory with non-cooperative game theory to establish some new results concerning the impact of policy uncertainty, product market interactions, and debt financing on the firm¿s optimal investment strategy.

Essays on bargaining and repeated games

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2011.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 194-202).The thesis consists of four essays on bargaining and repeated games. The first essay studies whether allowing players to sign binding contracts governing future play leads to reputation effects in repeated games with long-run players. Given any prior over behavioral types, a modified prior is constructed with the same total weight on behavioral types and a larger support under which almost all efficient, feasible, and individually rational payoffs are attainable in perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Thus, whether reputation effects emerge in repeated games with contracts depends on details of the prior distribution over behavioral types other than its support. The second essay studies reputational bargaining under the assumption of first-order knowledge of rationality. The share of the surplus that a player can guarantee herself is determined, as is the bargaining posture that she must announce in order to guarantee herself this much. It is shown that this maxmin share of the surplus is large relative to the player's initial reputation, and that the corresponding bargaining posture simply demands this share plus compensation for any delay in reaching agreement. The third essay studies the maximum level of cooperation that can be sustained in sequential equilibrium in repeated games with network monitoring. The foundational result is that the maximum level of cooperation can be sustained in grim trigger strategies. Comparative statics on the maximum level of cooperation are shown to be highly tractable. For the case of fixed monitoring networks, a new notion of network centrality is introduced, which characterizes which players have greater capacities for cooperation and which networks can support more cooperation. The fourth essay studies the price-setting problem of a monopoly that in each time period has the option of failing to deliver its good after receiving payment. Optimal equilibrium pricing and profits are characterized. For durable goods, a lower bound on optimal profit for any discount factor is provided. The bound converges to the optimal static monopoly profit as the discount factor converges to one, in contrast to the Coase conjecture.by Alexander G. Wolitzky.Ph.D