514,325 research outputs found
Davidsonâs Wittgenstein
Although the later Wittgenstein appears as one of the most influential
figures in Davidsonâs later works on meaning, it is not,
for the most part, clear how Davidson interprets and employs
Wittgensteinâs ideas. In this paper, I will argue that Davidsonâs
later works on meaning can be seen as mainly a manifestation of
his attempt to accommodate the later Wittgensteinâs basic ideas
about meaning and understanding, especially the requirement
of drawing the seems right/is right distinction and the way this
requirement must be met. These ideas, however, are interpreted
by Davidson in his own way. I will then argue that Davidson
even attempts to respect Wittgensteinâs quietism, provided that
we understand this view in the way Davidson does. Having argued
for that, I will finally investigate whether, for Davidson at
least, his more theoretical and supposedly explanatory projects,
such as that of constructing a formal theory of meaning and
his use of the notion of triangulation, are in conflict with this
Wittgensteinian quietist view
Ion: Platoâs Defense of Poetry
This reading of Plato's Ion shows that the philosophic action mimed and engendered by the dialogue thoroughly reverses its (and Plato's) often supposed philosophical point, revealing that poetry is just as defensible as philosophy, and only in the same way. It is by Plato's indirections we find true directions out: the war between philosophy and poetry is a hoax on Plato's part, and a mistake on the part of his literalist readers. The dilemma around which the dialogue moves is false, and would have been recognized as such by Plato's contemporaries. Further, it is intrinsically related to a false, but popular, view of language. So the way out of the false dilemma of the dialogue is the way out of the war between philosophy and poetry, and also makes one see what is false about the view of language which makes such war plausible
Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution
Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only link an agent to the truth; by contrast, nonfactive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an agent to either truths or falsehoods. Researchers of mental state attribution often draw a sharp line between the capacity to attribute accurate states of mind and the capacity to attribute inaccurate or âreality-incongruentâ states of mind, such as false belief. This article argues that the contrast that really matters for mental state attribution does not divide accurate from inaccurate states, but factive from nonfactive ones
Belief as an act of reason
Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that itâs an actualization of its subjectâs rational capacities or (ii) that itâs a rational activity (hence, a certain kind of event). And, though belief is not an act of reason in the second sense, it may nonetheless be one in the first: it may be a static actualization of its subjectâs rational capacities
The value and normative role of knowledge
Why does knowledge matter? Two answers have been influential in the recent literature. One is that it has value: knowledge is one of the goods. Another is that it plays a significant normative role: knowledge is the norm of action, belief, assertion, or the like. This paper discusses whether one can derive one of the claims from the other. That is, whether assuming the idea that knowledge has value â and some defensible general hypotheses about norms and values â, we could derive the claim that it plays the alleged normative role. Or whether, assuming that knowledge does play that role â and some defensible general hypotheses â, we could derive the claim that it has value. It argues that the route from Value to Norms is unsuccessful. The main problem here is that
the idea that knowledge has value does not seem enough to derive the idea
that one should act on what one knows. It finds the route from Norms
to Value more promising, though a complete path is missing. The main idea
here is that knowledge is good because it is normatively required to do good
things, such as believing the truth and acting in view of true propositions.
But since not all normative conditions for doing something good is itself good,
we still lack an explanation of why knowledge would be so. The paper finally
suggests an alternative perspective, on which we do not try to derive
the idea that knowledge has value from its normative role, but rather use its
normative role to explain away the idea that it has value
Declaring the Self and the Social
The epistemological problem is traditionally expressed in the question âHow do we know that we know?â The emphasis is on the relationship between the claim that we know and what it is that we know. We notice, only belatedly, that the agent who knows does not really matter in the question. The knower is but an abstracted entity whose only qualification is that s/he claims to know. Virtue epistemologyâs virtue lies in the centering of the knower: What is it about the knower that enables her to claim that she knows or that enables us to agree that she indeed knows? The concept of intellectual responsibility in virtue epistemology does not only brings us into the realm of the normative but also implicates, necessarily, the social and the political. Invoking the openness of alternative virtue epistemology to unconventional sources and methods, this essay turns to metaphysics and social ontology in order to explore the problems of intellectual responsibility, society, and politics in humankindâs disposition and striving to know
- âŠ