Merits of Leśniewski type nominalism

For the sake of explaining the merits of a Leśniewski type nominalism, it should be made clear what is meant by „nominalism” and what the characteristics of this special type of nominalism are. To the first question we can find quite a lot of mutually inconsistent answers. Therefore I will just explain the distinction between two different nominalistic traditions which I hold to be fundamental. I think we should not just focus on the question which so-called abstract entities are rejected but as well look for basic entities nominalists rely on

Barry Smith an sich

Festschrift in Honor of Barry Smith on the occasion of his 65th Birthday. Published as issue 4:4 of the journal Cosmos + Taxis: Studies in Emergent Order and Organization. Includes contributions by Wolfgang Grassl, Nicola Guarino, John T. Kearns, Rudolf Lüthe, Luc Schneider, Peter Simons, Wojciech Żełaniec, and Jan Woleński

Quine and Quantified Modal Logic – Against the Received View

The textbook-like history of analytic philosophy is a history of myths, re-ceived views and dogmas. Though mainly the last few years have witnessed a huge amount of historical work that aimed to reconsider our narratives of the history of ana-lytic philosophy there is still a lot to do. The present study is meant to present such a micro story which is still quite untouched by historians. According to the received view Kripke has defeated all the arguments of Quine against quantified modal logic and thus it became a respectful tool for philosophers. If we accept the historical interpreta-tion of the network between Quine, Kripke and modal logic, which is to be presented here, we have to conclude that Quine’s real philosophical animadversions against the modalities are still on the table: though Kripke has provided some important (formal-logical) answers, Quine’s animadversions are still viable and worthy of further consideration

Quine and Quantified Modal Logic

The textbook - like history of analytic philosophy is a history of myths, r e- ceived views and dogmas. Though mainly the last few years have witnessed a huge amo unt of historical work that aimed to reconsider our narratives of the history of an a- lytic philosophy there is still a lot to do. The present study is meant to present such a micro story which is still quite untouched by historians. According to the receiv ed view Kripke has defeated all the arguments of Quine against quantified modal logic and thus it became a respectful tool for philosophers. If we accept the historical interpret ation of the network between Quine, Kripke and modal logic, which is to be pre sented here, we have to conclude that Quine’s real philosophical animadversions against the modalities are still on the table: though Kripke has provided some important (formal - logical) answers, Quine’s animadversions are still viable and worthy of further consider ation

Formal Theodicy: Religious Determinism and the Logical Problem of Evil

Edward Nieznański developed two logical systems to deal with the problem of evil and to refute religious determinism. However, when formalized in first-order modal logic, two axioms of each system contradict one another, revealing that there is an underlying minimal set of axioms enough to settle the questions. In this article, we develop this minimal system, called N3, which is based on Nieznański’s contribution. The purpose of N3 is to solve the logical problem of evil through the defeat of a version of religious determinism. On the one hand, these questions are also addressed by Nieznański’s systems, but, on the other hand, they are obtained in N3 with fewer assumptions. Our approach can be considered a case of logic of religion, that is, of logic applied to religious discourse, as proposed by Józef Maria Bocheński; in this particular case, it is a discourse in theodicy, which is situated in the context of the philosophy of religion

Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures

This open access book constitutes the proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures, FOSSACS 2022, which was held during April 4-6, 2022, in Munich, Germany, as part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2022. The 23 regular papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 77 submissions. They deal with research on theories and methods to support the analysis, integration, synthesis, transformation, and verification of programs and software systems