Verification-guided modelling of salience and cognitive load

Well-designed interfaces use procedural and sensory cues to increase the cognitive salience of appropriate actions. However, empirical studies suggest that cognitive load can influence the strength of those cues. We formalise the relationship between salience and cognitive load revealed by empirical data. We add these rules to our abstract cognitive architecture, based on higher-order logic and developed for the formal verification of usability properties. The interface of a fire engine dispatch task from the empirical studies is then formally modelled and verified. The outcomes of this verification and their comparison with the empirical data provide a way of assessing our salience and load rules. They also guide further iterative refinements of these rules. Furthermore, the juxtaposition of the outcomes of formal analysis and empirical studies suggests new experimental hypotheses, thus providing input to researchers in cognitive science

Being-in-the-world-with: Presence Meets Social And Cognitive Neuroscience

In this chapter we will discuss the concepts of “presence” (Inner Presence) and “social presence” (Co-presence) within a cognitive and ecological perspective. Specifically, we claim that the concepts of “presence” and “social presence” are the possible links between self, action, communication and culture. In the first section we will provide a capsule view of Heidegger’s work by examining the two main features of the Heideggerian concept of “being”: spatiality and “being with”. We argue that different visions from social and cognitive sciences – Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Enactive Approach, Situated Simulation, Covert Imitation - and discoveries from neuroscience – Mirror and Canonical Neurons - have many contact points with this view. In particular, these data suggest that our conceptual system dynamically produces contextualized representations (simulations) that support grounded action in different situations. This is allowed by a common coding – the motor code – shared by perception, action and concepts. This common coding also allows the subject for natively recognizing actions done by other selves within the phenomenological contents. In this picture we argue that the role of presence and social presence is to allow the process of self-identification through the separation between “self” and “other,” and between “internal” and “external”. Finally, implications of this position for communication and media studies are discussed by way of conclusion

Cortical Learning of Recognition Categories: A Resolution of the Exemplar Vs. Prototype Debate

Do humans and animals learn exemplars or prototypes when they categorize objects and events in the world? How are different degrees of abstraction realized through learning by neurons in inferotemporal and prefrontal cortex? How do top-down expectations influence the course of learning? Thirty related human cognitive experiments (the 5-4 category structure) have been used to test competing views in the prototype-exemplar debate. In these experiments, during the test phase, subjects unlearn in a characteristic way items that they had learned to categorize perfectly in the training phase. Many cognitive models do not describe how an individual learns or forgets such categories through time. Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) neural models provide such a description, and also clarify both psychological and neurobiological data. Matching of bottom-up signals with learned top-down expectations plays a key role in ART model learning. Here, an ART model is used to learn incrementally in response to 5-4 category structure stimuli. Simulation results agree with experimental data, achieving perfect categorization in training and a good match to the pattern of errors exhibited by human subjects in the testing phase. These results show how the model learns both prototypes and certain exemplars in the training phase. ART prototypes are, however, unlike the ones posited in the traditional prototype-exemplar debate. Rather, they are critical patterns of features to which a subject learns to pay attention based on past predictive success and the order in which exemplars are experienced. Perturbations of old memories by newly arriving test items generate a performance curve that closely matches the performance pattern of human subjects. The model also clarifies exemplar-based accounts of data concerning amnesia.Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency SyNaPSE program (Hewlett-Packard Company, DARPA HR0011-09-3-0001; HRL Laboratories LLC #801881-BS under HR0011-09-C-0011); Science of Learning Centers program of the National Science Foundation (NSF SBE-0354378

Computational and Robotic Models of Early Language Development: A Review

We review computational and robotics models of early language learning and development. We first explain why and how these models are used to understand better how children learn language. We argue that they provide concrete theories of language learning as a complex dynamic system, complementing traditional methods in psychology and linguistics. We review different modeling formalisms, grounded in techniques from machine learning and artificial intelligence such as Bayesian and neural network approaches. We then discuss their role in understanding several key mechanisms of language development: cross-situational statistical learning, embodiment, situated social interaction, intrinsically motivated learning, and cultural evolution. We conclude by discussing future challenges for research, including modeling of large-scale empirical data about language acquisition in real-world environments. Keywords: Early language learning, Computational and robotic models, machine learning, development, embodiment, social interaction, intrinsic motivation, self-organization, dynamical systems, complexity.Comment: to appear in International Handbook on Language Development, ed. J. Horst and J. von Koss Torkildsen, Routledg

Brain Categorization: Learning, Attention, and Consciousness

How do humans and animals learn to recognize objects and events? Two classical views are that exemplars or prototypes are learned. A hybrid view is that a mixture, called rule-plus-exceptions, is learned. None of these models learn their categories. A distributed ARTMAP neural network with self-supervised learning incrementally learns categories that match human learning data on a class of thirty diagnostic experiments called the 5-4 category structure. Key predictions of ART models have received behavioral, neurophysiological, and anatomical support. The ART prediction about what goes wrong during amnesic learning has also been supported: A lesion in its orienting system causes a low vigilance parameter.Air Force Office of Scientific Research (F49620-01-1-0397, F49620-01-1-0423); Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Office of Naval Research (N00014-01-1-0624), the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NMA 201-01-1-2016); National Science Foundation (EIA-01-30851, IIS-97-20333, SBE-0354378); Office of Naval Research (N00014-95-1-0657, N00014-01-1-0624

Spring School on Language, Music, and Cognition: Organizing Events in Time

The interdisciplinary spring school “Language, music, and cognition: Organizing events in time” was held from February 26 to March 2, 2018 at the Institute of Musicology of the University of Cologne. Language, speech, and music as events in time were explored from different perspectives including evolutionary biology, social cognition, developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience of speech, language, and communication, as well as computational and biological approaches to language and music. There were 10 lectures, 4 workshops, and 1 student poster session. Overall, the spring school investigated language and music as neurocognitive systems and focused on a mechanistic approach exploring the neural substrates underlying musical, linguistic, social, and emotional processes and behaviors. In particular, researchers approached questions concerning cognitive processes, computational procedures, and neural mechanisms underlying the temporal organization of language and music, mainly from two perspectives: one was concerned with syntax or structural representations of language and music as neurocognitive systems (i.e., an intrapersonal perspective), while the other emphasized social interaction and emotions in their communicative function (i.e., an interpersonal perspective). The spring school not only acted as a platform for knowledge transfer and exchange but also generated a number of important research questions as challenges for future investigations

The Mechanics of Embodiment: A Dialogue on Embodiment and Computational Modeling

Embodied theories are increasingly challenging traditional views of cognition by arguing that conceptual representations that constitute our knowledge are grounded in sensory and motor experiences, and processed at this sensorimotor level, rather than being represented and processed abstractly in an amodal conceptual system. Given the established empirical foundation, and the relatively underspecified theories to date, many researchers are extremely interested in embodied cognition but are clamouring for more mechanistic implementations. What is needed at this stage is a push toward explicit computational models that implement sensory-motor grounding as intrinsic to cognitive processes. In this article, six authors from varying backgrounds and approaches address issues concerning the construction of embodied computational models, and illustrate what they view as the critical current and next steps toward mechanistic theories of embodiment. The first part has the form of a dialogue between two fictional characters: Ernest, the �experimenter�, and Mary, the �computational modeller�. The dialogue consists of an interactive sequence of questions, requests for clarification, challenges, and (tentative) answers, and touches the most important aspects of grounded theories that should inform computational modeling and, conversely, the impact that computational modeling could have on embodied theories. The second part of the article discusses the most important open challenges for embodied computational modelling

Take another little piece of my heart: a note on bridging cognition and emotions

Science urges philosophy to be more empirical and philosophy urges science to be more reflective. This markedly occurred along the “discovery of the artificial” (CORDESCHI 2002): in the early days of Cybernetics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers aimed at making machines more cognizant while setting up a framework to better understand human intelligence. By and large, those genuine goals still hold today, whereas AI has become more concerned with specific aspects of intelligence, such as (machine) learning, reasoning, vision, and action. As a matter of fact, the field suffers from a chasm between two formerly integrated aspects. One is the engineering endeavour involving the development of tools, e.g., autonomous systems for driving cars as well as software for semantic information retrieval. The other is the philosophical debate that tries to answer questions concerning the nature of intelligence. Bridging these two levels can indeed be crucial in developing a deeper understanding of minds. An opportunity might be offered by the cogent theme of emotions. Traditionally, computer science, psychological and philosophical research have been compelled to investigate mental processes that do not involve mood, emotions and feelings, in spite of Simon’s early caveat (SIMON 1967) that a general theory of cognition must incorporate the influences of emotion. Given recent neurobiological findings and technological advances, the time is ripe to seriously weigh this promising, albeit controversial, opportunity