Out of Control!? How Loss of Self-Control Influences Prosocial Behavior: The Role of Power and Moral Values

Lack of self-control has been suggested to facilitate norm-transgressing behaviors because of the operation of automatic selfish impulses. Previous research, however, has shown that people having a high moral identity may not show such selfish impulses when their self-control resources are depleted. In the present research, we extended this effect to prosocial behavior. Moreover, we investigated the role of power in the interaction between moral identity and self-control depletion. More specifically, we expected that power facilitates the externalization of internal states, which implies that for people who feel powerful, rather than powerless, depletion decreases prosocial behavior especially for those low in moral identity. A laboratory experiment and a multisource field study supported our predictions. The present finding that the interaction between self-control depletion and moral identity is contingent upon people’s level of power suggests that power may enable people to refrain from helping behavior. Moreover, the findings suggest that if organizations want to improve prosocial behaviors, it may be effective to situationally induce moral values in their employees

Selfishness, fraternity, and other-regarding preference in spatial evolutionary games

Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect income from symmetric two-person two-strategy (called cooperation and defection) games with their nearest neighbors. During the elementary steps of evolution a randomly chosen player modifies her strategy in order to maximize stochastically her utility function composed from her own and the co-players' income with weight factors $1-Q$ and Q. These models are studied within a wide range of payoff parameters using Monte Carlo simulations for noisy strategy updates and by spatial stability analysis in the low noise limit. For fraternal players ($Q=1/2$) the system evolves into ordered arrangements of strategies in the low noise limit in a way providing optimum payoff for the whole society. Dominance of defectors, representing the "tragedy of the commons", is found within the regions of prisoner's dilemma and stag hunt game for selfish players (Q=0). Due to the symmetry in the effective utility function the system exhibits similar behavior even for Q=1 that can be interpreted as the "lovers' dilemma".Comment: 7 two-column pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in J. Theor. Bio

Moral Sentiments and Material Interests behind Altruistic Third-Party Punishment

Social norms are ubiquitous in human life. Their role is essential in allowing cooperation to prevail, despite the presence of incentives to free ride. As far as norm enforcement devices are concerned, it would be impossible to have widespread social norms if second parties only enforced them. However, both the quantitative relevance and the motivations underlying altruistic punishment on the part of ‘unaffected’ third parties are still largely unexplored. This paper contributes to shed light on the issue, by means of an experimental design consisting of three treatments: a Dictator Game Treatment, a Third-Party Punishment Game Treatment (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) and a Metanorm Treatment, that is a variant of the Third-party Punishment Game where the Recipient can punish the third party. We find that third parties are willing to punish dictators (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Ottone, 2008) and, in doing so, they are affected by ‘reference-dependent fairness’, rather than by the ‘egalitarian distribution norm’. By eliciting players’ normative expectations, it turns out that all of them expect a Dictator to transfer something – not half of the endowment. Consequently, the Observers’ levels of punishment are sensitive to their subjective sense of fairness. A positive relation between the level of punishment and the degree of negative subjective unfairness emerges. Subjective unfairness also affects Dictators’ behaviour: their actual transfers and their ideal transfer are not significantly different. Finally, we interestingly find that third parties are also sensitive to the receivers’ (credible) threat to punish them: as the Dictator’s transfer becomes lower and lower than the Observer’s ideal transfer, the Observer’s reaction is – other things being equal – significantly stronger in the Metanorm Treatment than in the Third-Party Punishment Game Treatment. Hence, despite their being to some extent genuinely nonstrategically motivated, also third parties – like second parties – are sensitive to the costs of punishing.Third-Party Punishment, Moral Sentiments, Material Interests, Subjective Unfairness, Social Norms

When resistance is useless: policing and the evolution of reproductive acquiescence in insect societies

In social groups composed of kin, inclusive fitness benefits can favor greater cooperation. Alternatively, cooperation can be enforced through the policing of less cooperative individuals. Here, we show that the effect of policing can be twofold: not only can it directly suppress individual selfishness, it can also entirely remove the incentive for individuals to act selfishly in the first place. We term such individual restraint in response to socially imposed policing "acquiescence" and illustrate the concept using examples drawn from the social Hymenoptera (the ants, bees, and wasps). Inclusive fitness models confirm that when a policing system is in place, individuals should be less tempted to act selfishly. This is shown to have important consequences for the resolution of conflict within their societies. For example, it can explain why in many species very few workers attempt to reproduce and why immature females usually do not attempt to develop as queens rather than workers. Although our analyses are primarily focused on the social insects, our conclusions are likely to be general and to apply to other societies as well

The Nature of Legal Dispute Bargaining

The longstanding debate over the relative merits of adversarial and communitarian theories of legal dispute bargaining has been in somewhat of a holding pattern for several years, but recent research in the field of cognitive neuroscience may break the logjam. Laboratory experiments and case studies in that field have shown how dispositions and capacities for social cooperation inherited from natural selection and evolution predispose humans to configure disputing as a mixture of argument over factual reality, disagreement over the interpretation of normative standards, and a search for impartial resolutions that protect the interests of everyone involved equally. This neurobiological inheritance can be difficult to appreciate, resist, and control, but it is something all dispute bargaining theory, adversarial and communitarian alike, must take into account. Theories that ignore it are limited to telling only part of the dispute bargaining story

Education’s not black and white, it’s vibrant grey

This paper offers a learner’s eye-view of a journey through education, written in an auto-narrative style. Sarah’s story spans from Secondary School to College and through University finishing at the point of Graduation. Revealed in this open and honest account is an insight to coping with home life whilst navigating the trials of the Education system. Sarah makes criticisms of her peers at every level reminding us how competitive some students have to be to get on and achieve success in their education. Critical judgements are also made about Sarah’s School teachers and University lecturers, which are at times as rewarding as they are uncomfortable, but always truthful. Consequently, there is much to learn by both academics and students from this sensitive and vulnerable personal revelation. Sarah’s evidence in turn points to some fundamental questions about the genuine outcomes of the Educational system, e.g. what are we actually teaching young people to be like? And do we like the product in terms of their values, beliefs and motives? A concluding message from Sarah’s perspective is that greater independence in learning, freedom in thinking and equipping people to reason, judge and make decisions in whatever realm, may be defining steps towards becoming educated

Scarcity, self-interest and maximization from Islamic angle

This paper clarifies some misinterpretations of three foundational concepts in mainstream economics from Islamic viewpoint. These are scarcity of resources, pursuit of self-interest and maximizing behavior of economic agents. It argues that stocks of resources that God has provided are inexhaustible. But important is the availability of resources out of stocks to mankind. Availability is a function of human effort and the state of knowledge about resources over time and space. In that sense resources are scarce in relation to multiplicity of human wants for Islamic economics as well. Self-interest must be distinguished from selfishness. The motive operates on both ends of human existence: mundane and spiritual. Its pursuit does not preclude altruism from human life. Counter interests keep balance in society and promote civility. Islam recognizes the motive as valid. Maximization relates to quantifiable ex ante variables. Uncertainty of future outcomes of actions makes maximization a heuristic but useful analytical tool. The concept is value neutral. What is maximized, how and to what end alone give rise to moral issues. Modified in the light of Shari’ah requirements the three concepts can provide a firmer definition for Islamic economics centered on the notion of falah.Scarcity; self-interest, maximization, Islamic Economics, israf; Shri'ah, heuristics

Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within treatment variation is qualitatively in line with the normative predictions of the model under standard assumptions. Yet, we also find evidence for reciprocal behavior. Our data analysis shows, however, that it does not pay for the employer to solely rely on the reciprocity of employees