38 research outputs found

    Design and Analysis of Cryptographic Hash Functions

    Get PDF
    Wydział Matematyki i InformatykiKryptograficzne funkcje haszujące stanowią element składowy wielu algorytmów kryptograficznych. Przykładowymi zastosowaniami kryptograficznych funkcji haszujących są podpisy cyfrowe oraz kody uwierzytelniania wiadomości. Ich własności kryptograficzne mają znaczący wpływ na poziom bezpieczeństwa systemów kryptograficznych wykorzystujących haszowanie. W dysertacji analizowane są kryptograficzne funkcje haszujące oraz omówione główne zasady tworzenia bezpiecznych kryptograficznych funkcji haszujących. Analizujemy bezpieczeństwo dedykowanych funkcji haszujących (BMW, Shabal, SIMD, BLAKE2, Skein) oraz funkcji haszujących zbudowanych z szyfrów blokowych (Crypton, Hierocrypt-3, IDEA, SAFER++, Square). Głównymi metodami kryptoanalizy użytymi są skrócona analiza różnicowa, analiza rotacyjna i przesuwna. Uzyskane wyniki pokazują słabości analizowanych konstrukcji.Cryptographic Hash Functions (CHFs) are building blocks of many cryptographic algorithms. For instance, they are indispensable tools for efficient digital signature and authentication tags. Their security properties have tremendous impact on the security level of systems, which use cryptographic hashing. This thesis analyzes CHFs and studies the design principles for construction of secure and efficient CHFs. The dissertation investigates security of both dedicated hash functions (BMW, Shabal, SIMD, BLAKE2, Skein) and hash functions based on block ciphers (Crypton, Hierocrypt-3, IDEA, SAFER++, Square). The main cryptographic tools applied are truncated differentials, rotational and shift analysis. The findings show weaknesses in the designs

    MergeMAC:A MAC for Authentication with Strict Time Constraints and Limited Bandwidth

    Get PDF
    This paper presents MergeMAC, a MAC that is particularly suitable for environments with strict time requirements and extremely limited bandwidth. MergeMAC computes the MAC by splitting the message into two parts. We use a pseudorandom function (PRF) to map messages to random bit strings and then merge them with a very efficient keyless function. The advantage of this approach is that the outputs of the PRF can be cached for frequently needed message parts. We demonstrate the merits of MergeMAC for authenticating messages on the CAN bus where bandwidth is extremely limited and caching can be used to recover parts of the message counter instead of transmitting it. We recommend an instantiation of the merging function MERGE and analyze the security of our construction. Requirements for a merging function are formally defined and the resulting EUF-CMA security of MergeMAC is proven

    Rotational Cryptanalysis of ARX Revisited

    Get PDF
    Rotational cryptanalysis is a probabilistic attack applicable to word oriented designs that use (almost) rotation-invariant constants. It is believed that the success probability of rotational cryptanalysis against ciphers and functions based on modular additions, rotations and XORs, can be computed only by counting the number of additions. We show that this simple formula is incorrect due to the invalid Markov cipher assumption used for computing the probability. More precisely, we show that chained modular additions used in ARX ciphers do not form a Markov chain with regards to rotational analysis, thus the rotational probability cannot be computed as a simple product of rotational probabilities of individual modular additions. We provide a precise value of the probability of such chains and give a new algorithm for computing the rotational probability of ARX ciphers. We use the algorithm to correct the rotational attacks on BLAKE2 and to provide valid rotational attacks against the simplified version of Skein

    A New Related-Key Boomerang Distinguishing Attack of Reduced-Round Threefish-256

    Get PDF
    On Nov 2007, NIST announced the SHA-3 competition to select a new hash standard as a replacement of SHA-2. On Dec 2010, five submissions have been selected as the final round candidates, including Skein, which have components based on ARX. In this paper, a new related-key boomerang distinguishing attack is proposed on 31-round Threefish-256 with a time complexity of about 22342^{234}. Our improved attack is based on the efficient algorithms for calculating differentials of modular addition

    Rotational Cryptanalysis on ChaCha Stream Cipher

    Get PDF
    In this paper we consider the ChaCha20 stream cipher in the related-key scenario and we study how to obtain rotational-XOR pairs with nonzero probability after the application of the first quarter round. The ChaCha20 input can be viewed as a 4×4 matrix of 32-bit words, where the first row of the matrix is fixed to a constant value, the second two rows represent the key, and the fourth some initialization values. Under some reasonable independence assumptions and a suitable selection of the input, we show that the aforementioned probability is about 2−251.7857, a value greater than 2−256, which is the one expected from a random permutation. We also investigate the existence of constants, different from the ones used in the first row of the ChaCha20 input, for which the rotational-XOR probability increases, representing a potential weakness in variants of the ChaCha20 stream cipher. So far, to our knowledge, this is the first analysis of the ChaCha20 stream cipher from a rotational-XOR perspective

    Rotational Cryptanalysis in the Presence of Constants

    Get PDF
    Rotational cryptanalysis is a statistical method for attacking ARX constructions. It was previously shown that ARX-C, i.e., ARX with the injection of constants can be used to implement any function. In this paper we investigate how rotational cryptanalysis is affected when constants are injected into the state. We introduce the notion of an RX-difference, generalizing the idea of a rotational difference. We show how RX-differences behave around modular addition, and give a formula to calculate their transition probability. We experimentally verify the formula using Speck32/64, and present a 7-round distinguisher based on RX-differences. We then discuss two types of constants: round constants, and constants which are the result of using a fixed key, and provide recommendations to designers for optimal choice of parameters

    Near-Collision Attack on the Step-Reduced Compression Function of Skein-256

    Get PDF
    The Hash function Skein is one of the 5 finalists of NIST SHA-3 competition. It is designed based on the threefish block cipher and it only uses three primitive operations: modular addition, rotation and bitwise XOR (ARX). In this paper, we combine two short differential paths to a long differential path using the modular differential technique. And we present the semi-free start near-collision attack up to the 32-step Skein-256 with the Hamming difference 51. The complexity of our attack is about 21052^{105}

    Cryptanalysis of Haraka

    Get PDF
    In this paper, we describe attacks on the recently proposed Haraka hash functions. First, for the two hash functions Haraka-256/256 and Haraka-512/256 in the family, we show how two colliding messages can be constructed in about 216 function evaluations. Second, we invalidate the preimage security claim for Haraka-512/256 with an attack finding one preimage in about 2192 function evaluations. These attacks are possible thanks to symmetries in the internal state that are preserved over several rounds

    MOIM: a novel design of cryptographic hash function

    Get PDF
    A hash function usually has two main components: a compression function or permutation function and mode of operation. In this paper, we propose a new concrete novel design of a permutation based hash functions called MOIM. MOIM is based on concatenating two parallel fast wide pipe constructions as a mode of operation designed by Nandi and Paul, and presented at Indocrypt 2010 where the size of the internal state is significantly larger than the size of the output. And the permutations functions used in MOIM are inspired from the SHA-3 finalist Grøstl hash function which is originally inspired from Rijndael design (AES). As a consequence there is a very strong confusion and diffusion in MOIM. Also, we show that MOIM resists all the generic attacks and Joux attack in two defense security levels
    corecore