51,709 research outputs found
Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas
The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should
adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies
indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an
appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than the
most profitable strategy within the interaction range. Such conformity might be
due to herding instincts or crowd behavior in humans and social animals. In a
heterogeneous population where individuals differ in their degree, collective
influence, or other traits, an unanswered question remains who should conform.
Selecting conformists randomly is the simplest choice, but it is neither a
realistic nor the optimal one. We show that, regardless of the source of
heterogeneity and game parametrization, socially the most favorable outcomes
emerge if the masses conform. On the other hand, forcing leaders to conform
significantly hinders the constructive interplay between heterogeneity and
coordination, leading to evolutionary outcomes that are worse still than if
conformists were chosen randomly. We conclude that leaders must be able to
create a following for network reciprocity to be optimally augmented by
conformity. In the opposite case, when leaders are castrated and made to
follow, the failure of coordination impairs the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific
Reports [related work available at arXiv:1412.4113
The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas
In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contributions becomes a strategic variable that allows individuals to interact and influence one another. Herein, we use evolutionary game theory to study the impact of strategic timing on equilibrium selection. Depending on the risk of catastrophe, we identify three characteristic regimes. For low risks, defection is the only equilibrium, whereas high risks promote equilibria with sufficient contributions. Intermediate risks pose the biggest challenge for cooperation. In this risk regime, the option to interact over time is critical; if individuals can contribute over several rounds, then the group has a higher chance to succeed, and the expected welfare increases. This positive effect of timing is of particular importance in larger groups, where successful coordination becomes increasingly difficul
Heterogeneous resource allocation can change social hierarchy in public goods games
Public Goods Games represent one of the most useful tools to study group
interactions between individuals. However, even if they could provide an
explanation for the emergence and stability of cooperation in modern societies,
they are not able to reproduce some key features observed in social and
economical interactions. The typical shape of wealth distribution - known as
Pareto Law - and the microscopic organization of wealth production are two of
them. Here, we introduce a modification to the classical formulation of Public
Goods Games that allows for the emergence of both of these features from first
principles. Unlike traditional Public Goods Games on networks, where players
contribute equally to all the games in which they participate, we allow
individuals to redistribute their contribution according to what they earned in
previous rounds. Results from numerical simulations show that not only a Pareto
distribution for the payoffs naturally emerges but also that if players don't
invest enough in one round they can act as defectors even if they are formally
cooperators. Finally, we also show that the players self-organize in a very
productive backbone that covers almost perfectly the minimum spanning tree of
the underlying interaction network. Our results not only give an explanation
for the presence of the wealth heterogeneity observed in real data but also
points to a conceptual change regarding how cooperation is defined in
collective dilemmas.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figures, 55 reference
The Scandinavian Model â Prospects and Challenges
Scandinavian countries are often portrayed in policy debates as model examples having shown how to square concerns for efficiency and equity. The core principle of the Scandinavian welfare model is an individual entitlement to public sector provisions combined with collective financing via taxes. However, a high employment rate is needed to ensure financial viability of this model. The Scandinavian model faces several challenges which affect the possibilities of maintaining a high employment ratio, namely, demographic changes, a growth dilemma and globalization. This paper discusses how these challenges affect the need and scope for reforms of the Scandinavian welfare model.fiscal sustainability, welfare state, demographics, globalization
Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
Collective actions, from city marathons to labor strikes, are often mass-driven and subject to the snowball effect. Motivated by this, we study evolutionary advantages of conditional punishment in the spatial public goods game. Unlike unconditional punishers who always impose the same fines on defectors, conditional punishers do so proportionally with the number of other punishers in the group. Phase diagrams in dependence on the punishment fine and cost reveal that the two types of punishers cannot coexist. Spontaneous coarsening of the two strategies leads to an indirect territorial competition with the defectors, which is won by unconditional punishers only if the sanctioning is inexpensive. Otherwise conditional punishers are the victors of the indirect competition, indicating that under more realistic conditions they are indeed the more effective strategy. Both continuous and discontinuous phase transitions as well as tricritical points characterize the complex evolutionary dynamics, which is due to multipoint interactions that are introduced by conditional punishment. We propose indirect territorial competition as a generally applicable mechanism relying on pattern formation, by means of which spatial structure can be utilized by seemingly subordinate strategies to avoid evolutionary extinction
Transitions between homophilic and heterophilic modes of cooperation
Cooperation is ubiquitous in biological and social systems. Previous studies
revealed that a preference toward similar appearance promotes cooperation, a
phenomenon called tag-mediated cooperation or communitarian cooperation. This
effect is enhanced when a spatial structure is incorporated, because space
allows agents sharing an identical tag to regroup to form locally cooperative
clusters. In spatially distributed settings, one can also consider migration of
organisms, which has a potential to further promote evolution of cooperation by
facilitating spatial clustering. However, it has not yet been considered in
spatial tag-mediated cooperation models. Here we show, using computer
simulations of a spatial model of evolutionary games with organismal migration,
that tag-based segregation and homophilic cooperation arise for a wide range of
parameters. In the meantime, our results also show another evolutionarily
stable outcome, where a high level of heterophilic cooperation is maintained in
spatially well-mixed patterns. We found that these two different forms of
tag-mediated cooperation appear alternately as the parameter for temptation to
defect is increased.Comment: 16 pages, 7 figure
Adaptive long-range migration promotes cooperation under tempting conditions
Migration is a fundamental trait in humans and animals. Recent studies
investigated the effect of migration on the evolution of cooperation, showing
that contingent migration favors cooperation in spatial structures. In those
studies, only local migration to immediate neighbors was considered, while
long-range migration has not been considered yet, partly because the long-range
migration has been generally regarded as harmful for cooperation as it would
bring the population to a well-mixed state that favors defection. Here, we
studied the effects of adaptive long-range migration on the evolution of
cooperation through agent-based simulations of a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma
game where individuals can jump to a farther site if they are surrounded by
more defectors. Our results show that adaptive long-range migration strongly
promotes cooperation, especially under conditions where the temptation to
defect is considerably high. These findings demonstrate the significance of
adaptive long-range migration for the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figure
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