231,825 research outputs found
Peer Effects in Risk Taking
This paper examines the effect of peers on individual risk taking. In the absence of informational motives, we investigate why social utility concerns may drive peer effects. We test for two main channels: utility from payoff differences and from conforming to the peer. We show experimentally that social utility generates substantial peer effects in risk taking. These are mainly explained by utility from payoff differences, in line with outcomebased
social preferences. Contrary to standard assumptions, we show that estimated social preference parameters change significantly when peers make active choices, compared to when lotteries are randomly assigned to them
Bots as Virtual Confederates: Design and Ethics
The use of bots as virtual confederates in online field experiments holds
extreme promise as a new methodological tool in computational social science.
However, this potential tool comes with inherent ethical challenges. Informed
consent can be difficult to obtain in many cases, and the use of confederates
necessarily implies the use of deception. In this work we outline a design
space for bots as virtual confederates, and we propose a set of guidelines for
meeting the status quo for ethical experimentation. We draw upon examples from
prior work in the CSCW community and the broader social science literature for
illustration. While a handful of prior researchers have used bots in online
experimentation, our work is meant to inspire future work in this area and
raise awareness of the associated ethical issues.Comment: Forthcoming in CSCW 201
Dynamic behaviours in tax evasion. An experimental approach
This paper investigates, from an experimental perspective, on the tax payers behaviour in a dynamic context and more precisely tries to cope with three main topics related to tax evasion. The first aspect analysed regards the effects produced by a repetitive dynamic choice process on the subjectsâ attitude towards risk and on the ability to learn to cope with risk. The second theme treated is about the effects produced on the tax payers by the inclusion in the experimental design of psychological moral constraints. The final topic is on the effects produced by the specific experimental context chosen (the simulation of a fiscal environment compared with other simulated environments). The main results emerged from the 8 experiments carried out confirmed the importance of the psychological factors in determining the tax payers actual behaviours and shown the complex dynamic that the agents activate to cope with risk
Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games
We investigate the effects of information feedback in rent-seeking games with two different contest structures. In the share contest a contestant receives a share of the rent equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures, while in the lottery contest a contestant wins the entire rent with probability equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures. In share contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get feedback about own earnings, and additional feedback about rivals' choices and earnings raises average expenditures. In lottery contests information feedback has an opposite, and even stronger, effect: when subjects only get feedback on own earnings we observe high levels of rent dissipation, usually exceeding the value of the rent, and additional feedback about rivals' choices and earnings has a significant moderating influence on expenditures. In a follow-up treatment we make information feedback endogenous by allowing contestants in a lottery contest to make public or private expenditures. Subjects make the vast majority of expenditures privately and overall excess expenditures are similar to the lottery contest with own feedback
What happens if you single out? An experiment
We present an experiment investigating the effects of singling out an individual on trust and trustworthiness. We find that (a) trustworthiness falls if there is a singled out subject; (b) non-singled out subjects discriminate against the singled out subject when they are not responsible of the distinct status of this person; (c) under a negative frame, the singled out subject returns significantly less; (d) under a positive frame, the singled out subject behaves bimodally, either selecting very low or very high return rates. Overall, singling out induces a negligible effect on trust but is potentially disruptive for trustworthiness
Price dynamics, informational efficiency and wealth distribution in continuous double auction markets
This paper studies the properties of the continuous double auction trading mechanishm using an artificial market populated by heterogeneous computational agents. In particular, we investigate how changes in the population of traders and in market microstructure characteristics affect price dynamics, information dissemination and distribution of wealth across agents. In our computer simulated market only a small fraction of the population observe the risky asset's fundamental value with noise, while the rest of agents try to forecast the asset's price from past transaction data. In contrast to other artificial markets, we assume that the risky asset pays no dividend, so agents cannot learn from past transaction prices and subsequent dividend payments. We find that private information can effectively disseminate in the market unless market regulation prevents informed investors from short selling or borrowing the asset, and these investors do not constitute a critical mass. In such case, not only are markets less efficient informationally, but may even experience crashes and bubbles. Finally, increased informational efficiency has a negative impact on informed agents' trading profits and a positive impact on artificial intelligent agents' profits
Audit Certainty, Audit Productivity, and Taxpayer Compliance
Strategies for dealing with evasion include such standard policies as stricter enforcement (e.g., increased audit rates, more extensive audits, larger penalties). However, the exact responses of taxpayers to these enforcement measures are quite difficult to measure with existing field data, and so are not known precisely. In this paper we use experimental methods to examine how individuals respond in their compliance decisions to a "certain" probability of audit and to information concerning the "productivity" of an audit. Our design informs some individuals that their return will be audited with certainty prior to making their compliance decision, while other individuals receive information that they will not be audited; we also inform individuals of the productivity of the audit by stating how much unreported income will be discovered via the audit. We find that the announcement of audits increases the compliance rate of those who are told that they will be audited. However, the compliance rate of those who know that they will not be audited falls, and the net effect is that overall compliance falls. Working Paper 06-4
How group identification distorts beliefs
This paper investigates how group identification distorts peopleâs beliefs about the ability of their peers in social groups. We find that experimentally manipulated identification with a randomly composed group leads to overconfident beliefs about fellow group membersâ performance on an intelligence test. This result cannot be explained by individual overconfidence, i.e., participants overconfident in their own skill believing that their group performed better because of them, as this was ruled out by experimental design. Moreover, we find that participants with stronger group identification put more weight on positive signals about their group when updating their beliefs. These in-group biases in beliefs can have important economic consequences when group membership is used to make inference about an individualâs characteristics as, for instance, in hiring decisions
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Towards a Theory of Analytical Behaviour: A Model of Decision-Making in Visual Analytics
This paper introduces a descriptive model of the human-computer processes that lead to decision-making in visual analytics. A survey of nine models from the visual analytics and HCI literature are presented to account for different perspectives such as sense-making, reasoning, and low-level human-computer interactions. The survey examines the people and computers (entities) presented in the models, the divisions of labour between entities (both physical and role-based), the behaviour of both people and machines as constrained by their roles and agency, and finally the elements and processes which define the flow of data both within and between entities. The survey informs the identification of four observations that characterise analytical behaviour - defined as decision-making facilitated by visual analytics: bilateral discourse, divisions of labour, mixed-synchronicity information flows, and bounded behaviour. Based on these principles, a descriptive model is presented as a contribution towards a theory of analytical behaviour. The future intention is to apply prospect theory, a economic model of decision-making under uncertainty, to the study of analytical behaviour. It is our assertion that to apply prospect theory first requires a descriptive model of the processes that facilitate decision-making in visual analytics. We conclude it necessary to measure the perception of risk in future work in order to apply prospect theory to the study of analytical behaviour using our proposed model
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