8,339 research outputs found
Regulation, competition, and liberalization
In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are pro-competitive from corresponding anti-competitive liberalization policies
Recommended from our members
The British model in Britain: failing slowly
In 1990, Britain became the first developed country to reorganise its electricity industry to run on competitive lines. The British reforms are widely regarded as the benchmark for other reforms and the model used provides the basis for reforms of electricity and other network industries around the world. The factors behind this perception of success are major reductions in the real price of electricity with no apparent reduction in service quality. This paper examines whether the high reputation of the British reforms is justified and whether these good results can be maintained. It concludes that the reputation is not justified and that serious problems are beginning to emerge.
The central question that must be asked is: have the British reforms resulted in the creation of efficient markets at the wholesale and retail level? On this criterion, the reforms have failed. The wholesale market remains illusory. Obscure long-term contracts, privileged access to the market and self-dealing within integrated generator/retailers have dominated wholesale purchases leaving the spot markets with minimal liquidity and unreliable prices. The failure to develop an efficient wholesale market places the onus on consumers to impose competitive forces on electricity companies by switching regularly. Small consumers will not do this and they are paying too much for their power. For the future, there is a serious risk that the electricity industry will become a weakly regulated oligopoly with a veneer of competition
Network Regulation Using an Agent
This paper introduces a new regulatory concept: the independent profit-maximising regulatory agent, as a possible model for regulating network industries where complex demand interdependencies, in particular demand complementarities, make traditional methods of regulation difficult. We derive a simple theoretical network model with differentiated demands and explore alternative competitive and regulatory strategies. We show that the employment of an independent profit-maximising agent may offer a partial solution to the problem of network regulation, yielding outcomes which involve all parties pursuing their own interests yet are relatively desirable to both firms and society
Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds : exogenous and endogenous timing
The purpose of this article is to investigate how the introduction of the shadow cost of public funds in the utilitarian measure of the economy wide welfare affects the behavior of a welfare maximizer public firm in amixed duopoly. We prove that when firms play simultaneously, the mixed-Nash equilibrium can dominate any Cournot equilibria implemented after a privatization, with or without efficiency gains. This can be true both interms of welfare and of public firm's profit. When we consider endogenous timing, we show that either mixed-Nash, private leadership or both Stackelberg equilibria can result as subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). As a consequence, the sustainability of sequential equilibria enlarges the subspace of parameters such that themarket performance with an inefficient public firm is better than the one implemented after a full-efficient privatization. Absent efficiency gains, privatization always lowers welfare
On the problem of network monopoly
We introduce a new regulatory concept: the independent profit-maximising agent, as a model for regulating a network monopoly. The agent sets prices on cross-network goods taking either a complete, or arbitrarily small, share of the associated profit. We examine welfare and profits with and without each agent type under both network monopoly and network duopoly. We show that splitting up the network monopoly (creating network duopoly) may be inferior for both firm(s) and society compared with a network monopoly "regulated" by an agent and that society always prefers any of the four agent regimes over network monopoly and network duopoly
Intra- and inter-channel competition in local-service sectors.
Although economically very important, local-service sectors have received little attention in the extensive literature on competitive interactions. Detailed data gathering in these sectors is hard, not only because of the multitude of local players, but also because key service dimensions are hard to quantify. Using empirical entry models, we show how to infer information on these sectors' degree of intra- and inter-channel competition from the observed entry decisions in different local markets. The approach also controls for relevant socio-demographic characteristics of the trading area that may affect performance. We apply the proposed empirical entry model to the video-rental market. Additional entries of video stores are found to significantly increase the level of intra-channel competition. Unlike the predictions of many normative economic models, we find this increase to be larger when the entry occurs in a duopoly than in a monopoly, a pattern consistent with recent experimental research on collusive behavior in oligopolies. We also find evidence of inter-channel cannibalization from the upstream channel (movie theatres), but not from the downstream channel (premium cable). Finally, various socio-demographic characteristics of the trading zone, such as income and household size, are found to also have a significant impact on store performance.Competition; Sector; Channel competition; Characteristics; Oligopoly; Monopoly;
Market structure, Regulation and the Speed of Mobile Network Penetration
The speed of market penetration (i.e. diffusion) is an important summary measure of how well the market works for potential consumers of a new product. This paper identifies the structural features associated with rapid diffusion of mobile telephony. We use a sample of thirty countries over the sixteen years in which average penetration rose from 2% to 97% of the population (earlier studies observed only the initial years of diffusion during which there was typically only one or two networks). We find a non-monotonic effect of market structure, with three firms maximising consumer uptake. Privatization and independent regulation are also important positive factors. Further results show that the market structure effect works only partially through the level of prices
Market Structure and Entry: Where's the Beef?.
We study the effects of market structure on entry using data from the UK fast food (counter-service burger)industry over the years 1991-1995. Over this period, the market can be characterized as a duopoly. We find that market structure matters greatly: for both firms, rival presence increases the probability of entry. We control for market specific time-invariant unobservable and their correlation with existing outlets of both firms through a variety of methods.LEARNING ; MARKET ; DUOPOLY
Regulation, Competition and Liberalization
In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are pro-competitive from corresponding anti-competitive liberalization policiesCompetition, Regulation, Liberalization
- …