1,380 research outputs found
Evolution of Cooperation and Coordination in a Dynamically Networked Society
Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in
society and game theory is one major way in which they can be investigated.
Starting from the observation that individuals in society interact through
networks of acquaintances, we model the co-evolution of the agents' strategies
and of the social network itself using two prototypical games, the Prisoner's
Dilemma and the Stag Hunt. Allowing agents to dismiss ties and establish new
ones, we find that cooperation and coordination can be achieved through the
self-organization of the social network, a result that is non-trivial,
especially in the Prisoner's Dilemma case. The evolution and stability of
cooperation implies the condensation of agents exploiting particular game
strategies into strong and stable clusters which are more densely connected,
even in the more difficult case of the Prisoner's Dilemma.Comment: 18 pages, 14 figures. to appea
Coalition structure generation over graphs
We give the analysis of the computational complexity of coalition structure generation over graphs. Given an undirected graph G = (N,E) and a valuation function v : P(N) → R over the subsets of nodes, the problem is to find a partition of N into connected subsets, that maximises the sum of the components values. This problem is generally NP-complete; in particular, it is hard for a defined class of valuation functions which are independent of disconnected members — that is, two nodes have no effect on each others marginal contribution to their vertex separator. Nonetheless, for all such functions we provide bounds on the complexity of coalition structure generation over general and minor free graphs. Our proof is constructive and yields algorithms for solving corresponding instances of the problem. Furthermore, we derive linear time bounds for graphs of bounded treewidth. However, as we show, the problem remains NP-complete for planar graphs, and hence, for any Kk minor free graphs where k ≥ 5. Moreover, a 3-SAT problem with m clauses can be represented by a coalition structure generation problem over a planar graph with O(m2) nodes. Importantly, our hardness result holds for a particular subclass of valuation functions, termed edge sum, where the value of each subset of nodes is simply determined by the sum of given weights of the edges in the induced subgraph
Measuring social dynamics in a massive multiplayer online game
Quantification of human group-behavior has so far defied an empirical,
falsifiable approach. This is due to tremendous difficulties in data
acquisition of social systems. Massive multiplayer online games (MMOG) provide
a fascinating new way of observing hundreds of thousands of simultaneously
socially interacting individuals engaged in virtual economic activities. We
have compiled a data set consisting of practically all actions of all players
over a period of three years from a MMOG played by 300,000 people. This
large-scale data set of a socio-economic unit contains all social and economic
data from a single and coherent source. Players have to generate a virtual
income through economic activities to `survive' and are typically engaged in a
multitude of social activities offered within the game. Our analysis of
high-frequency log files focuses on three types of social networks, and tests a
series of social-dynamics hypotheses. In particular we study the structure and
dynamics of friend-, enemy- and communication networks. We find striking
differences in topological structure between positive (friend) and negative
(enemy) tie networks. All networks confirm the recently observed phenomenon of
network densification. We propose two approximate social laws in communication
networks, the first expressing betweenness centrality as the inverse square of
the overlap, the second relating communication strength to the cube of the
overlap. These empirical laws provide strong quantitative evidence for the Weak
ties hypothesis of Granovetter. Further, the analysis of triad significance
profiles validates well-established assertions from social balance theory. We
find overrepresentation (underrepresentation) of complete (incomplete) triads
in networks of positive ties, and vice versa for networks of negative ties...Comment: 23 pages 19 figure
Upstream reciprocity in heterogeneous networks
Many mechanisms for the emergence and maintenance of altruistic behavior in
social dilemma situations have been proposed. Indirect reciprocity is one such
mechanism, where other-regarding actions of a player are eventually rewarded by
other players with whom the original player has not interacted. The upstream
reciprocity (also called generalized indirect reciprocity) is a type of
indirect reciprocity and represents the concept that those helped by somebody
will help other unspecified players. In spite of the evidence for the
enhancement of helping behavior by upstream reciprocity in rats and humans,
theoretical support for this mechanism is not strong. In the present study, we
numerically investigate upstream reciprocity in heterogeneous contact networks,
in which the players generally have different number of neighbors. We show that
heterogeneous networks considerably enhance cooperation in a game of upstream
reciprocity. In heterogeneous networks, the most generous strategy, by which a
player helps a neighbor on being helped and in addition initiates helping
behavior, first occupies hubs in a network and then disseminates to other
players. The scenario to achieve enhanced altruism resembles that seen in the
case of the Prisoner's Dilemma game in heterogeneous networks.Comment: 10 figures, Journal of Theoretical Biology, in press (2010
Evolutionary Dilemmas in a Social Network
We simulate the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games on a real social
acquaintance network. Using a discrete analogue of replicator dynamics, we show
that surprisingly high levels of cooperation can be achieved, contrary to what
happens in unstructured mixing populations. Moreover, we empirically show that
cooperation in this network is stable with respect to invasion by defectors.Comment: 13 pages, 9 figures; to be published in Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 200
- …