814 research outputs found
ERROR CORRECTION CODE-BASED EMBEDDING IN ADAPTIVE RATE WIRELESS COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
In this dissertation, we investigated the methods for development of embedded channels within error
correction mechanisms utilized to support adaptive rate communication systems. We developed an error
correction code-based embedding scheme suitable for application in modern wireless data communication
standards. We specifically implemented the scheme for both low-density parity check block codes and
binary convolutional codes. While error correction code-based information hiding has been previously
presented in literature, we sought to take advantage of the fact that these wireless systems have the ability to
change their modulation and coding rates in response to changing channel conditions. We utilized this
functionality to incorporate knowledge of the channel state into the scheme, which led to an increase in
embedding capacity. We conducted extensive simulations to establish the performance of our embedding
methodologies. Results from these simulations enabled the development of models to characterize the
behavior of the embedded channels and identify sources of distortion in the underlying communication
system. Finally, we developed expressions to define limitations on the capacity of these channels subject to
a variety of constraints, including the selected modulation type and coding rate of the communication
system, the current channel state, and the specific embedding implementation.Commander, United States NavyApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited
A NOVEL APPROACH FOR COVERT COMMUNICATION OVER TCP VIA INDUCED CLOCK SKEW
The goal of this thesis is to determine the feasibility and provide a proof of concept for a covert
communications channel based on induced clock skew. Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) timestamps
provide a means for measuring clock skew between two hosts. By intentionally altering timestamps, a host
can induce artificial clock skew as measured by the receiver, thereby providing a means to covertly
communicate. A novel scheme for transforming symbols into skew values is developed in this work, along
with methods for extraction at the receiver. We tested the proposed scheme in a laboratory network
consisting of Dell laptops running Ubuntu 16.04. The results demonstrated a successful implementation of
the proposed covert channel with achieved bit rates as high as 33 bits per second under ideal conditions.
Forward error correction was also successfully employed in the form of a Reed–Solomon code to mitigate
the effects of variation in delay over the Internet.Lieutenant, United States NavyApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Packet Chasing: Spying on Network Packets over a Cache Side-Channel
This paper presents Packet Chasing, an attack on the network that does not
require access to the network, and works regardless of the privilege level of
the process receiving the packets. A spy process can easily probe and discover
the exact cache location of each buffer used by the network driver. Even more
useful, it can discover the exact sequence in which those buffers are used to
receive packets. This then enables packet frequency and packet sizes to be
monitored through cache side channels. This allows both covert channels between
a sender and a remote spy with no access to the network, as well as direct
attacks that can identify, among other things, the web page access patterns of
a victim on the network. In addition to identifying the potential attack, this
work proposes a software-based short-term mitigation as well as a light-weight,
adaptive, cache partitioning mitigation that blocks the interference of I/O and
CPU requests in the last-level cache
Application of information theory and statistical learning to anomaly detection
In today\u27s highly networked world, computer intrusions and other attacks area constant threat. The detection of such attacks, especially attacks that are new or previously unknown, is important to secure networks and computers. A major focus of current research efforts in this area is on anomaly detection.;In this dissertation, we explore applications of information theory and statistical learning to anomaly detection. Specifically, we look at two difficult detection problems in network and system security, (1) detecting covert channels, and (2) determining if a user is a human or bot. We link both of these problems to entropy, a measure of randomness information content, or complexity, a concept that is central to information theory. The behavior of bots is low in entropy when tasks are rigidly repeated or high in entropy when behavior is pseudo-random. In contrast, human behavior is complex and medium in entropy. Similarly, covert channels either create regularity, resulting in low entropy, or encode extra information, resulting in high entropy. Meanwhile, legitimate traffic is characterized by complex interdependencies and moderate entropy. In addition, we utilize statistical learning algorithms, Bayesian learning, neural networks, and maximum likelihood estimation, in both modeling and detecting of covert channels and bots.;Our results using entropy and statistical learning techniques are excellent. By using entropy to detect covert channels, we detected three different covert timing channels that were not detected by previous detection methods. Then, using entropy and Bayesian learning to detect chat bots, we detected 100% of chat bots with a false positive rate of only 0.05% in over 1400 hours of chat traces. Lastly, using neural networks and the idea of human observational proofs to detect game bots, we detected 99.8% of game bots with no false positives in 95 hours of traces. Our work shows that a combination of entropy measures and statistical learning algorithms is a powerful and highly effective tool for anomaly detection
Steganographic Timing Channels
This paper describes steganographic timing channels that use cryptographic primitives to hide the presence of covert channels in the timing of network traffic. We have identified two key properties for steganographic timing channels: (1) the parameters of the scheme should be cryptographically keyed, and (2) the distribution of input timings should be indistinguishable from output timings. These properties are necessary (although we make no claim they are sufficient) for the undetectability of a steganographic timing channel. Without them, the contents of the channel can be read and observed by unauthorized persons, and the presence of the channel is trivially exposed by noticing large changes in timing distributions – a previously proposed methodology for covert channel detection. Our steganographic timing scheme meets the secrecy requirement by employing cryptographic keys, and we achieve a restricted form of input/output distribution parity. Under certain distributions, our schemes conforms to a uniformness property; input timings that are uniformly distributed modulo a timing window are indistinguishable from output timings, measured under the same modulo. We also demonstrate that our scheme is practical under real network conditions, and finally present an empirical study of its covertness using the firstorder entropy metric, as suggested by Gianvecchio and Wang [8], which is currently the best published practical detection heuristic for timing channels
Traffic Analysis Resistant Infrastructure
Network traffic analysis is using metadata to infer information from traffic flows. Network traffic flows are the tuple of source IP, source port, destination IP, and destination port. Additional information is derived from packet length, flow size, interpacket delay, Ja3 signature, and IP header options. Even connections using TLS leak site name and cipher suite to observers. This metadata can profile groups of users or individual behaviors.
Statistical properties yield even more information. The hidden Markov model can track the state of protocols where each state transition results in an observation. Format Transforming Encryption (FTE) encodes data as the payload of another protocol. The emulated protocol is called the host protocol. Observation-based FTE is a particular case of FTE that uses real observations from the host protocol for the transformation. By communicating using a shared dictionary according to the predefined protocol, it can difficult to detect anomalous traffic.
Combining observation-based FTEs with hidden Markov models (HMMs) emulates every aspect of a host protocol. Ideal host protocols would cause significant collateral damage if blocked (protected) and do not contain dynamic handshakes or states (static). We use protected static protocols with the Protocol Proxy--a proxy that defines the syntax of a protocol using an observation-based FTE and transforms data to payloads with actual field values. The Protocol Proxy massages the outgoing packet\u27s interpacket delay to match the host protocol using an HMM. The HMM ensure the outgoing traffic is statistically equivalent to the host protocol. The Protocol Proxy is a covert channel, a method of communication with a low probability of detection (LPD). These covert channels trade-off throughput for LPD.
The multipath TCP (mpTCP) Linux kernel module splits a TCP streams across multiple interfaces. Two potential architectures involve splitting a covert channel across several interfaces (multipath) or splitting a single TCP stream across multiple covert channels (multisession). Splitting a covert channel across multiple interfaces leads to higher throughput but is classified as mpTCP traffic. Splitting a TCP flow across multiple covert channels is not as performant as the previous case, but it provides added obfuscation and resiliency. Each covert channel is independent of the others, and a channel failure is recoverable.
The multipath and multisession frameworks provide independently address the issues associated with covert channels. Each tool addresses a challenge. The Protocol Proxy provides anonymity in a setting were detection could have critical consequences. The mpTCP kernel module offers an architecture that increases throughput despite the channel\u27s low-bandwidth restrictions. Fusing these architectures improves the goodput of the Protocol Proxy without sacrificing the low probability of detection
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