Confidence, Pessimism and their Impact on Product Differentiation in a Hotelling Model with Demand Location Uncertainty

We analyze a Hotelling location-then-price duopoly game under demand uncertainty with uniformly distributed consumers in a standard quadratic costs scenario. The novelty of our approach consists of assuming that firms' beliefs are represented by non-extreme-outcome-additive (neo-additive) capacities. We derive firms' subgame-perfect product design decisions under ambiguity. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude on equilibrium product differentiation and contrast our results with an environment of risky firms. We find that the impact of the degree of confidence or ambiguity is particularly significant when it comes to delivering accurate explanations for a wide range of phenomena related to observed product design behavior

Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 137:Employment protection and globalisation in dynamic oligopoly

We construct a model in which oligopolistic firms decide where to locate. Firms choose to locate either in a country where employment protection implies costly output adjustments or in one without adjustment costs. Using a two-period three-stage game with uncertainty it is demonstrated that location is influenced by both flexibility and strategic concerns. We show that the strategic effects under Cournot work towards domestic anchorage in the country with adjustment costs while those under Bertrand do not. Strategic agglomeration can occur in the inflexible country under Cournot and even under Bertrand provided uncertainty and foreign direct investment costs are low

Stochastic make-to-stock inventory deployment problem: an endosymbiotic psychoclonal algorithm based approach

Integrated steel manufacturers (ISMs) have no specific product, they just produce finished product from the ore. This enhances the uncertainty prevailing in the ISM regarding the nature of the finished product and significant demand by customers. At present low cost mini-mills are giving firm competition to ISMs in terms of cost, and this has compelled the ISM industry to target customers who want exotic products and faster reliable deliveries. To meet this objective, ISMs are exploring the option of satisfying part of their demand by converting strategically placed products, this helps in increasing the variability of product produced by the ISM in a short lead time. In this paper the authors have proposed a new hybrid evolutionary algorithm named endosymbiotic-psychoclonal (ESPC) to decide what and how much to stock as a semi-product in inventory. In the proposed theory, the ability of previously proposed psychoclonal algorithms to exploit the search space has been increased by making antibodies and antigen more co-operative interacting species. The efficacy of the proposed algorithm has been tested on randomly generated datasets and the results compared with other evolutionary algorithms such as genetic algorithms (GA) and simulated annealing (SA). The comparison of ESPC with GA and SA proves the superiority of the proposed algorithm both in terms of quality of the solution obtained and convergence time required to reach the optimal/near optimal value of the solution

The Evolution of Shopping Center Research: A Review and Analysis

Retail research has evolved over the past sixty years. Christaller\u27s early work on central place theory, with its simplistic combination of range and threshold has been advanced to include complex consumer shopping patterns and retailer behavior in agglomerated retail centers. Hotelling\u27s seminal research on competition in a spatial duopoly has been realized in the form of comparison shopping in regional shopping centers. The research that has followed Christaller and Hoteling has been as wide as it has been deep, including literature in geography, economics, finance, marketing, and real estate. In combination, the many extensions of central place theory and retail agglomeration economics have clearly enhanced the understanding of both retailer and consumer behavior. In addition to these two broad areas of shopping center research, two more narrowly focused areas of research have emerged. The most recent focus in the literature has been on the positive effects large anchor tenants have on smaller non-anchor tenant sales. These positive effects are referred to as retail demand externalities. Exploring the theoretical basis for the valuation of shopping centers has been another area of interest to researchers. The primary focus of this literature is based in the valuation of current and expected lease contracts

Product differentiation in a linear city and wage bargaining

Economides (1986) has shown that within a linear city an equilibrium exists in a two-stage location-price game when the curvature of the transportation cost function is sufficiently high. One important point is that not all of these equilibria are at maximal differentiation. In this paper we include an additional stage with decentralized wage bargaining. This intensifies price competition resulting in locations that are nearer to the extremes of the city. The magnitude of this effect depends on the bargaining power of the unions.Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Serie

Road User Charging – Pricing Structures.

This project considers the extent to which the public could cope with complex price or tariff structures such as those that might be considered in the context of a national congestion pricing scheme. The key elements of the brief were: • to review existing studies of road pricing schemes to assess what information and evidence already exists on the key issues; • to identify what can be learned about pricing structures from other transport modes and other industries and in particular what issues and conclusions might be transferable; • to improve the general understanding of the relationship between information and people’s ability to respond; and • to recommend what further research would be most valuable to fill evidence gaps and enable conclusions to be drawn about an effective structure

Strategic Information Disclosure: The Case of Multi-Attribute Products with Heterogeneous Consumers

We examine the incentives for firms to voluntarily disclose otherwise private information about the quality attributes of their products. In particular, we focus on the case of differentiated products with multiple attributes and heterogeneous consumers. We show that there exist certain configurations of consumers’ multi-dimensional preferences under which a firm, no matter whether producing a high- or low-quality product, may choose not to reveal the quality even with zero disclosure costs. The failure of information unraveling arises when providing consumers with more information results in more elastic demand, which triggers more intensive price competition and leads to lower prices and profits for competing firms. As a result, the equilibrium in which disclosure is voluntary may diverge from that in which disclosure is mandatory.

Uncertainty in Spatial Duopoly with Possibly Asymmetric Distributions: a State Space Approach

In spatial competition firms are likely to be uncertain about consumer locations when launching products either because of shifting demograph- ics or of asymmetric information about preferences. Realistically distri- butions of consumer locations should be allowed to vary over states and need not be uniform. However, the existing literature models location uncertainty as an additive shock to a uniform consumer distribution. The additive shock restricts uncertainty to the mean of the consumers loca- tions. We generalize this approach to a state space model in which a vector of parameters gives rise to different distributions of consumer tastes in dif- ferent states, allowing other moments (besides the mean) of the consumer distribution to be uncertain. We illustrate our model with an asymmetric consumer distribution and obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with an explicit, closed-form solution. An equilibrium existence result is then given for the general case. For symmetric distributions, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the general case can be described by a simple closed-form solution.Location, Product Differentiation, Uncertainty, Hotelling