Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights

This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that impose externalities on other members of the organization. When only decision rights can be contractually assigned to one of the organization’s stakeholders, the optimal assignment minimizes the resulting inefficiencies by giving control rights to the party with the highest stake in the organization’s decisions. Under asymmetric information, the efficient allocation of authority depends on the communication of private information. In the case of multiple decision areas, divided control rights may enhance organizational efficiency unless there exist complementarities between different decisions

Teacher talk about student characteristics and patterns of behaviour : a thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Psychology at Massey University, Albany Campus, Auckland, New Zealand

This thesis reports on the discourse analysis of two groups of secondary school teachers' conversation about student behaviour. The study involved a two stage analysis. The teachers' conversation was first analysed according to its reflection of teachers' views of students and the environment on continua from active to passive. Main themes emerging across the conversations were then identified with links between the themes established through understanding of the teachers' views on the active to passive continua. This method of analysis generated a theory of behaviour management for the teachers who took part in the study. It provided in-depth understanding of the relationship between the teachers' sense of agency at the time and the forms of interventions they implemented to address student behaviour. This theory identified contextual factors that affected teachers' choices of action in relation to student behaviour and indicated pivotal points for intervention to foster shared student-teacher problem solving

Investments and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market

This paper studies investment incentives in the steady state of a dynamic bilateral matching market. Because of search frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked–in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments. The associated holdup problem depends on market conditions and is more important for the long side of the market. In the case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is always underinvestment on both sides of the market. But when market frictions become negligible, the equilibrium investment levels tend towards the ?rst–best

Externalities and the Allocation of Decision Rights in the Theory of the Firm

This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that have external effects on other members of the organization. Because of contractual incompleteness, monetary incentives are insufficient to internalize these effects in the decision maker’s objective. The optimal assignment of decision rights minimizes the resulting inefficiencies. We illustrate this in a principal–agent model where the principal retains the authority to select ‘large’ projects but delegates the decision right to the agent to implement ‘small’ projects. Extensions of the model discuss the role of effort incentives, asymmetric information and multistage decisions

A bargaining model of financial intermediation

Investment;Bargaining;Financial Institutions

Externalities and the Allocation of Decision Rights in the Theory of the Firm

This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that have external effects on other members of the organization. Because of contractual incompleteness, monetary incentives are insufficient to internalize these effects in the decision maker’s objective. The optimal assignment of decision rights minimizes the resulting inefficiencies. We illustrate this in a principal–agent model where the principal retains the authority to select ‘large’ projects but delegates the decision right to the agent to implement ‘small’ projects. Extensions of the model discuss the role of effort incentives, asymmetric information and multistage decisions.Authority; Control Rights; Decision Rights; Delegation; Externalities; Incomplete Contracts; Theory of the Firm

Investments and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market

This paper studies investment incentives in the steady state of a dynamic bilateral matching market. Because of search frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked–in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments. The associated holdup problem depends on market conditions and is more important for the long side of the market. In the case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is always underinvestment on both sides of the market. But when market frictions become negligible, the equilibrium investment levels tend towards the ?rst–best.Holdup Problem; Matching Market; Investments

Bargaining vs. price competition in a market with quality uncertainty

Economics;Price Policy

Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market

This paper studies investment incentives in the steady state of a dynamic bilateral matching market. Because of search frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked-in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments. The associated holdup problem depends on market conditions and is more important for the long side of the market. In the case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is always underinvestment on both sides of the market. But when market frictions become negligible, the equilibrium investment levels tend towards the first-best. --Holdup Problem,Matching Market,Investments