Robust Simulation for Hybrid Systems: Chattering Path Avoidance

The sliding mode approach is recognized as an efficient tool for treating the chattering behavior in hybrid systems. However, the amplitude of chattering, by its nature, is proportional to magnitude of discontinuous control. A possible scenario is that the solution trajectories may successively enter and exit as well as slide on switching mani-folds of different dimensions. Naturally, this arises in dynamical systems and control applications whenever there are multiple discontinuous control variables. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a robust computational framework for the most general way to extend a flow map on the intersection of p intersected (n--1)-dimensional switching manifolds in at least p dimensions. We explore a new formulation to which we can define unique solutions for such particular behavior in hybrid systems and investigate its efficient computation/simulation. We illustrate the concepts with examples throughout the paper.Comment: The 56th Conference on Simulation and Modelling (SIMS 56), Oct 2015, Link\"oping, Sweden. 2015, Link\"oping University Pres

Patent Office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect

The number of patent applications and "bad" patents issued has been rising rapidly in recent years. Based on this trend, we study the overload problem within the Patent Office and its consequences on the firms' R&D incentives. We assume that the examination process of patent applications is imperfect, and that its quality is poorer under congestion. Depend- ing on policy instruments such as submission fees and the toughness of the non-obviousness requirement, the system may result in a high-R&D equilibrium, in which firms self-select in their patent applications, or in an equilibrium with low R&D, opportunistic patent applications and the issuance of bad patents. Multiple equilibria often coexist, which deeply undermines the effectiveness of policy instruments. We investigate the robustness of our conclusions as to how the value of patent protection is formalized, taking into consideration the introduction of a penalty system for rejected patent applications, as well as the role of commitment to a given IP protection policy.patent office ; patent quality ; congestion ; innovation

Implementing the Optimal Auction

In a general framework with independent private values of the bidders, we propose a game, with a simple economic interpretation, that allows implementing the optimal auction outcome when the seller ignores the distributions of the different bidders' valuations. In this robust or detail-free implementation procedure, a second-price auction is organized and the winner volunteers a payment to the seller; this payment can then be challenged by another bidder who knows the distribution of the winner's valuation. Dans un cadre du modèle d'enchères avec des valeurs privées indépendantes, nous proposons un jeu, ayant une interprétation économique simple, qui permet de mettre en oeuvre les enchères optimales même quand le vendeur ignore les distributions des volontés à payer des différents soumissionnaires. Dans cette procédure robuste (detail-free), une enchère au deuxième prix est organisée et le gagnant de cette enchère propose un paiement au vendeur; ce paiement peut alors être contesté par un autre soumissionnaire qui connaît la distribution de l'évaluation du gagnant.Auction, mechanism design, Wilson doctrine, Enchères, design de mécanismes, doctrine de Wilson

A Generic Model of Contracts for Embedded Systems

We present the mathematical foundations of the contract-based model developed in the framework of the SPEEDS project. SPEEDS aims at developing methods and tools to support "speculative design", a design methodology in which distributed designers develop different aspects of the overall system, in a concurrent but controlled way. Our generic mathematical model of contract supports this style of development. This is achieved by focusing on behaviors, by supporting the notion of "rich component" where diverse (functional and non-functional) aspects of the system can be considered and combined, by representing rich components via their set of associated contracts, and by formalizing the whole process of component composition

Consensus building: How to persuade a group

Many decisions in private and public organizations are made by groups. The paper explores strategies that the sponsor of a proposal may employ to convince a qualified majority of group members to approve the proposal. Adopting a mechanism design approach to communication, it emphasizes the need to distill information selectively to key members of the group and to engineer persuasion cascades in which members who are brought on board sway the opinion of others. The paper unveils the factors, such as the extent of congruence among group members and between them and the sponsor, and the size and governance of the group, that condition the sponsor's ability to maneuver and get his project approved.group decision-making ; selective communication ; persuasion cascade ; internal and external congruence

Strategic loyalty reward in dynamic price Discrimination

This paper proposes a dynamic model of duopolistic competition under behaviorbased price discrimination with the following property: in equilibrium, a firm may reward its previous customers although long term contracts are not enforceable. A firm can offer a lower price to its previous customers than to its new customers as a strategic means to hamper its rival to gather precise information on the young generation of customers for subsequent profitable behavior-based pricing. The result holds both with myopic and forward-looking, impatient enough consumers.Price discrimination ; Dynamic pricing ; Loyalty reward