in defense of a presuppositional account of slurs

Abstract In the last fifteen years philosophers and linguists have turned their attention to slurs: derogatory expressions that target certain groups on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, nationality and so on. This interest is due to the fact that, on the one hand, slurs possess puzzling linguistic properties; on the other hand, the questions they pose are related to other crucial issues, such as the descriptivism/expressivism divide, the semantics/pragmatics divide and, generally speaking, the theory of meaning. Despite these recent investigations about pejoratives, there is no widely accepted explanation of slurs:in my paper I consider the intuitions we have about slurs and I assess the difficulties that the main theories encounter in explaining how these terms work in order to identify the phenomena that a satisfactory account of slurs needs to explain. Then, I focus on the pragmatic theories that deal with the notions of conventional implicature and pragmatic presupposition: I assess the objections that have been raised and I propose two ways of defending the presuppositional account, taking into consideration the notion of cancellability. I will claim that the reason why most pragmatic strategies seem to fail to account for slurs is that they assume a rigid divide between conventional implicatures and presuppositions that should not be taken for granted. Reconsidering the relationship between these two notions gives a hint about how a pragmatic account of slurs should look like. Finally, I assess the problem of which presupposition slurs in fact trigger

On the semantics and logic of declaratives and interrogatives

In many natural languages, there are clear syntactic and/or intonational differences between declarative sentences, which are primarily used to provide information, and interrogative sentences, which are primarily used to request information. Most logical frameworks restrict their attention to the former. Those that are concerned with both usually assume a logical language that makes a clear syntactic distinction between declaratives and interrogatives, and usually assign different types of semantic values to these two types of sentences. A different approach has been taken in recent work on inquisitive semantics. This approach does not take the basic syntactic distinction between declaratives and interrogatives as its starting point, but rather a new notion of meaning that captures both informative and inquisitive content in an integrated way. The standard way to treat the logical connectives in this approach is to associate them with the basic algebraic operations on these new types of meanings. For instance, conjunction and disjunction are treated as meet and join operators, just as in classical logic. This gives rise to a hybrid system, where sentences can be both informative and inquisitive at the same time, and there is no clearcut division between declaratives and interrogatives. It may seem that these two general approaches in the existing literature are quite incompatible. The main aim of this paper is to show that this is not the case. We develop an inquisitive semantics for a logical language that has a clearcut division between declaratives and interrogatives. We show that this language coincides in expressive power with the hybrid language that is standardly assumed in inquisitive semantics, we establish a sound and complete axiomatization for the associated logic, and we consider a natural enrichment of the system with presuppositional interrogatives

The Implications of New Historicism for Evangelical Bible Interpretation: An Evaluation

The twentieth century has seen a rise in recognizing the Bible not only as historical or theological work but also as a piece of literature, and the natural progression of this idea is to apply the same methods used for literary texts to the biblical text. However, many movements in literary studies seem antithetical to evangelical ideas of interpretation, as the goal of evangelical interpretation is always to find God’s intended meaning for the text. This thesis will explore the features of one literary theory, New Historicism, as presented in Practicing New Historicism, and ask if this theory can be made compatible with evangelical presuppositions, or even offer any unique insights for biblical interpretation

The logic and mathematics of occasion sentences

The prime purpose of this paper is, first, to restore to discourse-bound occasion sentences their rightful central place in semantics and secondly, taking these as the basic propositional elements in the logical analysis of language, to contribute to the development of an adequate logic of occasion sentences and a mathematical (Boolean) foundation for such a logic, thus preparing the ground for more adequate semantic, logical and mathematical foundations of the study of natural language. Some of the insights elaborated in this paper have appeared in the literature over the past thirty years, and a number of new developments have resulted from them. The present paper aims atproviding an integrated conceptual basis for this new development in semantics. In Section 1 it is argued that the reduction by translation of occasion sentences to eternal sentences, as proposed by Russell and Quine, is semantically and thus logically inadequate. Natural language is a system of occasion sentences, eternal sentences being merely boundary cases. The logic hasfewer tasks than is standardly assumed, as it excludes semantic calculi, which depend crucially on information supplied by cognition and context and thus belong to cognitive psychology rather than to logic. For sentences to express a proposition and thus be interpretable and informative, they must first be properly anchored in context. A proposition has a truth value when it is, moreover, properly keyed in the world, i.e. is about a situation in the world. Section 2 deals with the logical properties of natural language. It argues that presuppositional phenomena require trivalence and presents the trivalent logic PPC3, with two kinds of falsity and two negations. It introduces the notion of Σ-space for a sentence A (or A/A, the set of situations in which A is true) as the basis of logical model theory, and the notion of PA/ (the Σ-space of the presuppositions of A), functioning as a `private' subuniverse for A/A. The trivalent Kleene calculus is reinterpreted as a logical account of vagueness, rather than of presupposition. PPC3 and the Kleene calculus are refinements of standard bivalent logic and can be combined into one logical system. In Section 3 the adequacy of PPC3 as a truth-functional model of presupposition is considered more closely and given a Boolean foundation. In a noncompositional extended Boolean algebra, three operators are defined: 1a for the conjoined presuppositions of a, ã for the complement of a within 1a, and â for the complement of 1a within Boolean 1. The logical properties of this extended Boolean algebra are axiomatically defined and proved for all possible models. Proofs are provided of the consistency and the completeness of the system. Section 4 is a provisional exploration of the possibility of using the results obtained for a new discourse-dependent account of the logic of modalities in natural language. The overall result is a modified and refined logical and model-theoretic machinery, which takes into account both the discourse-dependency of natural language sentences and the necessity of selecting a key in the world before a truth value can be assigne

Presupposed free choice and the theory of scalar implicatures

A disjunctive sentence like Olivia took Logic or Algebra conveys that Olivia didn’t take both classes (EXCLUSIVITY) and that the speaker doesn’t know which of the two classes she took (IGNORANCE). The corresponding sentence with a possibility modal, Olivia can take Logic or Algebra, conveys instead that she can take Logic and that she can take Algebra (FREE CHOICE). These EXCLUSIVITY, IGNORANCE and FREE CHOICE inferences are argued by many to be scalar implicatures. Recent work has looked at cases in which EXCLUSIVITY and IGNORANCE appear to be computed instead at the presupposition level, independently from the assertion. On the basis of those data, Spector and Sudo (Linguist Philos 40(5):473–517, 2017) have argued for a hybrid account relying on a pragmatic principle for deriving implicatures in the presupposition. In this paper, we observe that a sentence like Noah is unaware that Olivia can take Logic or Algebra has a reading on which FREE CHOICE appears in the presupposition, but not in the assertion, and we show that deriving this reading is challenging on Spector and Sudo’s (2017) hybrid account. Following the dialectic in Fox (Presupposition and implicature in compositional semantics, Palgrave, London, pp 71–120, 2007), we argue against a pragmatic approach to presupposition-based implicatures on the ground that it is not able to account for presupposed free choice. In addition, we raise a novel challenge for Spector and Sudo’s (2017) account coming from the conflicting presupposed IGNORANCE triggered by sentences like #Noah is unaware that I have a son or a daughter, which is infelicitous even if it’s not common knowledge whether the speaker has a son or a daughter. More generally, our data reveals a systematic parallelism between the assertion and presupposition levels in terms of EXCLUSIVITY, IGNORANCE, and FREE CHOICE. We argue that such parallels call for a unified analysis and we sketch how a grammatical theory of implicatures where meaning strengthening operates in a similar way at both levels (Gajewski and Sharvit in Nat Lang Semant 20(1):31–57, 2012; Magri in A theory of individual-level predicates based on blind mandatory scalar implicatures, MIT dissertation, 2009; Marty in Implicatures in the DP domain, MIT dissertation, 2017) can account for such parallels.publishedVersio

Scientific Realism without the Wave-Function: An Example of Naturalized Quantum Metaphysics

Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories can be regarded as (approximately) true. This is connected with the view that science, physics in particular, and metaphysics could (and should) inform one another: on the one hand, science tells us what the world is like, and on the other hand, metaphysical principles allow us to select between the various possible theories which are underdetermined by the data. Nonetheless, quantum mechanics has always been regarded as, at best, puzzling, if not contradictory. As such, it has been considered for a long time at odds with scientific realism, and thus a naturalized quantum metaphysics was deemed impossible. Luckily, now we have many quantum theories compatible with a realist interpretation. However, scientific realists assumed that the wave-function, regarded as the principal ingredient of quantum theories, had to represent a physical entity, and because of this they struggled with quantum superpositions. In this paper I discuss a particular approach which makes quantum mechanics compatible with scientific realism without doing that. In this approach, the wave-function does not represent matter which is instead represented by some spatio-temporal entity dubbed the primitive ontology: point-particles, continuous matter fields, space-time events. I argue how within this framework one develops a distinctive theory-construction schema, which allows to perform a more informed theory evaluation by analyzing the various ingredients of the approach and their inter-relations

Proof-checking mathematical texts in controlled natural language

The research conducted for this thesis has been guided by the vision of a computer program that could check the correctness of mathematical proofs written in the language found in mathematical textbooks. Given that reliable processing of unrestricted natural language input is out of the reach of current technology, we focused on the attainable goal of using a controlled natural language (a subset of a natural language defined through a formal grammar) as input language to such a program. We have developed a prototype of such a computer program, the Naproche system. This thesis is centered around the novel logical and linguistic theory needed for defining and motivating the controlled natural language and the proof checking algorithm of the Naproche system. This theory provides means for bridging the wide gap between natural and formal mathematical proofs. We explain how our system makes use of and extends existing linguistic formalisms in order to analyse the peculiarities of the language of mathematics. In this regard, we describe a phenomenon of this language previously not described by other logicians or linguists, the implicit dynamic function introduction, exemplified by constructs of the form "for every x there is an f(x) such that ...". We show how this function introduction can lead to a paradox analogous to Russell's paradox. To tackle this problem, we developed a novel foundational theory of functions called Ackermann-like Function Theory, which is equiconsistent to ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice) and can be used for imposing limitations to implicit dynamic function introduction in order to avoid this paradox. We give a formal account of implicit dynamic function introduction by extending Dynamic Predicate Logic, a formalism developed by linguists to account for the dynamic nature of natural language quantification, to a novel formalism called Higher-Order Dynamic Predicate Logic, whose semantics is based on Ackermann-like Function Theory. Higher-Order Dynamic Predicate Logic also includes a formal account of the linguistic theory of presuppositions, which we use for clarifying and formally modelling the usage of potentially undefined terms (e.g. 1/x, which is undefined for x=0) and of definite descriptions (e.g. "the even prime number") in the language of mathematics. The semantics of the controlled natural language is defined through a translation from the controlled natural language into an extension of Higher-Order Dynamic Predicate Logic called Proof Text Logic. Proof Text Logic extends Higher-Order Dynamic Predicate Logic in two respects, which make it suitable for representing the content of mathematical texts: It contains features for representing complete texts rather than single assertions, and instead of being based on Ackermann-like Function Theory, it is based on a richer foundational theory called Class-Map-Tuple-Number Theory, which does not only have maps/functions, but also classes/sets, tuples, numbers and Booleans as primitives. The proof checking algorithm checks the deductive correctness of proof texts written in the controlled natural language of the Naproche system. Since the semantics of the controlled natural language is defined through a translation into the Proof Text Logic formalism, the proof checking algorithm is defined on Proof Text Logic input. The algorithm makes use of automated theorem provers for checking the correctness of single proof steps. In this way, the proof steps in the input text do not need to be as fine-grained as in formal proof calculi, but may contain several reasoning steps at once, just as is usual in natural mathematical texts. The proof checking algorithm has to recognize implicit dynamic function introductions in the input text and has to take care of presuppositions of mathematical statements according to the principles of the formal account of presuppositions mentioned above. We prove two soundness and two completeness theorems for the proof checking algorithm: In each case one theorem compares the algorithm to the semantics of Proof Text Logic and one theorem compares it to the semantics of standard first-order predicate logic. As a case study for the theory developed in the thesis, we illustrate the working of the Naproche system on a controlled natural language adaptation of the beginning of Edmund Landau's Grundlagen der Analysis.Beweisprüfung mathematischer Texte in kontrollierter natürlicher Sprache Die Forschung, die für diese Dissertation durchgeführt wurde, basiert auf der Vision eines Computerprogramms, das die Korrektheit von mathematischen Beweisen, die in der gewöhnlichen mathematischen Fachsprache verfasst sind, überprüfen kann. Da die zuverlässige automatische Bearbeitung von uneingeschränktem natürlich-sprachlichen Input außer Reichweite der gegenwärtigen Technologie ist, haben wir uns auf das erreichbare Ziel fokussiert, eine kontrollierte natürliche Sprache (eine Teilmenge der natürlichen Sprache, die durch eine formale Grammatik definiert ist) als Eingabesprache für ein solches Programm zu verwenden. Wir haben einen Prototypen eines solchen Computerprogramms, das Naproche-System, entwickelt. Die vorliegende Dissertation beschreibt die neuartigen logischen und linguistischen Theorien, die benötigt werden, um die kontrollierte natürliche Sprache und den Beweisprüfungs-Algorithmus des Naproche-Systems zu definieren und zu motivieren. Diese Theorien stellen Methoden zu Verfügung, die dazu verwendet werden können, die weite Kluft zwischen natürlichen und formalen mathematischen Beweisen zu überbrücken. Wir erklären, wie unser System existierende linguistische Formalismen verwendet und erweitert, um die Besonderheiten der mathematischen Fachsprache zu analysieren. In diesem Zusammenhang beschreiben wir ein Phänomen dieser Fachsprache, das bisher von Logikern und Linguisten nicht beschrieben wurde – die implizite dynamische Funktionseinführung, die durch Konstruktionen der vorm "für jedes x gibt es ein f(x), so dass ..." veranschaulicht werden kann. Wir zeigen, wie diese Funktionseinführung zu einer der Russellschen analogen Antinomie führt. Um dieses Problem zu lösen, haben wir eine neuartige Grundlagentheorie für Funktionen entwickelt, die Ackermann-artige Funktionstheorie, die äquikonsistent zu ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel-Mengenlehre mit Auswahlaxiom) ist und verwendet werden kann, um der impliziten dynamischen Funktionseinführung Grenzen zu setzen, die zur Vermeidung dieser Antinomie führen. Wir beschreiben die implizite dynamische Funktionseinführung formal, indem wir die Dynamische Prädikatenlogik – ein Formalismus, der von Linguisten entwickelt wurde, um die dynamischen Eigenschaften der natürlich-sprachlichen Quantifizierung zu erfassen – zur Dynamischen Prädikatenlogik Höherer Stufe erweitern, deren Semantik auf der Ackermann-artigen Funktionstheorie basiert. Die Dynamische Prädikatenlogik Höherer Stufe formalisiert auch die linguistische Theorie der Präsuppositionen, die wir verwenden, um den Gebrauch potentiell undefinierter Terme (z.B. der Term 1/x, der für x=0 undefiniert ist) und bestimmter Kennzeichnungen (z.B. "die gerade Primzahl") in der mathematischen Fachsprache zu modellieren. Die Semantik der kontrollierten natürlichen Sprache wird definiert durch eine Übersetzung dieser in eine Erweiterung der Dynamischen Prädikatenlogik Höherer Stufe mit der Bezeichnung Beweistext-Logik. Die Beweistext-Logik erweitert die Dynamische Prädikatenlogik Höherer Stufe in zwei Hinsichten: Sie stellt Funktionalitäten für die Repräsentation von vollständigen Texten, und nicht nur von Einzelaussagen, zur Verfügung, und anstatt auf der Ackermann-artigen Funktionstheorie zu basieren, basiert sie auf einer reichhaltigeren Grundlagentheorie – der Klassen-Abbildungs-Tupel-Zahlen-Theorie, die neben Abbildungen/Funktionen auch noch Klassen/Mengen, Tupel, Zahlen und boolesche Werte als Grundobjekte zur Verfügung stellt. Der Beweisprüfungs-Algorithmus prüft die deduktive Korrektheit von Beweistexten, die in der kontrollierten natürlichen Sprache des Naproche-Systems verfasst sind. Da die Semantik dieser kontrollierten natürlichen Sprache durch eine Übersetzung in die Beweistext-Logik definiert ist, ist der Beweisprüfungs-Algorithmus für Beweistext-Logik-Input definiert. Der Algorithmus verwendet automatische Beweiser für die Überprüfung einzelner Beweisschritte. Dadurch müssen die Beweisschritte in dem Eingabetext nicht so kleinschrittig sein wie in formalen Beweiskalkülen, sondern können mehrere Deduktionsschritte zu einem Schritt vereinen, so wie dies auch in natürlichen mathematischen Texten üblich ist. Der Beweisprüfungs-Algorithmus muss die impliziten Funktionseinführungen im Eingabetext erkennen und Präsuppositionen von mathematischen Aussagen auf Grundlage der oben erwähnten Präsuppositionstheorie behandeln. Wir beweisen zwei Korrektheits- und zwei Vollständigkeitssätze für den Beweisprüfungs-Algorithmus: Jeweils einer dieser Sätze vergleicht den Algorithmus mit der Semantik der Beweistext-Logik und jeweils einer mit der Semantik der üblichen Prädikatenlogik erster Stufe. Als Fallstudie für die in dieser Dissertation entwickelte Theorie veranschaulichen wir die Funktionsweise des Naproche-Systems an einem an die kontrollierte natürliche Sprache angepassten Anfangsabschnitt von Edmund Landaus Grundlagen der Analysis