Creativity and the Brain

Neurocognitive approach to higher cognitive functions that bridges the gap between psychological and neural level of description is introduced. Relevant facts about the brain, working memory and representation of symbols in the brain are summarized. Putative brain processes responsible for problem solving, intuition, skill learning and automatization are described. The role of non-dominant brain hemisphere in solving problems requiring insight is conjectured. Two factors seem to be essential for creativity: imagination constrained by experience, and filtering that selects most interesting solutions. Experiments with paired words association are analyzed in details and evidence for stochastic resonance effects is found. Brain activity in the process of invention of novel words is proposed as the simplest way to understand creativity using experimental and computational means. Perspectives on computational models of creativity are discussed

Microgenesis, immediate experience and visual processes in reading

The concept of microgenesis refers to the development on a brief present-time scale of a percept, a thought, an object of imagination, or an expression. It defines the occurrence of immediate experience as dynamic unfolding and differentiation in which the ‘germ’ of the final experience is already embodied in the early stages of its development. Immediate experience typically concerns the focal experience of an object that is thematized as a ‘figure’ in the global field of consciousness; this can involve a percept, thought, object of imagination, or expression (verbal and/or gestural). Yet, whatever its modality or content, focal experience is postulated to develop and stabilize through dynamic differentiation and unfolding. Such a microgenetic description of immediate experience substantiates a phenomenological and genetic theory of cognition where any process of perception, thought, expression or imagination is primarily a process of genetic differentiation and development, rather than one of detection (of a stimulus array or information), transformation, and integration (of multiple primitive components) as theories of cognitivist kind have contended. My purpose in this essay is to provide an overview of the main constructs of microgenetic theory, to outline its potential avenues of future development in the field of cognitive science, and to illustrate an application of the theory to research, using visual processes in reading as an example

Distortions of Subjective Time Perception Within and Across Senses

Background: The ability to estimate the passage of time is of fundamental importance for perceptual and cognitive processes. One experience of time is the perception of duration, which is not isomorphic to physical duration and can be distorted by a number of factors. Yet, the critical features generating these perceptual shifts in subjective duration are not understood. Methodology/Findings: We used prospective duration judgments within and across sensory modalities to examine the effect of stimulus predictability and feature change on the perception of duration. First, we found robust distortions of perceived duration in auditory, visual and auditory-visual presentations despite the predictability of the feature changes in the stimuli. For example, a looming disc embedded in a series of steady discs led to time dilation, whereas a steady disc embedded in a series of looming discs led to time compression. Second, we addressed whether visual (auditory) inputs could alter the perception of duration of auditory (visual) inputs. When participants were presented with incongruent audio-visual stimuli, the perceived duration of auditory events could be shortened or lengthened by the presence of conflicting visual information; however, the perceived duration of visual events was seldom distorted by the presence of auditory information and was never perceived shorter than their actual durations. Conclusions/Significance: These results support the existence of multisensory interactions in the perception of duration and, importantly, suggest that vision can modify auditory temporal perception in a pure timing task. Insofar as distortions in subjective duration can neither be accounted for by the unpredictability of an auditory, visual or auditory-visual event, we propose that it is the intrinsic features of the stimulus that critically affect subjective time distortions

Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness

Most ‘theories of consciousness’ are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states – the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ‘Type-C’ processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology

Consciousness, introspection, and subjective measures

This chapter discusses the main types of so-called ’subjective measures of consciousness’ used in current-day science of consciousness. After explaining the key worry about such measures, namely the problem of an ever-present response bias, I discuss the question of whether subjective measures of consciousness are introspective. I show that there is no clear answer to this question, as proponents of subjective measures do not employ a worked-out notion of subjective access. In turn, this makes the problem of response bias less tractable than it might otherwise be

Underpowered samples, false negatives, and unconscious learning

The scientific community has witnessed growing concern about the high rate of false positives and unreliable results within the psychological literature, but the harmful impact of false negatives has been largely ignored. False negatives are particularly concerning in research areas where demonstrating the absence of an effect is crucial, such as studies of unconscious or implicit processing. Research on implicit processes seeks evidence of above-chance performance on some implicit behavioral measure at the same time as chance-level performance (that is, a null result) on an explicit measure of awareness. A systematic review of 73 studies of contextual cuing, a popular implicit learning paradigm, involving 181 statistical analyses of awareness tests, reveals how underpowered studies can lead to failure to reject a false null hypothesis. Among the studies that reported sufficient information, the meta-analytic effect size across awareness tests was d z = 0.31 (95 % CI 0.24–0.37), showing that participants’ learning in these experiments was conscious. The unusually large number of positive results in this literature cannot be explained by selective publication. Instead, our analyses demonstrate that these tests are typically insensitive and underpowered to detect medium to small, but true, effects in awareness tests. These findings challenge a widespread and theoretically important claim about the extent of unconscious human cognition

How do changes in speed affect the perception of duration?

Six experiments investigated how changes in stimulus speed influence subjective duration. Participants saw rotating or translating shapes in three conditions: constant speed, accelerating motion, and decelerating motion. The distance moved and average speed were the same in all three conditions. In temporal judgment tasks, the constant-speed objects seemed to last longer than the decelerating objects, which in turn seemed to last longer than the accelerating stimuli. In temporal reproduction tasks, the difference between accelerating and decelerating stimuli disappeared; furthermore, watching an accelerating shape lengthened the apparent duration of the subsequent (static) display. These results (a) suggest that temporal judgment and reproduction can dissociate for moving stimuli because the stimulus influences the apparent duration of the subsequent interval, and (b) constrain theories of time perception, including those which emphasize memory storage, those which emphasize the existence of a pacemaker-accumulator timing system, and those which emphasize the division of attention between temporal and non-temporal information processing

The positional-specificity effect reveals a passive-trace contribution to visual short-term memory.

The positional-specificity effect refers to enhanced performance in visual short-term memory (VSTM) when the recognition probe is presented at the same location as had been the sample, even though location is irrelevant to the match/nonmatch decision. We investigated the mechanisms underlying this effect with behavioral and fMRI studies of object change-detection performance. To test whether the positional-specificity effect is a direct consequence of active storage in VSTM, we varied memory load, reasoning that it should be observed for all objects presented in a sub-span array of items. The results, however, indicated that although robust with a memory load of 1, the positional-specificity effect was restricted to the second of two sequentially presented sample stimuli in a load-of-2 experiment. An additional behavioral experiment showed that this disruption wasn't due to the increased load per se, because actively processing a second object--in the absence of a storage requirement--also eliminated the effect. These behavioral findings suggest that, during tests of object memory, position-related information is not actively stored in VSTM, but may be retained in a passive tag that marks the most recent site of selection. The fMRI data were consistent with this interpretation, failing to find location-specific bias in sustained delay-period activity, but revealing an enhanced response to recognition probes that matched the location of that trial's sample stimulus

A Role for the prefrontal cortex in supporting singular demonstrative reference

One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond lowlevel sensory representations while also falling short of more sophisticated intellectual abilities

Neural Models of Motion Integration, Segmentation, and Probablistic Decision-Making

When brain mechanism carry out motion integration and segmentation processes that compute unambiguous global motion percepts from ambiguous local motion signals? Consider, for example, a deer running at variable speeds behind forest cover. The forest cover is an occluder that creates apertures through which fragments of the deer's motion signals are intermittently experienced. The brain coherently groups these fragments into a trackable percept of the deer in its trajectory. Form and motion processes are needed to accomplish this using feedforward and feedback interactions both within and across cortical processing streams. All the cortical areas V1, V2, MT, and MST are involved in these interactions. Figure-ground processes in the form stream through V2, such as the seperation of occluding boundaries of the forest cover from the boundaries of the deer, select the motion signals which determine global object motion percepts in the motion stream through MT. Sparse, but unambiguous, feauture tracking signals are amplified before they propogate across position and are intergrated with far more numerous ambiguous motion signals. Figure-ground and integration processes together determine the global percept. A neural model predicts the processing stages that embody these form and motion interactions. Model concepts and data are summarized about motion grouping across apertures in response to a wide variety of displays, and probabilistic decision making in parietal cortex in response to random dot displays.National Science Foundation (SBE-0354378); Office of Naval Research (N00014-01-1-0624