49 research outputs found
Information Processing Constraints and Asset Mispricing
I analyse a series of natural quasi-experiments - centred on betting exchange data on the Wimbledon Tennis Championships - to determine whether information processing constraints are partially responsible for mispricing in asset markets. I find that the arrival of information during each match leads to substantial mispricing between two equivalent assets, and that part of this mispricing can be attributed to differences in the frequency with which the two prices are updated inplay. This suggests that information processing constraints force the periodic neglect of one of the assets, thereby causing substantial, albeit temporary, mispricing in this simple asset market
Financial Contagion and Attention Allocation
This paper explains financial contagion between two independent stock markets by fluctuations in international investors' attention allocation. I model the process of attention allocation that underlies portfolio investment in international markets using rationally inattentive agents. Investors optimally allocate more attention to a region hit by a financial crisis, to the detriment of other markets. The resulting endogenous increase in uncertainty causes the risk premium on all risky assets to rise. Hence, stock prices around the world collapse and there is a flight to quality. I show that the degree of (non)anticipation of a crisis is crucial for the existence of contagion. Using Financial Times coverage as a proxy for attention allocation, I find strong support for the model's predictions.Financial Crises, Rational Inattention, Portfolio Choice
Sales, Quantity Surcharge, and Consumer Inattention
Quantity surcharges occur when firms market a product in two sizes and offer a promotion on the small size: the large size then costs more per unit than the small one. When quantity surcharges occur the sales of the large size decrease only slightly despite the fact that the small size is a cheaper option - a clear arbitrage opportunity. This behavior is consistent with the notion of rationally inattentive consumers that has been developed in models of information frictions. We discuss implications for consumer decision making, demand estimation, and firm pricing.quantity surcharge, sales, promotions, consumer inattention, quantity discounts, nonlinear pricing
Information Inertia
We study how information about an asset affects optimal portfolios and equilibrium asset prices when investors are not sure about the model that predicts future asset values and thus treat the information as ambiguous. We show that this ambiguity leads to optimal portfolios that are insensitive to news even though there are no information processing costs or other market frictions. In equilibrium, we show that stock prices may not react to public information that is worse than expected and this mispricing of bad news leads to profitable trading strategies based on public information
Portfolio Choice with Information-Processing Limits
In this paper, we examine the joint consumption-portfolio decision of an agent with limited information-processing capacity (rational inattention or RI) in the sense of Sims (2003) within a non-linear-quadratic (non-LQ) setting. Our model predicts that, as processing capacity falls, agents choose to hold less of their savings in the form of risky assets on average; however, they still choose to hold substantial risky assets with some positive probability. Low capacity causes households to act as if they are more risk averse and more willing to substitute consumption intertemporally
Information Inertia
We study how information about an asset affects optimal portfolios and equilibrium asset prices when investors are not sure about the model that predicts future asset values and thus treat the information as ambiguous. We show that this ambiguity leads to optimal portfolios that are insensitive to news even though there are no information processing costs or other market frictions. In equilibrium, we show that stock prices may not react to public information that is worse than expected and this mispricing of bad news leads to profitable trading strategies based on public information
Information Inertia
We show that aversion to risk and ambiguity leads to information inertia when investors process public news about future asset values. Optimal portfolios do not always depend on news that is worse than expected; hence, the equilibrium stock price does not reflect this news. This informational inefficiency is more severe when there is more risk and ambiguity, but disappears when investors are risk neutral or the news is about idiosyncratic risk. Information inertia leads to time-series momentum and is consistent with low trading activity of households. An ex-ante ambiguity premium helps explain the macro and earnings announcement premium
Endogenous product design and quality with rationally inattentive consumers
n some markets, consumers do not know the attributes of all the products that are available in
the market, or the prices at which they are offered. To overcome this uncertainty, consumers may
gather and process information about those attributes and prices. In this paper, we examine the
consequences of consumer costs of doing so on firms product attribute and pricing decisions. To do
so, we follow the rational inattention literature in assuming that, before entering the choice situation,
consumers are in contact with all products, but may have an incomplete or imprecise prior idea about
their attributes and prices. Further, we also assume that consumers can, at a cost, gather and process
information in a non-random fashion about any (sub)set of products, with any precision about their
attributes and prices. Furthermore, we assume that products are characterized by both horizontal
and vertically differentiated attributes, which we address as design and quality, respectively. We find
a number of interesting results. First, if the unit costs of gathering and processing information are
homogeneous among consumers, firm' should differentiate their products as those costs fall, so to relax
the otherwise increasing price competition. This implies that equilibrium prices may increase as these
costs decrease, because product differentiation countervails the otherwise negative impact on prices.
Second, if the unit costs of gathering and processing information are heterogeneous among consumers,
with a sizeable proportion of "informed" consumers, firms should always seek to differentiate their
products as maximum as possible, independently of the level of information costs of the "uninformed"
consumers. This implies that equilibrium price levels do not increase (and, in fact, tend to decrease)
as the unit costs of those consumers decrease and that "informed" consumers serve as a "market
competition guardian". Finally, in all the above cases, firms do not need to differentiate themselves
along all attribute dimensions. Differentiation along one attribute dimension is more than enough to
relax price competition.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
What We Don't Know Doesn't Hurt Us: Rational Inattention and the Permanent Income Hypothesis in General Equilibrium
This paper derives the general equilibrium effects of rational inattention (or RI; Sims 2003, 2010) in a model of incomplete income insurance (Huggett 1993, Wang 2003). We show that, under the assumption of CARA utility with Gaussian shocks, the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) arises in equilibrium, as in models with full information-rational expectations, due to a balancing of precautionary savings and impatience. We then explore how RI affects the equilibrium joint dynamics of consumption, income and wealth, and find that elastic attention can make the model fit the data better. We finally show that the welfare costs of incomplete information are even smaller due to general equilibrium adjustments in interest rates
Imperfect Information and Aggregate Supply
This paper surveys the research in the past decade on imperfect information models of aggregate supply and the Phillips curve. This new work has emphasized that information is dispersed and disseminates slowly across a population of agents who strategically interact in their use of information. We discuss the foundations on which models of aggregate supply rest, as well as the micro-foundations for two classes of imperfect information models: models with partial information, where agents observe economic conditions with noise, and models with delayed information, where they observe economic conditions with a lag. We derive the implications of these two classes of models for: the existence of a non-vertical aggregate supply, the persistence of the real effects of monetary policy, the difference between idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, the dynamics of disagreement, and the role of transparency in policy. Finally, we present some of the topics on the research frontier in this area