55 research outputs found
Enhanced Hardware Security Using Charge-Based Emerging Device Technology
The emergence of hardware Trojans has largely reshaped the traditional view that the hardware layer can be blindly trusted. Hardware Trojans, which are often in the form of maliciously inserted circuitry, may impact the original design by data leakage or circuit malfunction. Hardware counterfeiting and IP piracy are another two serious issues costing the US economy more than $200 billion annually. A large amount of research and experimentation has been carried out on the design of these primitives based on the currently prevailing CMOS technology. However, the security provided by these primitives comes at the cost of large overheads mostly in terms of area and power consumption. The development of emerging technologies provides hardware security researchers with opportunities to utilize some of the otherwise unusable properties of emerging technologies in security applications. In this dissertation, we will include the security consideration in the overall performance measurements to fully compare the emerging devices with CMOS technology. The first approach is to leverage two emerging devices (Silicon NanoWire and Graphene SymFET) for hardware security applications. Experimental results indicate that emerging device based solutions can provide high level circuit protection with relatively lower performance overhead compared to conventional CMOS counterpart. The second topic is to construct an energy-efficient DPA-resilient block cipher with ultra low-power Tunnel FET. Current-mode logic is adopted as a circuit-level solution to countermeasure differential power analysis attack, which is mostly used in the cryptographic system. The third investigation targets on potential security vulnerability of foundry insider\u27s attack. Split manufacturing is adopted for the protection on radio-frequency (RF) circuit design
Internet-of-Things (IoT) Security Threats: Attacks on Communication Interface
Internet of Things (IoT) devices collect and process information from remote places and have significantly increased the productivity of distributed systems or individuals. Due to the limited budget on power consumption, IoT devices typically do not include security features such as advanced data encryption and device authentication. In general, the hardware components deployed in IoT devices are not from high end markets. As a result, the integrity and security assurance of most IoT devices are questionable. For example, adversary can implement a Hardware Trojan (HT) in the fabrication process for the IoT hardware devices to cause information leak or malfunctions. In this work, we investigate the security threats on IoT with a special emphasis on the attacks that aim for compromising the communication interface between IoT devices and their main processing host. First, we analyze the security threats on low-energy smart light bulbs, and then we exploit the limitation of Bluetooth protocols to monitor the unencrypted data packet from the air-gapped network. Second, we examine the security vulnerabilities of single-wire serial communication protocol used in data exchange between a sensor and a microcontroller. Third, we implement a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack on a master-slave communication protocol adopted in Inter-integrated Circuit (I2C) interface. Our MITM attack is executed by an analog hardware Trojan, which crosses the boundary between digital and analog worlds. Furthermore, an obfuscated Trojan detection method(ADobf) is proposed to monitor the abnormal behaviors induced by analog Trojans on the I2C interface
CMOS Vision Sensors: Embedding Computer Vision at Imaging Front-Ends
CMOS Image Sensors (CIS) are key for imaging technol-ogies. These chips are conceived for capturing opticalscenes focused on their surface, and for delivering elec-trical images, commonly in digital format. CISs may incor-porate intelligence; however, their smartness basicallyconcerns calibration, error correction and other similartasks. The term CVISs (CMOS VIsion Sensors) definesother class of sensor front-ends which are aimed at per-forming vision tasks right at the focal plane. They havebeen running under names such as computational imagesensors, vision sensors and silicon retinas, among others. CVIS and CISs are similar regarding physical imple-mentation. However, while inputs of both CIS and CVISare images captured by photo-sensors placed at thefocal-plane, CVISs primary outputs may not be imagesbut either image features or even decisions based on thespatial-temporal analysis of the scenes. We may hencestate that CVISs are more “intelligent” than CISs as theyfocus on information instead of on raw data. Actually,CVIS architectures capable of extracting and interpretingthe information contained in images, and prompting reac-tion commands thereof, have been explored for years inacademia, and industrial applications are recently ramp-ing up.One of the challenges of CVISs architects is incorporat-ing computer vision concepts into the design flow. Theendeavor is ambitious because imaging and computervision communities are rather disjoint groups talking dif-ferent languages. The Cellular Nonlinear Network Univer-sal Machine (CNNUM) paradigm, proposed by Profs.Chua and Roska, defined an adequate framework forsuch conciliation as it is particularly well suited for hard-ware-software co-design [1]-[4]. This paper overviewsCVISs chips that were conceived and prototyped at IMSEVision Lab over the past twenty years. Some of them fitthe CNNUM paradigm while others are tangential to it. Allthem employ per-pixel mixed-signal processing circuitryto achieve sensor-processing concurrency in the quest offast operation with reduced energy budget.Junta de Andalucía TIC 2012-2338Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad TEC 2015-66878-C3-1-R y TEC 2015-66878-C3-3-
Towards Provably-Secure Analog and Mixed-Signal Locking Against Overproduction
Similar to digital circuits, analog and mixed-signal (AMS) circuits are also susceptible to supply-chain attacks such as piracy, overproduction, and Trojan insertion. However, unlike digital circuits,
supply-chain security of AMS circuits is less explored. In this work,
we propose to perform “logic locking” on digital section of the AMS
circuits. The idea is to make the analog design intentionally suffer
from the effects of process variations, which impede the operation of the circuit. Only on applying the correct key, the effect of process
variations are mitigated, and the analog circuit performs as desired.
We provide the theoretical guarantees of the security of the circuit,
and along with simulation results for the band-pass filter, low-noise
amplifier, and low-dropout regulator, we also show experimental
results of our technique on a band-pass filter
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Design of Hardware with Quantifiable Security against Reverse Engineering
Semiconductors are a 412 billion dollar industry and integrated circuits take on important roles in human life, from everyday use in smart-devices to critical applications like healthcare and aviation. Saving today\u27s hardware systems from attackers can be a huge concern considering the budget spent on designing these chips and the sensitive information they may contain. In particular, after fabrication, the chip can be subject to a malicious reverse engineer that tries to invasively figure out the function of the chip or other sensitive data. Subsequent to an attack, a system can be subject to cloning, counterfeiting, or IP theft. This dissertation addresses some issues concerning the security of hardware systems in such scenarios.
First, the issue of privacy risks from approximate computing is investigated in Chapter 2. Simulation experiments show that the erroneous outputs produced on each chip instance can reveal the identity of the chip that performed the computation, which jeopardizes user privacy.
The next two chapters deal with camouflaging, which is a technique to prevent reverse engineering from extracting circuit information from the layout. Chapter 3 provides a design automation method to protect camouflaged circuits against an adversary with prior knowledge about the circuit\u27s viable functions. Chapter 4 provides a method to reverse engineer camouflaged circuits. The proposed reverse engineering formulation uses Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) solving in a way that incorporates laser fault injection and laser voltage probing capabilities to figure out the function of an aggressively camouflaged circuit with unknown gate functions and connections.
Chapter 5 addresses the challenge of secure key storage in hardware by proposing a new key storage method that applies threshold-defined behavior of memory cells to store secret information in a way that achieves a high degree of protection against invasive reverse engineering. This approach requires foundry support to encode the secrets as threshold voltage offsets in transistors. In Chapter 6, a secret key storage approach is introduced that does not rely on a trusted foundry. This approach only relies on the foundry to fabricate the hardware infrastructure for key generation but not to encode the secret key. The key is programmed by the IP integrator or the user after fabrication via directed accelerated aging of transistors. Additionally, this chapter presents the design of a working hardware prototype on PCB that demonstrates this scheme.
Finally, chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and summarizes possible future research
Design of Discrete-time Chaos-Based Systems for Hardware Security Applications
Security of systems has become a major concern with the advent of technology. Researchers are proposing new security solutions every day in order to meet the area, power and performance specifications of the systems. The additional circuit required for security purposes can consume significant area and power. This work proposes a solution which utilizes discrete-time chaos-based logic gates to build a system which addresses multiple hardware security issues. The nonlinear dynamics of chaotic maps is leveraged to build a system that mitigates IC counterfeiting, IP piracy, overbuilding, disables hardware Trojan insertion and enables authentication of connecting devices (such as IoT and mobile). Chaos-based systems are also used to generate pseudo-random numbers for cryptographic applications.The chaotic map is the building block for the design of discrete-time chaos-based oscillator. The analog output of the oscillator is converted to digital value using a comparator in order to build logic gates. The logic gate is reconfigurable since different parameters in the circuit topology can be altered to implement multiple Boolean functions using the same system. The tuning parameters are control input, bifurcation parameter, iteration number and threshold voltage of the comparator. The proposed system is a hybrid between standard CMOS logic gates and reconfigurable chaos-based logic gates where original gates are replaced by chaos-based gates. The system works in two modes: logic locking and authentication. In logic locking mode, the goal is to ensure that the system achieves logic obfuscation in order to mitigate IC counterfeiting. The secret key for logic locking is made up of the tuning parameters of the chaotic oscillator. Each gate has 10-bit key which ensures that the key space is large which exponentially increases the computational complexity of any attack. In authentication mode, the aim of the system is to provide authentication of devices so that adversaries cannot connect to devices to learn confidential information. Chaos-based computing system is susceptible to process variation which can be leveraged to build a chaos-based PUF. The proposed system demonstrates near ideal PUF characteristics which means systems with large number of primary outputs can be used for authenticating devices
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On Improving Robustness of Hardware Security Primitives and Resistance to Reverse Engineering Attacks
The continued growth of information technology (IT) industry and proliferation of interconnected devices has aggravated the problem of ensuring security and necessitated the need for novel, robust solutions. Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have emerged as promising secure hardware primitives that can utilize the disorder introduced during manufacturing process to generate unique keys. They can be utilized as \textit{lightweight} roots-of-trust for use in authentication and key generation systems. Unlike insecure non-volatile memory (NVM) based key storage systems, PUFs provide an advantage -- no party, including the manufacturer, should be able to replicate the physical disorder and thus, effectively clone the PUF. However, certain practical problems impeded the widespread deployment of PUFs. This dissertation addresses such problems of (i) reliability and (ii) unclonability. Also, obfuscation techniques have proven necessary to protect intellectual property in the presence of an untrusted supply chain and are needed to aid against counterfeiting. This dissertation explores techniques utilizing layout and logic-aware obfuscation. Collectively, we present secure and cost-effective solutions to address crucial hardware security problems
Adaptive Integrated Circuit Design for Variation Resilience and Security
The past few decades witness the burgeoning development of integrated circuit in terms of process technology scaling. Along with the tremendous benefits coming from the scaling, challenges are also presented in various stages. During the design time, the complexity of developing a circuit with millions to billions of smaller size transistors is extended after the variations are taken into account. The difficulty of analyzing these nondeterministic properties makes the allocation scheme of redundant resource hardly work in a cost-efficient way. Besides fabrication variations, analog circuits are suffered from severe performance degradations owing to their physical attributes which are vulnerable to aging effects. As such, the post-silicon calibration approach gains increasing attentions to compensate the performance mismatch. For the user-end applications, additional system failures result from the pirated and counterfeited devices provided by the untrusted semiconductor supply chain. Again analog circuits show their weakness to this threat due to the shortage of piracy avoidance techniques.
In this dissertation, we propose three adaptive integrated circuit designs to overcome these challenges respectively. The first one investigates the variability-aware gate implementation with the consideration of the overhead control of adaptivity assignment. This design improves the variation resilience typically for digital circuits while optimizing the power consumption and timing yield. The second design is implemented as a self-validation system for the calibration of diverse analog circuits. The system is completely integrated on chip to enhance the convenience without external assistance. In the last design, a classic analog component is further studied to establish the configurable locking mechanism for analog circuits. The use of Satisfiability Modulo Theories addresses the difficulty of searching the unique unlocking pattern of non-Boolean variables
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