Developing an Overbooking Fuzzy-Based Mathematical Optimization Model for Multi-Leg Flights

Overbooking is one of the most vital revenue management practices that is used in the airline industry. Identification of an overbooking level is a challenging task due to the uncertainties associated with external factors, such as demand for tickets, and inappropriate overbooking levels which may cause revenue losses as well as loss of reputation and customer loyalty. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to propose a fuzzy linear programming model and Genetic Algorithms (GAs) to maximize the overall revenue of a large-scale multi-leg flight network by minimizing the number of empty seats and the number of denied passengers. A fuzzy logic technique is used for modeling the fuzzy demand on overbooking flight tickets and a metaheuristics-based GA technique is adopted to solve large-scale multi-leg flights problem. As part of model verification, the proposed GA is applied to solve a small multi-leg flight linear programming model with a fuzzified demand factor. In addition, experimentation with large-scale problems with different input parameters’ settings such as penalty rate, show-up rate and demand level are also conducted to understand the behavior of the developed model. The validation results show that the proposed GA produces almost identical results to those in a small-scale multi-leg flight problem. In addition, the performance of the large-scale multi-leg flight network represented by a number of KPIs including total booking, denied passengers and net-overbooking profit towards changing these input parameters will also be revealed

Single-leg airline revenue management with overbooking

Airline revenue management is about identifying the maximum revenue seat allocation policies. Since a major loss in revenue results from cancellations and no-show passengers, over the years overbooking has received a significant attention in the literature. In this study, we propose new models for static and dynamic single-leg overbooking problems. In the static case, we introduce computationally tractable models that give upper and lower bounds for the optimal expected revenue. In the dynamic case, we propose a new dynamic programming model, which is based on two streams of arrivals. The first stream corresponds to the booking requests and the second stream represents the cancellations. We also conduct simulation experiments to illustrate the proposed models and the solution methods

Single-leg airline revenue management with overbooking

Airline revenue management is about identifying the maximum revenue seat allocation policies. Since a major loss in revenue results from cancellations and no-show passengers, over the years overbooking has received a significant attention in the literature. In this study, we propose new models for static and dynamic single-leg overbooking problems. In the static case, we introduce computationally tractable models that give upper and lower bounds for the optimal expected revenue. In the dynamic case, we propose a new dynamic programming model, which is based on two streams of arrivals. The first stream corresponds to the booking requests and the second stream represents the cancellations. We also conduct simulation experiments to illustrate the proposed models and the solution methods

The Forty-year History of Revenue Management: Bibliometric Analysis

This paper presents research trends, leading publishers, influential articles, and shifting concerns in the field of Revenue Management for over forty years based on bibliometric analysis. Bibliometric data was retrieved from Web of Science core collection with a well-defined strategy. The data was processed using Network Analysis Interface for Literature Studies Project scripts. Subject-wise and year-wise research trends were presented. The shifting concerns in RM in terms of topic, method, and domain were highlighted using keyword analysis. In general, RM showed an increasing number of published papers with exponential manner every year. The research core in RM covered the three major decisions in RM including pricing, quantity control, and structural decision. It was highlighted that RM’s concern has shifted from single-firm decision to be more consumer- and competition-centric. The data showed that the needs of empirical study and more advanced quantitative methods for complex and real-time problems were urged. In addition, the adoption of RM was extended for industries with semi-flexible capacity. The top influential publishers were Decision Sciences, Operations Research, Management Science, and Management Science Manufacturing & Service Operations Management

Revenue Management Strategies in Airline Industry: A Literature Review

The airline industry has rapidly evolved, fostering intense competition among companies. This competition drives airlines to formulate strategies for revenue maximization, giving rise to Revenue Management. This literature review spans the past 13 years, examining the development of Airline Revenue Management methods. By analyzing 22 journals with at least Q2 and SINTA 2 indexing, three primary scopes emerge: Quantity Decision, Pricing Decision, and Structural Decision. Airlines predominantly employ dynamic pricing and programming to optimize revenue by adapting to ongoing changes. The development trend in Airline Revenue Management indicates a shift towards faster and more accurate processing through increased integration with simulation and algorithm programming. This paper identifies the three main scopes involved in revenue management strategies and explores the diverse approaches airlines take to optimize income. Notably, dynamic pricing and programming remain prevalent methods, adapting to changing decision variables. The evolving landscape emphasizes integration with advanced technology for efficient processing. The study utilizes numerical and case studies to exemplify the ongoing development of Airline Revenue Management methods within this dynamic industry

Network revenue management with product-specific no-shows

Revenue management practices often include overbooking capacity to account for customers who make reservations but do not show up. In this paper, we consider the network revenue management problem with no-shows and overbooking, where the show-up probabilities are specific to each product. No-show rates differ significantly by product (for instance, each itinerary and fare combination for an airline) as sale restrictions and the demand characteristics vary by product. However, models that consider no-show rates by each individual product are difficult to handle as the state-space in dynamic programming formulations (or the variable space in approximations) increases significantly. In this paper, we propose a randomized linear program to jointly make the capacity control and overbooking decisions with product-specific no-shows. We establish that our formulation gives an upper bound on the optimal expected total profit and our upper bound is tighter than a deterministic linear programming upper bound that appears in the existing literature. Furthermore, we show that our upper bound is asymptotically tight in a regime where the leg capacities and the expected demand is scaled linearly with the same rate. We also describe how the randomized linear program can be used to obtain a bid price control policy. Computational experiments indicate that our approach is quite fast, able to scale to industrial problems and can provide significant improvements over standard benchmarks.Network revenue management, linear programming, simulation, overbooking, no-shows.

Airline Booking Limit Competition Game Under Differentiated Fare Structure

We address a two-firm booking limit competition game in the airline industry. We assume aggregate common demand, and differentiated ticket fare and capacity, to make this study more realistic. A game theoretic approach is used to analyze the competition game. The optimal booking limits and the best response functions are derived. We show the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium and provide the closed-form equilibrium solution. The location of the Nash equilibrium depends on the relative magnitude of the ratios of the full and discount fares. We also show that the sum of the booking limits of the two firms remains the same regardless of the initial allocation proportion of the demand

Hotel sales and reservations planning

Includes bibliographical references (p. 26-27).Research partially supported by the Leaders for Manufacturing Program.Gabriel R. Bitran, Thin-Yin Leong

An Airline Seat Allocation Game

We examine a seat allocation game between two airlines for flights with two fares with dependent random demands. The strategic variable of this game is each airline’s booking limit for the low fare. We have shown that there exists an equilibrium booking strategy such that both airlines will protect the same number of seats for the full fare and the total number of seats available for the discount fare under competition is smaller than the total number of seats that would be available if the two airlines collude. A numerical example is used to illustrate the equilibrium solutions and to examine the impact of the capacity shares and the level of dependency between random demands