Neural Belief Reasoner

This paper proposes a new generative model called neural belief reasoner (NBR). It differs from previous models in that it specifies a belief function rather than a probability distribution. Its implementation consists of neural networks, fuzzy-set operations and belief-function operations, and query-answering, sample-generation and training algorithms are presented. This paper studies NBR in two tasks. The first is a synthetic unsupervised-learning task, which demonstrates NBR's ability to perform multi-hop reasoning, reasoning with uncertainty and reasoning about conflicting information. The second is supervised learning: a robust MNIST classifier for 4 and 9, which is the most challenging pair of digits. This classifier needs no adversarial training, and it substantially exceeds the state of the art in adversarial robustness as measured by the L2 metric, while at the same time maintains 99.1% accuracy on natural images

Learning and Reasoning for Robot Sequential Decision Making under Uncertainty

Robots frequently face complex tasks that require more than one action, where sequential decision-making (SDM) capabilities become necessary. The key contribution of this work is a robot SDM framework, called LCORPP, that supports the simultaneous capabilities of supervised learning for passive state estimation, automated reasoning with declarative human knowledge, and planning under uncertainty toward achieving long-term goals. In particular, we use a hybrid reasoning paradigm to refine the state estimator, and provide informative priors for the probabilistic planner. In experiments, a mobile robot is tasked with estimating human intentions using their motion trajectories, declarative contextual knowledge, and human-robot interaction (dialog-based and motion-based). Results suggest that, in efficiency and accuracy, our framework performs better than its no-learning and no-reasoning counterparts in office environment.Comment: In proceedings of 34th AAAI conference on Artificial Intelligence, 202

Ideal Reasoners don’t Believe in Zombies

The negative zombie argument concludes that physicalism is false from the premises that p ∧¬q is ideally negatively conceivable and that what is ideally negatively conceivable is possible, where p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and q is a phenomenal truth (Chalmers 2002; 2010). A sentence φ is ideally negatively conceivable iff φ is not ruled out a priori on ideal rational reflection. In this paper, I argue that the negative zombie argument is neither a priori nor conclusive. First, I argue that the premises of the argument are true only if there exists an adequate finite ideal reasoner R that believes ◊(p ∧ ¬q) on the basis of not believing p→q on a priori basis. Roughly, a finite reasoner is a reasoner with cognitive limitations (e.g. finite memory). I argue that R is finite only if R reasons nonmonotonically and only approach ideal reflection at the limit of a reasoning sequence. This would render the argument nonconclusive. Finally, I argue that, for some q, R does not believe ◊(p ∧ ¬q) on the basis of not believing p→q on a priori basis (e.g. for q =‘something is conscious’). This would render the choice of an adequate q dependent on empirical information (and the argument a posteriori). I conclude that the negative zombie argument (and, maybe, all zombie arguments) is neither a priori nor conclusive

A Boxology of Design Patterns for Hybrid Learning and Reasoning Systems

We propose a set of compositional design patterns to describe a large variety of systems that combine statistical techniques from machine learning with symbolic techniques from knowledge representation. As in other areas of computer science (knowledge engineering, software engineering, ontology engineering, process mining and others), such design patterns help to systematize the literature, clarify which combinations of techniques serve which purposes, and encourage re-use of software components. We have validated our set of compositional design patterns against a large body of recent literature.Comment: 12 pages,55 reference

Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Acheivement

This chapter argues that the only tenable unconscious inferences theories of cognitive achievement are ones that employ a theory internal technical notion of representation, but that once we give cash-value definitions of the relevant notions of representation and inference, there is little left of the ordinary notion of representation. We suggest that the real value of talk of unconscious inferences lies in (a) their heuristic utility in helping us to make fruitful predictions, such as about illusions, and (b) their providing a high-level description of the functional organization of subpersonal faculties that makes clear how they equip an agent to navigate its environment and pursue its goals

Toward machines that behave ethically better than humans do

With the increasing dependence on autonomous operating agents and robots the need for ethical machine behavior rises. This paper presents a moral reasoner that combines connectionism, utilitarianism and ethical theory about moral duties. The moral decision-making matches the analysis of expert ethicists in the health domain. This may be useful in many applications, especially where machines interact with humans in a medical context. Additionally, when connected to a cognitive model of emotional intelligence and affective decision making, it can be explored how moral decision making impacts affective behavior

The intersection between Descriptivism and Meliorism in reasoning research: further proposals in support of 'soft normativism'

The rationality paradox centres on the observation that people are highly intelligent, yet show evidence of errors and biases in their thinking when measured against normative standards. Elqayam and Evans (e.g., 2011) reject normative standards in the psychological study of thinking, reasoning and deciding in favour of a ‘value-free’ descriptive approach to studying high-level cognition. In reviewing Elqayam and Evans’ position, we defend an alternative to descriptivism in the form of ‘soft normativism’, which allows for normative evaluations alongside the pursuit of descriptive research goals. We propose that normative theories have considerable value provided that researchers: (1) are alert to the philosophical quagmire of strong relativism; (2) are mindful of the biases that can arise from utilising normative benchmarks; and (3) engage in a focused analysis of the processing approach adopted by individual reasoners. We address the controversial ‘is–ought’ inference in this context and appeal to a ‘bridging solution’ to this contested inference that is based on the concept of ‘informal reflective equilibrium’. Furthermore, we draw on Elqayam and Evans’ recognition of a role for normative benchmarks in research programmes that are devised to enhance reasoning performance and we argue that such Meliorist research programmes have a valuable reciprocal relationship with descriptivist accounts of reasoning. In sum, we believe that descriptions of reasoning processes are fundamentally enriched by evaluations of reasoning quality, and argue that if such standards are discarded altogether then our explanations and descriptions of reasoning processes are severely undermined