Guidelines for Specifying the Use of IPsec Version 2

The Security Considerations sections of many Internet Drafts say, in effect, "just use IPsec". While this is sometimes correct, more often it will leave users without real, interoperable security mechanisms. This memo offers some guidance on when IPsec Version 2 should and should not be specified

PERBANDINGAN KINERJA IP SEC DAN SSL

Ipsec (IP Security) dan SSL (Secure Socket Layer) merupakan teknik yang paling banyak digunakan untuk mengamankan komunikasi data melalui Internet. Kedua teknik ini memiliki keunggulan dan kelemahan masing-masing. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menyajikan analisis terhadap kedua teknik di atas dalam segi keamanan dan kinerja

PERBANDINGAN KINERJA IP SEC DAN SSL

Ipsec (IP Security) and SSL (Secure Socket Layer) is the most widely used techniques to secure data communications over the Internet. Both of these techniques has advantages and disadvantages of each. The purpose of this study is to present an analysis of the two techniques above in terms of security and performance

Bootstrapping Secure Multicast using Kerberized Multimedia Internet Keying

We address bootstrapping secure multicast in enterprise and public-safety settings. Our work is motivated by the fact that secure multicast has important applications in such settings, and that the application setting significantly influences the design of security systems and protocols. This document presents and analyzes two designs for the composition of the authentication protocol, Kerberos, and the key transport protocol, Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY). The two designs are denoted to be KM1 and KM2 . The main aspect in which the objective impacts the design is the assumption of an additional trusted third party (called a Key Server) that is the final arbiter on whether a principal is authorized to receive a key. Secure composition can be a challenge, and therefore the designs were kept to be simple so they have intuitive appeal. Notwithstanding this, it was recognized that even simple, seemingly secure protocols can have flaws. Two main security properties of interest called safety and avail- ability were articulated. A rigorous analysis of KM1 and KM2 was conducted using Protocol Composition Logic (PCL), a symbolic approach to analyzing security protocols, to show that the designs have those properties. The value of the analysis is demonstrated by a possible weakness in KM1 that was discovered which lead to the design of KM2 . A prototype of KM1 and KM2 was implemented starting with the publicly available reference implementation of Kerberos, and an open-source implementation of MIKEY. This document also discusses the experience from the implementation, and present empirical results which demonstrate the inherent trade-off between security and performance in the design of KM1 and KM2

Authentication in Protected Core Networking

Protected Core Networking (PCN) is a concept that aims to increase information sharing between nations in coalition military operations. PCN specifies the interconnection of national transport networks, called Protected Core Segments (PCSs), to a federated transport network called Protected Core (PCore). PCore is intended to deliver high availability differentiated transport services to its user networks, called Colored Clouds (CCs). To achieve this goal, entity authentication of all connecting entities is specified as a protective measure. In resource constrained environments, the distribution of service policy can be challenging. That is, which transport services are associated with a given entity. The thesis proposes two new and original protocols where CCs push service policy to the network by performing authentication based on attributes. Using identity-based signatures, attributes constituting a service policy are used directly for an entity's identity, and no external mechanism linking identity and policy is needed. For interoperability, the idea has been incorporated into PKINIT Kerberos and symmetric key Kerberos by carrying the authorized attributes within tickets. The proposed protocols are formally verified in the symbolic model using scyther-proof. The experiment shows that both CCs, and PCSs achieve greater assurance on agreed attributes, and hence on expected service delivery. A CC and a visiting PCS are able to negotiate, and agree on the expected service depending on the situation. The proposed solution provides benefits to CCs on expected service when connecting to a visiting PCS, with poor connectivity to the home PCS. In that respect, interconnection of entities with little pre-established relationship is simplified, and hence fulfillment of the PCN concept is facilitated

Privacy and Security Framework. OpenIoT Deliverable D522

This deliverable describes the Security and Privacy Framework of the OpenIoT platform, including details about its design and implementation. The aim of this framework is to ensure that Internet-Connected Objects (ICOs) contributing to the OpenIoT platform, its internal modules and external applications will communicate through secured IoT data interfaces (according to the target security/confidentiality level specified by the user). Moreover we show the feasibility of this security module in the implemented prototype, which is an integral part of the OpenIoT platform. In particular we describe the implementation of the Central Authorisation Server (CAS), the Security Management console, the Security Client, and the integration of the security framework in the core modules of the platform

Building mobile L2TP/IPsec tunnels

Wireless networks introduce a whole range of challenges to the traditional TCP/IP network, especially Virtual Private Network (VPN). Changing IP address is a difficult issue for VPNs in wireless networks because IP addresses are used as one of the identifiers of a VPN connection and the change of IP addresses will break the original connection. The current solution to this problem is to run VPN tunnels over Mobile IP (MIP). However, Mobile IP itself has significant problems in performance and security and that solution is inefficient due to double tunneling. This thesis proposes and implements a new and novel solution on simulators and real devices to solve the mobility problem in a VPN. The new solution adds mobility support to existing L2TP/IPsec (Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol/IP Security) tunnels. The new solution tunnels Layer 2 packets between VPN clients and a VPN server without using Mobile IP, without incurring tunnel-re-establishment at handoff, without losing packets during handoff, achieves better security than current mobility solutions for VPN, and supports fast handoff in IPv4 networks. Experimental results on a VMware simulation showed the handoff time for the VPN tunnel to be 0.08 seconds, much better than the current method which requires a new tunnel establishment at a cost of 1.56 seconds. Experimental results with a real network of computers showed the handoff time for the VPN tunnel to be 4.8 seconds. This delay was mainly caused by getting an IP address from DHCP servers via wireless access points (4.6 seconds). The time for VPN negotiation was only 0.2 seconds. The experimental result proves that the proposed mobility solution greatly reduces the VPN negotiation time but getting an IP address from DHCP servers is a large delay which obstructs the real world application. This problem can be solved by introducing fast DHCP or supplying an IP address from a new wireless access point with a strong signal while the current Internet connection is weak. Currently, there is little work on fast DHCP and this may open a range of new research opportunities