On the Relative Expressiveness of Argumentation Frameworks, Normal Logic Programs and Abstract Dialectical Frameworks

We analyse the expressiveness of the two-valued semantics of abstract argumentation frameworks, normal logic programs and abstract dialectical frameworks. By expressiveness we mean the ability to encode a desired set of two-valued interpretations over a given propositional signature using only atoms from that signature. While the computational complexity of the two-valued model existence problem for all these languages is (almost) the same, we show that the languages form a neat hierarchy with respect to their expressiveness.Comment: Proceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR 2014

Planning with Incomplete Information

Planning is a natural domain of application for frameworks of reasoning about actions and change. In this paper we study how one such framework, the Language E, can form the basis for planning under (possibly) incomplete information. We define two types of plans: weak and safe plans, and propose a planner, called the E-Planner, which is often able to extend an initial weak plan into a safe plan even though the (explicit) information available is incomplete, e.g. for cases where the initial state is not completely known. The E-Planner is based upon a reformulation of the Language E in argumentation terms and a natural proof theory resulting from the reformulation. It uses an extension of this proof theory by means of abduction for the generation of plans and adopts argumentation-based techniques for extending weak plans into safe plans. We provide representative examples illustrating the behaviour of the E-Planner, in particular for cases where the status of fluents is incompletely known.Comment: Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, April 9-11, 2000, Breckenridge, Colorad

On the equivalence between logic programming semantics and argumentation semantics

This work has been supported by the National Research Fund, Luxembourg (LAAMI project), by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC, UK), grant Ref. EP/J012084/1 (SAsSy project), by CNPq (Universal 2012 – Proc. 473110/2012-1), and by CNPq/CAPES (Casadinho/PROCAD 2011).Peer reviewedPreprin

The Bayesian boom: good thing or bad?

A series of high-profile critiques of Bayesian models of cognition have recently sparked controversy. These critiques question the contribution of rational, normative considerations in the study of cognition. The present article takes central claims from these critiques and evaluates them in light of specific models. Closer consideration of actual examples of Bayesian treatments of different cognitive phenomena allows one to defuse these critiques showing that they cannot be sustained across the diversity of applications of the Bayesian framework for cognitive modeling. More generally, there is nothing in the Bayesian framework that would inherently give rise to the deficits that these critiques perceive, suggesting they have been framed at the wrong level of generality. At the same time, the examples are used to demonstrate the different ways in which consideration of rationality uniquely benefits both theory and practice in the study of cognition

Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral Epistemology

This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve moral justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of moral epistemology

On the Equivalence between Logic Programming Semantics and Argumentation Semantics

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