20 research outputs found

    Gossip for social control in natural and artificial societies

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    In this work we propose a theory of gossip as a means for social control. Exercising social control roughly means to isolate and to punish cheaters. However, punishment is costly and it inevitably implies the problem of second-order cooperation. Moving from a cognitive model of gossip, we report data from ethnographic studies and agent-based simulations to support our claim that gossip reduces the costs of social control without lowering its efficacy

    Punishment and Gossip: Sustaining Cooperation in a Public Goods Game

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    In an environment in which free-riders are better off than cooperators, social control is required to foster and maintain coopera- tion. There are two main paths through which social control can be ap- plied: punishment and reputation. Our experiments explore the efficacy of punishment and reputation on cooperation rates, both in isolation and in combination. Using a Public Goods Game, we are interested in assessing how cooperation rates change when agents can play one of two different reactive strategies, i.e., they can pay a cost in order to reduce the payoff of free-riders, or they can know others\u27 reputation and then either play defect with free-riders, or refuse to interact with them. Co- operation is maintained at a high level through punishment, but also reputation-based partner selection proves effective in maintaining coop- eration. However, when agents are informed about free-riders\u27 reputation and play Defect, cooperation decreases. Finally, a combination of punish- ment and reputation-based partner selection leads to higher cooperation rates

    Partner selection supports reputation-based cooperation in a Public Goods Game

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    In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers' history of giving has a significant impact on the donor's decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation can hardly emerge. In this work we use a Public Goods Game to investigate whether publicly available reputation scores may support the evolution of cooperation and whether this is affected by the kind of network structure adopted. Moreover, if agents interact on a bipartite graph with partner selection cooperation can thrive in large groups and in a small amount of time.Comment: 6 pages, 10 figures. In press for Springer E

    Social Pressure and Environmental Effects on Networks: A Path to Cooperation

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    In this paper, we study how the pro-social impact due to the vigilance by other individuals is conditioned by both environmental and evolutionary effects. To this aim, we consider a known model where agents play a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) among themselves and the pay-off matrix of an individual changes according to the number of neighbors that are "vigilant", i.e., how many neighbors watch out for her behavior. In particular, the temptation to defect decreases linearly with the number of vigilant neighbors. This model proved to support cooperation in specific conditions, and here we check its robustness with different topologies, microscopical update rules and initial conditions. By means of many numerical simulations and few theoretical considerations, we find in which situations the vigilance by the others is more effective in favoring cooperative behaviors and when its influence is weaker.M.P. acknowledges support from the project H2020 FET OPEN RIA IBSEN/662725 and the Institute of Physics of Cantabria (IFCA-CSIS) for providing access to the Altamira supercomputer. D.V. acknowledges support from H2020 FETPROACT-GSS CIMPLEX Grant No. 641191, which funded the publication of this article and the CNR (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche) for the Short Term Mobility Program 2016, which funded his stay at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid where this work was accomplished

    The selfish vaccine Recipe: A simple mechanism for avoiding free-riding

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    Fairness and Trust in Virtual Environments: The Effects of Reputation

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    Reputation supports pro-social behaviors in a variety of social settings and across different ages. When re-encounters are possible, developing a positive reputation can be a valuable asset that will result in better outcomes. However, in real life, cooperative acts are ambiguous and happen in noisy environments in which individuals can have multiple goals, visibility is reduced, and reputation systems may differ. This study examined how reputation within a virtual environment affects fairness in material allocations and trust in information exchange, in a three-actors interaction game in which each player had an incentive to deceive the others. We compared the results of two experimental conditions, one in which informers could be evaluated, and one without reputational opportunities. A reputational system appeared to enhance both trust and fairness even within a virtual environment under anonymous condition. We tested adolescents and adults finding that they were consistently more generous when visibility was increased, but they showed significantly different patterns in resources allocation and information exchange. Male and female participants, across ages, showed other interesting differences. These findings suggest that reputational effects increase fairness and trust even in a noisy, ambiguous and uncertain environment, but this effect is modulated by age and gender

    Gossip as a Burdened Virtue

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    Gossip is often serious business, not idle chitchat. Gossip allows those oppressed to privately name their oppressors as a warning to others. Of course, gossip can be in error. The speaker may be lying or merely have lacked sufficient evidence. Bias can also make those who hear the gossip more or less likely to believe the gossip. By examining the social functions of gossip and considering the differences in power dynamics in which gossip can occur, we contend that gossip may be not only permissible but virtuous, both as the only reasonable recourse available and as a means of resistance against oppression

    Gossip promotes cooperation only when it is pro-socially motivated

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    Humans are often shown to cooperate with one another. Most of the mechanisms that foster cooperation among humans rely on reputation, which itself relies on the acquisition of information about other people’s behaviors. Gossip has been proposed as a cheap yet efficient tool to acquire information, and it has largely been proved to be an effective means to foster and maintain cooperation. However, empirical studies supporting this claim have ignored two aspects: (1) they often compared gossip to treatments in which no reputation was available, impeding a direct assessment of whether it is gossip that promotes cooperation or rather the introduction of a reputation system; and (2) they focused on pro-social gossip (e.g., gossip aimed at helping the receiver), neglecting the impact of other types of gossip. We show here that, in contrast with the widespread notion that gossip promotes cooperation, gossip mostly depletes cooperation compared to first-hand information. If lying is fruitful for individuals or if a group’s behavior is largely uncooperative, gossip leads to negative reputational information and decreased cooperation

    Deterrence and transmission as mechanisms ensuring reliability of gossip

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    Spreading information about the members of one\u27s group is one of the most universal human behaviors. Thanks to gossip, individuals can acquire the information about their peers without sustaining the burden of costly interactions with cheaters, but they can also create and revise social bonds. Gossip has also several positive functions at the group level, promoting cohesion and norm compliance. However, gossip can be unreliable, and can be used to damage others\u27 reputation or to circulate false information, thus becoming detrimental to people involved and useless for the group. In this work, we propose a the- oretical model in which reliability of gossip depends on the joint functioning of two distinct mechanisms. Thanks to the first, i.e., deterrence, individuals tend to avoid informational cheating because they fear punishment and the dis- ruption of social bonds. On the other hand, transmission provides humans with the opportunity of reducing the consequences of cheating through a manipulation of the source of gossip

    More than one’s negative ties: The role of friends’ antipathies in high school gossip

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    Gossip is universal, and multiple studies have demonstrated that it can have beneficial group-level outcomes when negative reports help identify defectors or norm-violators. Gossip, however, seldom happens in a social vacuum. Instead, it is enmeshed in a fabric of positive and negative relationships that creates opportunities, constraints, and also motives to gossip. This article studies the importance of friendships and antipathies among the three concerned parties (sender, receiver, target) for negative gossip among adolescents. We contrast two theoretical accounts. According to the first, gossip brings closer individuals who have “enemies” in common. Based on this, we infer that gossip appears in triads where both the sender and receiver share their antipathy against the target. The second position argues that gossip is used to compromise different opinions of friends towards the target. Thus, what predicts gossip is direct antipathy against the target or being friends with someone who dislikes the target (indirect antipathy) rather than the combination of the two antipathies. We test these two lines of reasoning with sociometric data from 17 classroom observations (13 unique classrooms in different time points) in Hungary. Bayesian Exponential Random Graph Models yield support for direct antipathy in 13 (nine unique) classrooms and indirect antipathy in five. No evidence for shared antipathy is found. Results suggest that, at least among adolescents, negative gossip is not about bonding with potential allies but more about consensus-making between friends. Also, results reveal that negative gossip concentrates on the two ends of the reputational echelon, hinting that, in the classroom, high reputation might be contested instead of rewarded
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