Lewis and the Poisoned Pawn

Lewisian modal realism is infamous for explaining the objectivity of modal discourse in terms of concrete possible worlds. Many have developed alternative theories which seek to explain the objectivity of modal discourse without concrete possible worlds. One such alternative, due to Fabrizio Mondadori and Adam Morton, attempts to ground modal discourse in actual, physical fact. Shockingly, Lewis seems to have claimed that their view is consistent with his own. I argue that the two views are consistent, from Lewis’s perspective. The result of the project is twofold. First, we see that in Lewisian realism intrinsic features of the actual world are a necessary component (i) for making modal propositions true in the actual world and (ii) for causally explaining how modal events would occur, if they did. Second, this insight motivates a rejection of the classic ‘Humphrey objection’ to counterpart theory, and ameliorates the worry that Lewis’ possible worlds somehow “change the subject”

Language and political reality: George Orwell reconsidered

The domain of reference of political discourse is not autonomous from language; this domain is a construct generated by the discourse itself. Such an approach to the relation between language and political reality was expressed in George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four. Concepts of modern semantics and pragmatics allow to explicate how language acts as both a form of constructing reality and a special type of social verbal behaviour. Language has become exclusively modal and intentional; any utterance expresses the relations of obligation, possibility, etc. and may be interpreted in intensional and, hence, in referentially non-opaque contexts. However, the semantics does not lose its referential force. In contrast, this force is multiplied, becoming a transworld relation. In this respect, the semantics of political discourse is akin to poetic semantics; however, the multidimensionality of the signified referents is hidden because referential discourse is a precondition for effectiveness. Political discourse, as a description of “world as it is”, presupposes a hidden reference to other modal contexts “world in the future” (or “in the past”); “how the world should be” (or “should not be”), etc. The domain of the interpretation of political discourse is a set of possible worlds

Philosophical Issues From Kripke's 'Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic'

In ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’, Kripke articulates his project in the discourse of “possible worlds”. There has been much philosophical discussion of whether endorsement of the Kripke semantics brings ontological commitment to possible worlds. However, that discussion is less than satisfactory because it has been conducted without the necessary investigation of the surrounding philosophical issues that are raised by the Kripke semantics. My aim in this paper is to map out the surrounding territory and to commence that investigation. Among the surrounding issues, and my attitudes to them, are these: (1) the potential of the standard distinction between pure and impure versions of the semantic theory has been under-exploited; (2) there has been under-estimation of what is achieved by the pure semantic theory alone; (3) there is a methodological imperative to co-ordinate a clear conception of the purposes of the impure theory with an equally clear conception of the content the theory; (4) there is a need to support by argument claims about how such a semantic theory, even in an impure state, can fund explanations in the theory of meaning and metaphysics; (5) greater attention needs to be paid to the crucial advance that Kripke makes on the precursors of possible-worlds semantics proper (e.g. Carnap 1947) in clearly distinguishing variation across the worlds within a model of modal space from variation across such models and, finally, (6) the normative nature of the concept of applicability, of the pure semantic theory, is both of crucial importance and largely ignored

A plea for a modal realist epistemology

David Lewis’s genuine modal realism postulates the existence of concrete possible worlds that are spatio-temporally discontinuous with the concrete world we inhabit. How, then, can we have modal knowledge? How can we know that there are possible worlds and how can we know the characters of those worlds

Truths qua Grounds

A number of philosophers have recently found it congenial to talk in terms of grounding. Grounding discourse features grounding sentences that are answers to questions about what grounds what. The goal of this article is to explore and defend a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of grounding discourse. We are familiar with David Lewis's applications of the method of counterpart theory to de re modal discourse. Counterpart-theoretic interpretations of de re modal idioms and grounding sentences share similar motivations, mechanisms, and applications. I shall explain my motivations and describe two applications of a counterpart theory for grounding discourse. But, in this article, my main focus is on counterpart-theoretic mechanisms

Expectation Biases and Context Management with Negative Polar Questions

This paper examines distinctive discourse properties of preposed negative 'yes/no' questions (NPQs), such as 'Isn’t Jane coming too?'. Unlike with other 'yes/no' questions, using an NPQ '∼p?' invariably conveys a bias toward a particular answer, where the polarity of the bias is opposite of the polarity of the question: using the negative question '∼p?' invariably expresses that the speaker previously expected the positive answer p to be correct. A prominent approach—what I call the context-management approach, developed most extensively by Romero and Han (2004)—attempts to capture speaker expectation biases by treating NPQs fundamentally as epistemic questions about the proper discourse status of a proposition. I raise challenges for existing context-managing accounts to provide more adequate formalizations of the posited context-managing content, its implementation in the compositional semantics and discourse dynamics, and its role in generating the observed biases. New data regarding discourse differences between NPQs and associated epistemic modal questions are introduced. I argue that we can capture the roles of NPQs in expressing speakers’ states of mind and managing the discourse common ground without positing special context-managing operators or treating NPQs as questions directly about the context. I suggest that we treat the operator introduced with preposed negation as having an ordinary semantics of epistemic necessity, though lexically associated with a general kind of endorsing use observed with modal expressions. The expressive and context-managing roles of NPQs are explained in terms of a general kind of discourse-oriented use of context-sensitive language. The distinctive expectation biases and discourse properties observed with NPQs are derived from the proposed semantics and a general principle of Discourse Relevance

The Quinean Roots of Lewis's Humeanism

An odd dissensus between confident metaphysicians and neopragmatist antimetaphysicians pervades early twenty-first century analytic philosophy. Each faction is convinced their side has won the day, but both are mistaken about the philosophical legacy of the twentieth century. More historical awareness is needed to overcome the current dissensus. Lewis and his possible-world system are lionised by metaphysicians; Quine’s pragmatist scruples about heavy-duty metaphysics inspire antimetaphysicians. But Lewis developed his system under the influence of his teacher Quine, inheriting from him his empiricism, his physicalism, his metaontology, and, I will show in this paper, also his Humeanism. Using published as well as never-before-seen unpublished sources, I will make apparent that both heavy-duty metaphysicians and neopragmatist antimetaphysicians are wrong about the roles Quine and Lewis played in the development of twentieth-century philosophy. The two are much more alike than is commonly supposed, and Quine much more instrumental to the pedigree of current metaphysics

Weak and Strong Necessity Modals: On Linguistic Means of Expressing "A Primitive Concept OUGHT"

This paper develops an account of the meaning of `ought', and the distinction between weak necessity modals (`ought', `should') and strong necessity modals (`must', `have to'). I argue that there is nothing specially ``strong'' about strong necessity modals per se: uses of `Must p' predicate the (deontic/epistemic/etc.) necessity of the prejacent p of the actual world (evaluation world). The apparent ``weakness'' of weak necessity modals derives from their bracketing whether the necessity of the prejacent is verified in the actual world. `Ought p' can be accepted without needing to settle that the relevant considerations (norms, expectations, etc.) that actually apply verify the necessity of p. I call the basic account a modal-past approach to the weak/strong necessity modal distinction (for reasons that become evident). Several ways of implementing the approach in the formal semantics/pragmatics are critically examined. The account systematizes a wide range of linguistic phenomena: it generalizes across flavors of modality; it elucidates a special role that weak necessity modals play in discourse and planning; it captures contrasting logical, expressive, and illocutionary properties of weak and strong necessity modals; and it sheds light on how a notion of `ought' is often expressed in other languages. These phenomena have resisted systematic explanation. In closing I briefly consider how linguistic inquiry into differences among necessity modals may improve theorizing on broader philosophical issues

Many worlds and modality in the interpretation of quantum mechanics: an algebraic approach

Many worlds interpretations (MWI) of quantum mechanics avoid the measurement problem by considering every term in the quantum superposition as actual. A seemingly opposed solution is proposed by modal interpretations (MI) which state that quantum mechanics does not provide an account of what `actually is the case', but rather deals with what `might be the case', i.e. with possibilities. In this paper we provide an algebraic framework which allows us to analyze in depth the modal aspects of MWI. Within our general formal scheme we also provide a formal comparison between MWI and MI, in particular, we provide a formal understanding of why --even though both interpretations share the same formal structure-- MI fall pray of Kochen-Specker (KS) type contradictions while MWI escape them.Comment: submitted to the Journal of Mathematical Physic