The illusion of control: influencing factors and underlying psychological processes.

The illusion of control refers to the overestimation of the probability of a win following a personal action in a gambling game. This thesis identifies gaps in the body of literature on factors influencing the illusion, uses a theoretically motivated methodology to address them, and tests the theory underlying the methodology. The thesis consists of a literature review and three papers. The review focuses on factors found to influence the illusion – factors such as the number of response options available in the gambling task, the degree of need for money, the average frequency of successes/wins in a sequence of rounds, and success-slope (i.e., whether wins are concentrated at the beginning or end of the sequence). The review draws attention to problems with the way the illusion of control has been measured in studies of success-frequency and success-slope. This observation, in turn, raises questions as to whether success-frequency and success-slope are, indeed, factors that influence the illusion. The review goes on to discuss the psychological processes underlying the effects of various influencing factors. Two relatively unexplored arguments are advanced. The first is that people in gambling tasks engage in problem-solving. Problem-solving involves searching for actions that bring about the desired outcome, which, in gambling settings, is a substantial monetary win. The greater the number of available response options and the need for money, the more likely the player is to still be searching for effective actions at the time that her perceived control is measured. Such a player is, in turn, less likely to report having 'no control' over the task. A second and related argument is that the actions people consider during problem-solving are influenced by their beliefs about the task at hand. In gambling, beliefs in the gambler's fallacy (Oskarsson et al., 2009) and beliefs about supernatural agents such as luck and God (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004) are particularly relevant. In line with terminology used by Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982), it is proposed that the illusion of control has two variants, primary and secondary, influenced by the gambler's fallacy and beliefs in supernatural agents respectively. The first two papers describe re-examinations of the effects of success-frequency (N = 97) and success-slope (N = 334) using a methodology consistent with the above explanation. Like most studies of these two factors, the experiments involved a gambling session under a particular success-frequency or success-slope condition, followed by a post-experimental questionnaire about the degree of perceived control over task outcomes. The novel aspects of the methodology included, for example, the separate measurement of the illusion's two variants. Success-frequency was found not to influence the illusion of control when it was measured in this way, while the influence of success-slope was confirmed, in that an 'ascending slope' (a concentration of wins at the end of the sequence) was found to be associated with higher illusory primary control. The finding regarding success-slopes suggests that people expected to learn the correct way of playing through trial-and-error, which is consistent with the above argument that people engage in problem-solving when gambling. The third paper describes a confirmatory factor analysis of a survey about erroneous gambling-related beliefs (N = 329). Items were based on interviews with people who gamble regularly, and, therefore, represented illusions of control – problem-solving solutions based on some playing experience. Consistently with the second argument presented above, the factor analysis showed that the items could be described in terms of two latent factors reflecting the gambler's fallacy and beliefs about supernatural agents, respectively.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, School of Psychology, 2013

Reusable Knowledge-based Components for Building Software Applications: A Knowledge Modelling Approach

In computer science, different types of reusable components for building software applications were proposed as a direct consequence of the emergence of new software programming paradigms. The success of these components for building applications depends on factors such as the flexibility in their combination or the facility for their selection in centralised or distributed environments such as internet. In this article, we propose a general type of reusable component, called primitive of representation, inspired by a knowledge-based approach that can promote reusability. The proposal can be understood as a generalisation of existing partial solutions that is applicable to both software and knowledge engineering for the development of hybrid applications that integrate conventional and knowledge based techniques. The article presents the structure and use of the component and describes our recent experience in the development of real-world applications based on this approach

From “Oh, OK” to “Ah, yes” to “Aha!”: Hyper-systemizing and the rewards of insight\ud

Hyper-systemizers are individuals displaying an unusually strong bias toward systemizing, i.e. toward explaining events and solving problems by appeal to mechanisms that do not involve intentions or agency. Hyper-systemizing in combination with deficit mentalizing ability typically presents clinically as an autistic spectrum disorder; however, the development of hyper-systemizing in combination with normal-range mentalizing ability is not well characterized. Based on a review and synthesis of clinical, observational, experimental, and neurofunctional studies, it is hypothesized that repeated episodes of insightful problem solving by systemizing result in attentional and motivational sensitization toward further systemizing via progressive and chronic deactivation of the default network. This hypothesis is distinguished from alternatives, and its correlational and causal implications are discussed. Predictions of the default-deactivation model accessible to survey-based instruments, standard cognitive measures and neurofunctional methods are outlined, and evidence pertaining to them considered

Removing opportunities to calculate improves students' performance on subsequent word problems.

BackgroundIn two studies we investigated whether removing opportunities to calculate could improve students' subsequent ability to solve similar word problems. Students were first asked to write explanations for three word-problems that they thought would help another student understand the problems. Half of the participants explained typical word problems (i.e., problems with enough information to make calculating an answer possible), while the other half explained the same problems with numbers removed, making calculating an answer impossible. We hypothesized that removing opportunities to calculate would induce students to think relationally about the word problems, which would result in higher levels of performance on subsequent transfer problems.ResultsIn both studies, participants who explained the non-calculable problems performed significantly better on the transfer test than participants who explained the typical (i.e., calculable) problems. This was so in spite of the manipulation not fully suppressing students' desire to calculate. Many students in the non-calculable group explicitly stated that they needed numbers in order to answer the question or made up numbers with which to calculate. There was a significant, positive relationship between the frequency with which students made up numbers and their self-reported mathematics anxiety.ConclusionsWe hypothesized that the mechanism at play was a reduction in instrumental thinking (and an increase in relational thinking). Interventions designed to help students remediate prior mathematical failure should perhaps focus less on the specific skills students are lacking, and more on the dispositions they bring to the task of "doing mathematics.

Helping behaviour during cooperative learning and learning gains

Is helping behaviour (i.e., solicited help and peer tutoring) during cooperative learning (CL) related to subsequent learning gains? And can teachers influence pupils’ helping behaviour? One hundred one 5th grade pupils from multiethnic schools, 10-12 years old, participated in the study. Forty two pupils (31 immigrant) worked in an experimental condition, characterized by the stimulation of solicited high quality help and 59 (24 immigrant) worked in a control condition. It was found that learning gains were predicted positively by pupils’ unsolicited helping behaviour (i.e., peer tutoring) and negatively by solicited help. Furthermore, teachers were able to affect pupils’ low quality solicited help only. Lastly, immigrant pupils used less helping behaviour than local pupils, irrespective of CL setting

Representational task formats and problem solving strategies in kinematics and work

Previous studies have reported that students employed different problem solving approaches when presented with the same task structured with different representations. In this study, we explored and compared students’ strategies as they attempted tasks from two topical areas, kinematics and work. Our participants were 19 engineering students taking a calculus-based physics course. The tasks were presented in linguistic, graphical, and symbolic forms and requested either a qualitative solution or a value. The analysis was both qualitative and quantitative in nature focusing principally on the characteristics of the strategies employed as well as the underlying reasoning for their applications. A comparison was also made for the same student’s approach with the same kind of representation across the two topics. Additionally, the participants’ overall strategies across the different tasks, in each topic, were considered. On the whole, we found that the students prefer manipulating equations irrespective of the representational format of the task. They rarely recognized the applicability of a ‘‘qualitative’’ approach to solve the problem although they were aware of the concepts involved. Even when the students included visual representations in their solutions, they seldom used these representations in conjunction with the mathematical part of the problem. Additionally, the students were not consistent in their approach for interpreting and solving problems with the same kind of representation across the two topical areas. The representational format, level of prior knowledge, and familiarity with a topic appeared to influence their strategies, their written responses, and their ability to recognize qualitative ways to attempt a problem. The nature of the solution does not seem to impact the strategies employed to handle the problem