773 research outputs found
Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies
The efficient design of networks has been an important engineering task that
involves challenging combinatorial optimization problems. Typically, a network
designer has to select among several alternatives which links to establish so
that the resulting network satisfies a given set of connectivity requirements
and the cost of establishing the network links is as low as possible. The
Minimum Spanning Tree problem, which is well-understood, is a nice example.
In this paper, we consider the natural scenario in which the connectivity
requirements are posed by selfish users who have agreed to share the cost of
the network to be established according to a well-defined rule. The design
proposed by the network designer should now be consistent not only with the
connectivity requirements but also with the selfishness of the users.
Essentially, the users are players in a so-called network design game and the
network designer has to propose a design that is an equilibrium for this game.
As it is usually the case when selfishness comes into play, such equilibria may
be suboptimal. In this paper, we consider the following question: can the
network designer enforce particular designs as equilibria or guarantee that
efficient designs are consistent with users' selfishness by appropriately
subsidizing some of the network links? In an attempt to understand this
question, we formulate corresponding optimization problems and present positive
and negative results.Comment: 30 pages, 7 figure
On the effectiveness of connection tolls in fair cost facility location games
We investigate the effectiveness of tolls to reduce the inefficiency of Nash equilibria in the classical fair cost facility location game. In this game, every terminal corresponds to a selfish player who wants to connect to some facility at minimum cost. The cost of a player is determined by the connection cost to the chosen facility plus an equal share of its opening cost. We are interested in the problem of imposing tolls on the connections to induce a socially optimal Nash equilibrium such that the total amount of tolls is minimized. It turns out that this problem is challenging to solve even for simple special cases. We provide polynomial-time algorithms for (i) instances with two facilities, and (ii) instances with a constant number of facilities arranged as a star. Our algorithm for (ii) exploits a relation between our tolling problem and a novel bipartite matching problem without crossings, which we prove to be NP-hard
Bargaining Mechanisms for One-Way Games
We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in
large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated
supply-chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of
some player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on
actions taken by other players. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way
games without payments and the social cost of any ex-post efficient mechanism,
can be far from the optimum. We also show that it is impossible to design a
Bayes-Nash incentive-compatible mechanism for one-way games that is
budget-balanced, individually rational, and efficient. To address this negative
result, we propose a privacy-preserving mechanism that is incentive-compatible
and budget-balanced, satisfies ex-post individual rationality conditions, and
produces an outcome which is more efficient than the equilibrium without
payments. The mechanism is based on a single-offer bargaining and we show that
a randomized multi-offer extension brings no additional benefit.Comment: An earlier, shorter version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of
the Twenty-Fourth International joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI) 201
Modeling endogenous learning and imperfect competition effects in climate change economics
In this two-part paper we evaluate the effect of "endogenizingâ technological learning and strategic behavior of agents in economic models used to assess climate change policies. In the first part we show the potential impact of R&D policies or demonstration and deployment (D&D) programs in the context of stringent stabilization scenarios. In the second part we show how game-theoretic methods can be implemented in climate change economic models to take into account three types of strategic interactions: (i) the market power of the countries benefiting from very low abatement costs on international markets for CO2 emissions, (ii) the strategic behavior of governments in the domestic allocation of CO2 emissions quotas, and (iii) the non-cooperative behavior of countries and regions in the burden sharing of CO2 concentration stabilization. The two topics of endogenous learning and game-theoretic approach to economic modeling are two manifestations of the need to take into account the strategic behavior of agents in the evaluation of climate change policies. In the first case an R&D policy or a demonstration and deployment (D&D) program are put in place in order to attain a cost reduction through the learning effect; in the second case the agents (countries) reply optimally to the actions decided by the other agents by exploiting their strategic advantages. Simulations based on integrated assessment models illustrate the approaches. These studies have been conducted under the Swiss NCCR-Climate progra
Coordination and Conflict: The Persistent Relevance of Networks in International Financial Regulation
This thesis presents SiGe(C)/Si(C) multi quantum well (MQW) layers individually or in combination with Si(C) Schottky diodes as material structures to detect infrared (IR) radiation. The performance of devices was investigated in terms of SiGe/Si periodicity and quality of SiGe/Si interface. The structures were grown by chemical vapour deposition using GeH4 and SiH4 sources at 650 °C and processed into pixel arrays with sizes of 25Ă25, 100Ă100 and 200Ă200 ÎŒm2. The device response to thermal variations was expressed by temperature coefficient of resistance (TCR) and the signal-to-noise-ratio was evaluated by noise measurements. The strain relaxation in SiGe layers was investigated by implementing oxygen at the interface of SiGe/Si or during SiGe growth. A minor amount of 10 ppb oxygen at the interface can be detected by noise measurements while the material characterizations could reveal defects for significantly higher defect density. Oxygen and water contaminations should be accounted for in low temperature epitaxy (350-650 °C) of the layers. Furthermore, an empirical model was developed to describe the kinetics of the SiGe growth using Si2H6 and Ge2H6 as precursors at low temperature. The model takes into account the energy for dissociation of gas molecules, diffusion of the molecules from the gas boundaries toward the substrate and the incorporation of absorbed molecules. A good consistency was observed between the experimental and calculated data.QC 20150211</p
Efficiency and complexity of price competition among single-product vendors
Motivated by recent progress on pricing in the AI literature, we study marketplaces that contain multiple vendors offering identical or similar products and unit-demand buyers with different valuations on these vendors. The objective of each vendor is to set the price of its product to a fixed value so that its profit is maximized. The profit depends on the vendor's price itself and the total volume of buyers that find the particular price more attractive than the price of the vendor's competitors. We model the behavior of buyers and vendors as a two-stage full-information game and study a series of questions related to the existence, efficiency (price of anarchy) and computational complexity of equilibria in this game. To overcome situations where equilibria do not exist or exist but are highly inefficient, we consider the scenario where some of the vendors are subsidized in order to keep prices low and buyers highly satisfied
Price Floors for Emissions Trading
Price floors in greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes can have advantages for technological innovation, price volatility, and management of cost uncertainty, but implementation has potential pitfalls. We argue that the best mechanism for implementing a price floor is to have firms pay an extra fee or tax. This has budgetary advantages and is more compatible with international permit trading than alternative approaches that dominate the academic and policy debate. The fee approach can also be used to implement more general hybrid approaches to emissions pricing.Price Floor, Price Ceiling, Carbon Tax, Emissions Trading, Carbon Pricing, Price and Quantity Controls, Waxman-Markey Bill
Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination
This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a profitable way. If the incumbent benefits from customer inertia, then it has an incentive to insist in the highest possible access markup even if access charges are reciprocal and even in the absence of actual switching costs. If instead the entrant benefits from customer activism, then foreclosure is profitable only when switching costs are large enough.Access Pricing, Entry Deterrence, Interconnection, Network Competition, Two-way Access
Identification of Options and Policy Instruments for the Internalisation of External Costs of Electricity Generation. Dissemination of External Costs of Electricity Supply Making Electricity External Costs Known to Policy-Makers MAXIMA
In the present paper, after reviewing the results of the ExternE project and its follow-up stages in the estimation of the external costs of electricity production, we look at the policy instruments for the internalisation of such costs. Emphasis is given to subsidies, such as feed-in tariffs, competitive bidding processes and tradable green certificates to stimulate the use of renewables in the production of electricity. When policy-makers are asked to choose the instrument(s) to internalise the externalities in the electricity production, they have to find a solution that gives the best outcome in terms of efficiency, cost minimisation, impact on the job market, security of energy supply, equity of the instrument, technological innovation, certainty of the level of the internalisation, and feasibility. The choice of the instrument will require some trade-offs among these criteria. Conjoint choice analysis can help in investigating how stakeholders and policy makers trade off the criteria when choosing a policy for the internalisation of the externalities. In this paper we present the first results of a questionnaire that employs conjoint choice questions to find out how policy makers and stakeholders of the electricity market trade off some socio-economic aspects in the selection of the policy instruments for the internalisation of the externalities. The results of this first set of interviews will be useful for further research.Policy instruments, ExternE, External costs, Electricity, Conjoint choice analysis
Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: a Survey and a Look Forward
URL des Documents de travail : http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/cesdp2016.htmlDocuments de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2016.58 - ISSN : 1955-611XWe provide a survey of the micro and macro economics of climate change from a complexity science perspective and we discuss the challenges ahead for this line of research. We identify four areas of the literature where complex system models have already produced valuable insights: (i) coalition formation and climate negotiations, (ii) macroeconomic impacts of climate-related events, (iii) energy markets and (iv) diffusion of climate-friendly technologies. On each of these issues, accounting for heterogeneity, interactions and disequilibrium dynamics provides a complementary and novel perspective to the one of standard equilibrium models. Furthermore, it highlights the potential economic benefits of mitigation and adaptation policies and the risk of under-estimating systemic climate change-related risks
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