1,820 research outputs found
Average-energy games
Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to
synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within
an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games,
where the objective is to optimize the long-run average gain per action, and
energy games, where the system has to avoid running out of energy.
We study average-energy games, where the goal is to optimize the long-run
average of the accumulated energy. We show that this objective arises naturally
in several applications, and that it yields interesting connections with
previous concepts in the literature. We prove that deciding the winner in such
games is in NP inter coNP and at least as hard as solving mean-payoff games,
and we establish that memoryless strategies suffice to win. We also consider
the case where the system has to minimize the average-energy while maintaining
the accumulated energy within predefined bounds at all times: this corresponds
to operating with a finite-capacity storage for energy. We give results for
one-player and two-player games, and establish complexity bounds and memory
requirements.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2015, arXiv:1509.0685
Optimal Reachability in Divergent Weighted Timed Games
Weighted timed games are played by two players on a timed automaton equipped
with weights: one player wants to minimise the accumulated weight while
reaching a target, while the other has an opposite objective. Used in a
reactive synthesis perspective, this quantitative extension of timed games
allows one to measure the quality of controllers. Weighted timed games are
notoriously difficult and quickly undecidable, even when restricted to
non-negative weights. Decidability results exist for subclasses of one-clock
games, and for a subclass with non-negative weights defined by a semantical
restriction on the weights of cycles. In this work, we introduce the class of
divergent weighted timed games as a generalisation of this semantical
restriction to arbitrary weights. We show how to compute their optimal value,
yielding the first decidable class of weighted timed games with negative
weights and an arbitrary number of clocks. In addition, we prove that
divergence can be decided in polynomial space. Last, we prove that for untimed
games, this restriction yields a class of games for which the value can be
computed in polynomial time
Limit Your Consumption! Finding Bounds in Average-energy Games
Energy games are infinite two-player games played in weighted arenas with
quantitative objectives that restrict the consumption of a resource modeled by
the weights, e.g., a battery that is charged and drained. Typically, upper
and/or lower bounds on the battery capacity are part of the problem
description. Here, we consider the problem of determining upper bounds on the
average accumulated energy or on the capacity while satisfying a given lower
bound, i.e., we do not determine whether a given bound is sufficient to meet
the specification, but if there exists a sufficient bound to meet it.
In the classical setting with positive and negative weights, we show that the
problem of determining the existence of a sufficient bound on the long-run
average accumulated energy can be solved in doubly-exponential time. Then, we
consider recharge games: here, all weights are negative, but there are recharge
edges that recharge the energy to some fixed capacity. We show that bounding
the long-run average energy in such games is complete for exponential time.
Then, we consider the existential version of the problem, which turns out to be
solvable in polynomial time: here, we ask whether there is a recharge capacity
that allows the system player to win the game.
We conclude by studying tradeoffs between the memory needed to implement
strategies and the bounds they realize. We give an example showing that memory
can be traded for bounds and vice versa. Also, we show that increasing the
capacity allows to lower the average accumulated energy.Comment: In Proceedings QAPL'16, arXiv:1610.0769
Multiplayer Cost Games with Simple Nash Equilibria
Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of
distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually
neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum
games. We study such games and show that a large class of these games,
including games where the individual objectives are mean- or discounted-payoff,
or quantitative reachability, and show that they do not only have a solution,
but a simple solution. We establish the existence of Nash equilibria that are
composed of k memoryless strategies for each agent in a setting with k agents,
one main and k-1 minor strategies. The main strategy describes what happens
when all agents comply, whereas the minor strategies ensure that all other
agents immediately start to co-operate against the agent who first deviates
from the plan. This simplicity is important, as rational agents are an
idealisation. Realistically, agents have to decide on their moves with very
limited resources, and complicated strategies that require exponential--or even
non-elementary--implementations cannot realistically be implemented. The
existence of simple strategies that we prove in this paper therefore holds a
promise of implementability.Comment: 23 page
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