Gradualism in Dynamic Agenda Formation

We analyze a dynamic model of agenda formation in which players compete in each period to put their ideal policies on the agenda. In each period, with some probability, a decision maker is called upon to take an action from the agenda. We show that in any Markov equilibrium of this game, players with extreme ideal policies will always compete to be in the agenda. On the other hand, there is a positive probability that in each round a more moderate policy will arise on the agenda. Therefore, agenda formation is a gradual process which evolves to include better policies for the decision maker but at a relatively slow pace.

Deciding on what to decide

Altres ajuts: financial support by MOVE for a research stage at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.We study two-stage collective decision-making procedures where in the first stage, part of the voters decide what issues will be put in the agenda and in the second stage, the whole set of voters decides on the positions to be adopted regarding the issues that are in the agenda. Using a protocol-free equilibrium concept, we show that essentially any set of issues can be obtained as an equilibrium agenda under two salient classes of voting procedures. Moreover, the chair may manipulate a sequential voting rule such that certain issues do not get to the floor

Sequential voting and agenda manipulation

We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. Moreover, our characterizations of the attainable outcomes for arbitrary quotas allow us to compare the possibilities for manipulation across different quotas. It turns out that the simple majority quota maximizes the domain of preference profiles for which neither procedure is manipulable, but at the same time neither the simple majority quota nor any other quota uniformly minimizes the scope of manipulation once this becomes possible. Hence, quite surprisingly, simple majority voting is not necessarily the optimal choice of a society that is concerned about agenda manipulation

Bargaining over an endogenous agenda

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the policies that can be implemented from any initial default in a pure-strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for an interesting class of environments including multidimensional and infinite policy spaces. It is convenient to start by characterizing the set of immovable policies that are implemented, once reached as default. These policies form a weakly stable set and, conversely, any weakly stable set is supported by some equilibrium. Using these results, we show that minimum-winning coalitions may not form and that a player who does not propose may nevertheless earn all of the surplus from agreement. We then consider how equilibrium outcomes change as we vary the order in which players propose, the identity of proposers, and the set of winning coalitions. First, if the policy space is well ordered, then the committee implements the ideal policy of the last proposer in a subset of a weakly stable set, but this result does not generalize to other cases. We also show, surprisingly, that a player may prefer not to be given the opportunity to propose and that the set of immovable policies may shrink as the quota increases. Finally, we derive conditions under which immovable policies in semi-Markovian equilibria form a consistent choice set

Endogenous agenda formation processes with the one-deviation property

Peer reviewe

The Politics of Bargaining as a Group

We develop a dynamic model in which a group collectively bargains with an external party. At each date the group makes an offer to the external party (the "agent") in exchange for a concession. Group members hold heterogeneous preferences over agreements and are uncertain about the agent’s resolve. We show that all group members favor more aggressive proposals than they would if they were negotiating alone. By eliciting more information about the agent’s resolve, these offers reduce the group members’ uncertainty about the agent’s preferences and therefore reduce the group’s internal conflicts over its negotiating strategy. To mitigate the consequent risk that negotiations fail, decisive group members successively give up their influence over proposals: starting from any initially democratic decision process, the group eventually consolidates its entire negotiation authority into the hands of a single member

Ensaio sobre economia política : votação sequencial, alianças partidárias e disciplina partidária

Esta tese apresenta três ensaios sobre economia política. Cada ensaio aborda um tema diferente neste contexto. O primeiro ensaio constrói um modelo de votação sequencial na qual os votantes possuem ideologia (opinião a priori sobre o assunto a ser votado) e desejam votar na opção vencedora. Nossa estrutura pode ser aplicada para avaliar os desafios de um organizador (agenda setter, como o presidente da Câmara dos Deputados) ao decidir a ordem em que os legisladores votarão em uma agenda de grande comoção social (impeachment, por exemplo). Contribuímos para a literatura de votações sequenciais ao incluir, simultaneamente, ideologia (informação privada) e preferência pelo lado vencedor, cujo benefício é incerto. Os resultados analíticos e de simulação mostram que, em geral, o arranjo de maior probabilidade de vitória “Sim” é aquele em que o votante mais propenso ao voto “Sim” ocupa a primeira posição na votação, seguido do menos propenso e finalizado pelo jogador com propensão mediana. Nosso modelo ajuda a lançar luz no debate sobre a ordem de votação do impeachment de Dilma Roussef na Câmara dos Deputados, dirigido pelo então presidente da casa, Eduardo Cunha. O segundo ensaio desenvolve uma teoria sobre alianças eleitorais, assumindo que os partidos maiores (cabeça de chapa) são office seekers (ou pragmáticos, desejando a vitória na eleição). A ideologia (plataforma políticas anunciadas durante a campanha e implementadas em caso de vitória), por sua vez, afeta seu payoff indiretamente, através da perda de base eleitoral. Contribuímos com a escassa literatura teórica sobre o assunto ao permitir que, ao disputar o apoio de um partido menor, os maiores ofereçam tanto transferências (cargos, recursos monetários, prestígio, etc) quanto aproximação ideológica via plataforma política. Os equilíbrios encontrados em nosso modelo nos mostram que partidos cujos eleitores são “mais ideológicos”, em geral, ofertam relativamente mais transferências ao partido menor, como um resultado da sua menor aproximção política. Os resultados ajudam a entender o padrão de alianças políticas de alguns dos maiores partidos políticos brasileiros, bem como lança luz em uma das potenciais razões de um dos maiores escândalos de corrupção recentes. O terceiro ensaio apresenta um modelo microfundamentado de disciplina partidária, no qual estudamos sob quais condições partidos políticos têm maior sucesso em fazer com que seus membros sigam a orientação de voto do líder. Por meio de um jogo dinâmico de informação completa e imperfeita, no qual os políticos buscam maximizar (exclusivamente) sua chance de reeleição e partidos desejam maximizar o número de deputados reeleitos, com uma preferência para aqueles disciplinados, mostramos que, em geral, existe maior chance de equilíbrios com disciplina quando: (i) disciplina partidária tiver um peso grande no payoff do partido; (ii) a popularidade do projeto a ser votado for baixa; e (iii) a importância do cargo a ser alocado a um dos deputados é pequena. Além disso, o carisma dos deputados possui um papel fundamental no nível de controle que grupos políticos possuem sobre seus membros. Nossos resultados fornecem microfundamentos para muitos das evidências empíricas encontradas na literatura.This thesis presents three essays on political economy. Each essay addresses a different theme in this context. The first essay builds a sequential voting model in which voters have ideology (a priori opinion on the subject to be voted on) and wish to vote for the winning option. Our framework can be applied to assess an organizer’s challenges (agenda-setter, such as the president of the Congress) when deciding the order in which legislators will vote on an agenda of great social commotion (impeachment, for example). We contribute to the literature on sequential voting by simultaneously including ideology (private information) and preference for the winning side, whose benefit is uncertain. The analytical and simulation results shows that, in general, the arrangement with the highest probability of winning “Yes” is the one in which the voter most likely to vote “Yes” occupies the first position in the vote, followed by the least likely and finalized by the player with a median propensity. Our model helps to elucidate the debate on the voting order for the impeachment of Dilma Roussef in the Chamber of Deputies, directed by then president of the house, Eduardo Cunha. The second essay develops a theory about electoral alliances, assuming that the larger parties (head of the ticket) are office-seekers (or pragmatists, desiring victory in the election). Ideology (policy platform announced during the campaign and implemented in case of victory), in turn, affects its payoff indirectly, through the loss of electoral base. Due to lack of literature our contribution is on the subject by allowing that, when disputing the support of a smaller party, the larger ones offer both transfers (positions, monetary resources, prestige, etc.) The balances found in our model show us that parties whose voters are “more ideological’, in general, offer relatively more transfers. to the smaller party, as a result of its lesser political approach. The results help to understand the pattern of political alliances of some of the largest Brazilian political parties, as well as elucidate one of the potential reasons for one of the biggest recent corruption scandals. The third essay presents a micro-grounded model of party discipline, in which we study under what conditions political parties are most successful in getting their members to follow the leader’s voting guidance. Through a dynamic game of complete and perfect information, in which politicians seek to maximize (exclusively) their chance of reelection and parties wish to maximize the number of deputies re-elected, with a preference for disciplined ones, shows that, in general, there is a greater chance of balance with discipline when: (i) party discipline has a great weight in the party payoff; (ii) the popularity of the project to be voted on is low; and (iii) the importance of the position to be allocated to one of the deputies is small. Furthermore, the charisma of deputies plays a fundamental role in the level of control that political groups have over their members. Our results provide micro-foundations for much of the empirical evidence found in the literature